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ABSTRACT 
   
The jobless recovery of the Great Recession has led policymakers and citizens 
alike to ask what can be done to better protect regions from the cascading effects of an 
economic downturn. Economic growth strategies that aim to redevelop a waterfront for 
tourism or attract high growth companies to the area, for example, have left regions 
vulnerable by consolidating resources in just a few industry sectors or parts of town. A 
promising answer that coincided with growing interest in regional innovation policy has 
been to promote entrepreneurship for bottom-up, individual-led regional development. 
However, these policies have also failed to maximize the potential for bottom-up 
development by focusing on high skill entrepreneurs and high tech industry sectors, such 
as green energy and nanotechnology.  
This dissertation uses the extended case method to determine whether industry 
cluster theory can be usefully extended from networks of high skill innovators to 
entrepreneurs in traditional trades. It uses U.S. Census data and in-person interviews in 
cluster and non-cluster neighborhoods in Dayton, Ohio to assess whether traditional 
entrepreneurs cluster and whether social networks explain high rates of neighborhood 
self-employment. Entrepreneur interviews are also conducted in Raleigh, North Carolina 
to explore regional resilience by comparing the behavior of traditional entrepreneurs in 
the ascendant tech-hub region of Raleigh and stagnant Rustbelt region of Dayton.  
The quantitative analysis documents, for the first time, a minor degree of 
neighborhood-level entrepreneur clustering. In interviews, entrepreneurs offered clear 
examples of social networks that resemble those shown to make regional clusters 
successful, and they helped clarify that a slightly larger geography may reveal more 
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clustering. Comparing Raleigh and Dayton entrepreneurs, the study found few 
differences in their behavior to explain the regions’ differing long-term economic trends. 
However, charitable profit-seeking and trial and error learning are consistent behaviors 
that may distinguish traditional, small scale entrepreneurs from larger export-oriented 
business owners and contribute to a region’s ability to withstand recessions and other 
shocks. The research informs growing policy interest in bottom-up urban development by 
offering qualitative evidence for how local mechanics, seamstresses, lawn care businesses 
and many others can be regional assets. Future research should use larger entrepreneur 
samples to systematically test the relationship between entrepreneur resilience behaviors 
to regional economic outcomes.    
  
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
   
This degree took five years to complete. My sister remarked that I have been in 
school for her daughter’s entire life. Many of those who have been with me since the 
beginning of this process can probably relate to that feeling. So many professors, friends 
and family made this possible, and each of you has made all the difference. I want to 
thank Erik Johnston and Yushim Kim, who as mentors and friends always renewed my 
interest in complexity science and in becoming a member of this unique world of 
academics. A special thanks to Erik for his endless encouragement and unwavering faith 
in me. I am grateful to my committee chair Jeff Chapman for his efficiency and humor in 
guiding me through this process, his wisdom will be sorely missed at the University in his 
retirement. Thank you to Nancy Jurik who brought knowledge without agenda to ensure 
that I pursed the research that was meaningful to me. I could not have asked for anything 
more. 
There are countless professors and colleagues who offered me their time and 
advice and I am amazed by their generosity: Matthew Chesnes, Kanisha Bond, Carol 
DeVita, Eric Twombly, Joanna Lucio, Tom Catlaw, John Hall, Jim Svara, Marco 
Janssen, Marty Anderies, Bill Griffin, Danielle Wallace, Eric Hedberg, and many others 
who, I regret, cannot all be mentioned by name. This research was supported by the 
School of Public Affairs at Arizona State University. It was also supported by the Office 
of the Vice-President for Research and Economic Affairs, the Graduate Research Support 
Program, and the Graduate College. I am grateful to the funders and especially to the 
department administrators who helped me obtain these much-needed grants and 
scholarships. A very heartfelt thanks to the 27 entrepreneurs who agreed to be part of this 
iv 
 
study, it was a pleasure and honor to get to know them. Lastly, I thank my Mom and Dad 
who continue to teach me everything I need to know.  
  
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... V 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... VIII 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ X 
CHAPTER ...........................................................................................................................1 
1 - INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................1 
Overview ..................................................................................................................1 
Importance of the Research to Public Policy ...........................................................4 
2 – BACKGROUND ...........................................................................................................8 
Methodology and Methods ......................................................................................8 
Entrepreneurs and Clusters ....................................................................................12 
Traditional Entrepreneurs Defined ........................................................................18 
Firm structure. ...................................................................................................19 
Local services ....................................................................................................20 
Motivations and outcomes .................................................................................22 
Role in economic development .........................................................................24 
Regional Resilience and Entrepreneurs .................................................................26 
Traditional Entrepreneurs and Economic Development Policy.............................28 
3 - NEIGHBORHOOD CLUSTERING AND TRADITIONAL ENTREPRENEURS ....33 
The Literature.........................................................................................................33 
An economic theory of clustering. ....................................................................34 
vi 
 
CHAPTER                                                                                                                      Page 
Empirical evidence of clustering. ......................................................................43 
Neighborhood clustering. ..................................................................................47 
Quantitative Methods and Analytic Tactics ...........................................................53 
Data sources. .....................................................................................................53 
Working class neighborhoods. ..........................................................................55 
Measure of concentration. .................................................................................59 
Findings from Statistical Analysis .........................................................................61 
Other explanations of clustering. .......................................................................68 
Robustness tests. ................................................................................................71 
Qualitative Methods and Analytic Tactics .............................................................74 
Neighborhood selection. ....................................................................................75 
Interviewee selection. ........................................................................................77 
Findings from the Interviews .................................................................................80 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................99 
4 - TRADITIONAL ENTREPRENEURS AND REGIONAL RESILIENCE ................103 
The Literature.......................................................................................................103 
A framework to study regional resilience. ......................................................104 
Empirical research on regional resilience. ......................................................115 
Traditional entrepreneurs and resilience. ........................................................119 
vii 
 
CHAPTER                                                                                                                      Page 
Research Methods and Analytic Tactics ..............................................................123 
The stagnant manufacturing titan and ascendant tech-hub. ............................123 
Analytic tactics. ...............................................................................................126 
Findings................................................................................................................127 
Conclusion ...........................................................................................................147 
5 –IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION ....................................................................151 
Future Research and Policy Implications of Traditional Entrepreneur Clusters .152 
Future Research and Policy Implications for Regional Resilience ......................158 
Conclusion ...........................................................................................................164 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................166 
APPENDIX ......................................................................................................................181 
1 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS ......................................................................................181 
2 INTERVIEWEES .........................................................................................................183 
3 ENTREPRENEUR SUMMARY STATISTICS ..........................................................186 
4 INTERVIEW PROTOCOL ..........................................................................................188 
5 HUMAN SUBJECTS IRB APPROVAL......................................................................190 
 
  
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table               Page 
 
1-1. Self-Employment by Educational Attainment, 2010 ................................................... 2 
1-2. Rate of New Business Startups by Educational Attainment, 2005-2011 .................... 3 
2-1. Type of Self-Employment by Educational Attainment, 2010 ................................... 20 
2-2. Self-Employment Market by Educational Attainment .............................................. 21 
3-1. Sources of Agglomeration Economies ...................................................................... 34 
3-2. Equivalent terms for the Debate on the Industrial Scope of Agglomeration 
Economies ......................................................................................................................... 38 
3-3. Regional Statistics ..................................................................................................... 55 
3-4. Sample Demographics ............................................................................................... 58 
3-5. Neighborhood Clustering by Type of Worker in All Study Counties ....................... 62 
3-6. Neighborhood Clustering and Regional Population Growth ..................................... 64 
3-7. Neighborhood Clustering and Self-employment Rates at the Regional and 
Neighborhood Level ......................................................................................................... 66 
3-8. Neighborhood Clustering and Self-employment Growth in Working Class 
Neighborhoods .................................................................................................................. 67 
3-9. OLS Model Predicting Neighborhood Self-employment Rate.................................. 70 
3-10. Neighborhood Clustering Over Time ...................................................................... 73 
3-11. 2007* Average Site Characteristics ......................................................................... 76 
3-12. Demographic and Firm Characteristics ................................................................... 78 
3-13. Number of Dayton and Raleigh Interviewees that Discussed a Type of Clustering 
(N=27) ............................................................................................................................... 80 
ix 
 
Table                                                                                                                               Page 
3-14. Percentage of Dayton Interviewees that Discussed a Cluster Type, by 
Neighborhood Type .......................................................................................................... 92 
3-15. Percentage of Dayton Interviewees that Discussed the Network, by Neighborhood
........................................................................................................................................... 93 
4-1. Evidence of Resilience under Different Resilience Frameworks and Types of 
Challenges ....................................................................................................................... 105 
4-2. Demographic Characteristics of the Regions, 2010 ................................................ 124 
4-3. Percentage of Entrepreneurs in Each Region that Described an Explore or Exploit 
Response or an Inter-firm Linkage ................................................................................. 130 
4-4 Percentage of Interviewees that Discussed the Network .......................................... 143 
4-5. Percentage of Entrepreneurs in Each Region that Described a New Firm Behavior
......................................................................................................................................... 145 
 
 
  
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                          Page 
 
2-1. Simplified Cause and Effect Relationships in Agglomeration Theory ..................... 11 
2-2. Simplified Cause and Effect Relationships in Agglomeration Theory - Extended 
Case Approach .................................................................................................................. 12 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 
1 - INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
Entrepreneurs and the spirit of entrepreneurialism represent an enduring 
American value. Over time, names like Ford and Rockefeller have been replaced by 
Dorsey and Zuckerberg, entrepreneurs of the digital age. Today’s policy research on 
entrepreneurship is focused on highly skilled individuals in knowledge-intensive 
industries with the capacity to innovate and catalyze economic growth. Their innovation 
networks and industry clusters are a significant departure from firm-based analyses 
because they suggest that groups of entrepreneurs can be both competitive and 
collaborative. It is within spatially proximate clusters that we find the positive 
externalities associated with agglomeration economies and regional growth. The positive 
externalities of small co-located firms, whether due to entrepreneurial ideas, skills 
diffusion or shared resources, are thought to create an environment ripe for 
entrepreneurship and regional economic growth(Acs & Armington, 2006). 
At the same time, innovation-related research—and commensurate public 
policy—have largely ignored a significant percentage of the self-employed population 
because higher education viewed as a proxy for innovation capacity (Rosenthal & 
Strange, 2004). Over half of the self-employed persons have high school and not college 
degrees, and thus would be missed in studies of entrepreneurship and innovation (see 
Table 1-1). Always alongside the start-ups, spinoffs, and eventual industry titans, have 
been the shop owners and mechanics, the pizzeria and the salon, the artist, the seamstress, 
and scores of other traditional entrepreneurs that comprise the 14 million Americans who 
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have chosen to work for themselves (Hipple, 2010). For generations, these entrepreneurs 
have contributed to a viable and vibrant economy by supplying a needed service to their 
local area, creating their own job, and even creating jobs for others. Yet little is known 
about how self-employed, high school-educated individuals in these traditional trades 
operate as a group and how they contribute to the so-called knowledge-based economy. 
Even within the broader urban affairs literature, the experience of entrepreneurs who do 
not possess college degrees has been confined to ethnic enclaves on the one hand and the 
chronically poor operating in the informal economy on the other (Wacquant, 2008). 
Table 1-1. Self-Employment by Educational Attainment, 2010 
 
Worker type (in thousands) 
Final educational 
attainment 
     Self-employed Not self-employed 
College graduate 5,522 38% 38,288 36% 
High school graduate 
        
7,755  
54% 60,235 56% 
Less than high school 
        
1,196  
8% 8,912 8% 
Total 14,473 100% 107,435 100% 
Source: Hipple, S. (2010). Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey. 
In addition to concerns about innovation, persistent unemployment and stalled 
growth since the mid- 2000s has simulated increasing academic interest in economic 
resilience—minimal disturbance or rapid recovery from downturns—over short term 
growth rates (e.g. Christopherson, Michie, & Tyler, 2010). Self-employment, no matter 
ones education or potential to catalyze large scale growth, is a promising strategy to 
promote resilience to recessions and industrial restructuring because it puts adaptive 
capacity in the hands of more workers. They operate small, sometimes home-based firms 
and are locally oriented; this makes them flexible and more easily aware of changes in 
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local conditions and needs. They also add necessary diversity to the types of businesses 
and human capital in an economic system. Recent data (Table 1-2) show that during the 
Great Recession, entrepreneurship grew the most among those with only a high school 
diploma (Fairlie, 2012). And although the (net) stock of entrepreneurs fell, 
unincorporated businesses, which are more likely to operate informally and without 
employees, have fared significantly better than incorporated ones in terms of remaining 
open (Shane, 2011). Traditional entrepreneurs then, may help regions recover from 
economic shocks or even insulate them from experiencing precipitous decline over the 
long run.  
Table 1-2. Rate of New Business Startups by Educational Attainment, 2005-2011 
 
Entrepreneur Activity 
Year 
High school 
graduate 
College 
graduate 
2005 0.29% 0.29% 
2006 0.29% 0.30% 
2007 0.30% 0.33% 
2008 0.35% 0.31% 
2009 0.38% 0.34% 
2010 0.34% 0.33% 
2011 0.33% 0.29% 
Source: Fairlie, R. (2012). Kauffman Foundation Entrepreneur Activity. 
Note: Entrepreneur activity is the percent of individuals (ages 25 to 64) who do not own a 
business in the first Current Population Survey month, that start a business in the 
following month with fifteen or more hours worked. 
 
This dissertation begins to fill the gap in entrepreneurship research by offering new 
quantitative analysis of census data and qualitative data gathered directly from a sample 
of traditional entrepreneurs. Drawing on insights from innovation and cluster theory, I 
posit that urban neighborhoods are the traditional entrepreneur’s analogy to high skill 
innovation networks. The research asks whether locally-owned firms in areas with a low 
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proportion of college graduates (i.e. working class neighborhoods) generate positive 
externalities akin to the agglomeration effects identified at the regional level. 
Considerable neighborhood research indicates that the economic outcomes of working 
class residents rise and fall together (e.g. Kefalas, 2003; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 
1997), but scholars have not looked at entrepreneurs in this light. Moreover, innovation 
networks rarely include interaction between established and home-based businesses. The 
neighborhood entrepreneur framework is also used to explore the resilience capacity that 
traditional entrepreneurs bring to their neighborhoods and regions. In short, I use mixed 
methods to investigate the following research questions: 
1. To what extent do traditional entrepreneurs cluster and what agglomeration 
(spillover) sources could explain clustering? 
2. In what ways do traditional entrepreneurs contribute to neighborhood or regional 
resilience? 
Importance of the Research to Public Policy 
A better understanding of positive entrepreneur environments for those outside of 
high skill industries has immediate practical policy implications. With just a third of 
workers holding a college diploma (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009), job creation strategies in 
the current model are heavily reliant on a small sector of innovators. This has proven 
limited in its ability to reverse the larger course of the economy over the past five years, 
either through job or production growth. Unemployment remains at nearly eight percent 
and many have dropped out of the labor force, too discouraged to continue looking for a 
job or to create their own (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). The ability to self-employ is 
a unique one. Identifying a need or market opportunity in one’s community and 
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determining how to address it is a valuable type of human capital and an individual and 
community asset. Effective and innovative workforce and economic development 
policies are in high demand. 
In a growing number of policy areas, analysts are evaluating when decentralizing 
decision-making authority from government bureaucrats and policymakers to citizens 
meets policy goals more effectively or less expensively. For example, alternative energy 
sources have led some regions to invest in centralized solar power plants, but a 
decentralized alternative is to subsidize solar energy shingles to embed energy usage and 
awareness within the household  (Hirematha, Shikhab, & Ravindranathb, 2007). In 
transportation, subways and mass transit have long been the solution to congested 
highways, but San Francisco commuters saw a more flexible approach in white-collar 
“hitch-hiking” and the city eventually designated areas where drivers could safely and 
legally pick up passengers (Innes & Booher, 1999). These decentralized solutions are 
advocated by public administration scholars as “smarter” infrastructures for governing 
(Johnston & Hansen, 2011; Kanter & Litow, 2009). 
Decentralizing the micro-foundations of job creation from established companies 
to individual entrepreneurs across all industries is a promising policy strategy for at least 
three reasons. First, entrepreneurs may be a particularly useful mechanism for successful 
regional adaptation to economic change because they have fewer barriers to identifying 
and acting on a course change. Second, neighborhoods are an established foundation on 
which to understand the collective capacity of a broader range of entrepreneurs and they 
allow immediate policy translation because local government redevelopment efforts are 
typically neighborhood-based. Third, using the conventions, theories and language of 
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regional economic development and innovation makes the value of the research more 
immediately understandable to the broader development community. As a result, it 
marries the interests of top-down economic development efforts and empowering bottom-
up, community (neighborhood) development efforts and creates a unified goal. 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I review 
several strands of literature to put the policy focus of this research in context, starting 
with the epistemic perspective and methodology that guide my investigation. Chapters 3 
and 4 are the main data sections. They explain the theoretical framework I use for 
assessing entrepreneur clusters and regional resilience, respectively. Each data chapter 
presents the theory, empirical findings in previous research, data collection and analysis 
methods, and findings, in that order. Chapter 3 is further divided into the data collection 
and findings from a statistical analysis of the American Community Survey (part 1) and 
the data collection and findings interviews with entrepreneurs (part 2), so it is the longest 
chapter. It is also longer because some of the data and analysis processes are introduced 
in Chapter 3 and simply referred to in Chapter 4. Similarly, major definitions and 
concepts (e.g. traditional entrepreneur) are introduced in full in Chapter 2, but referred to 
throughout the dissertation. To limit repetition, I only briefly summarize the process or 
concept in subsequent chapters, but I make note of what chapter includes the fuller 
description and Appendix 1 of the dissertation lists four of the most common concepts. 
The final chapter, Chapter 5, draws conclusions from the findings and focuses on the 
implications and future research that should evolve from this dissertation. 
This dissertation informs public policy that fosters success among this core group 
of workers. Over the next several chapters, I bring together new analysis and primary 
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data collection to increase the breadth and depth of information on traditional 
entrepreneurs. The analysis is supported by prior theorizing and empirical work. It builds 
on what is known about these workers and the phenomena of industry clusters by 
extending current economic development theory. The next chapter offers the reader 
background on entrepreneurship research and economic development. The purpose is to 
provide a big picture view of this interdisciplinary field to better understand the 
contribution my research makes to policy and theory. 
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CHAPTER 
2 – BACKGROUND 
This dissertation ties together three areas of regional development research: 
entrepreneurship, clusters, and resilience. Scholars have begun to link entrepreneurship to 
clusters, and they have explored the relationship between entrepreneurship and regional 
resilience. But no work has combined the three, and I believe it offers a distinct 
advantage in leveraging the entrepreneur spirit from across the skills spectrum. In this 
chapter I explain the extended case approach, my methodology for extending and 
combining current theories. I outline the major lines of inquiry in the two cross-over 
literatures to place my research in the larger context of local and regional economic 
development research. I also introduce the consequent definitions used throughout this 
dissertation, such as entrepreneur and innovation. A review of the theoretical 
underpinnings and empirical evidence more specifically related to clusters and resilience 
is in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. One of my motivations in this research is to further 
opportunities for bottom-up economic development. Therefore I conclude this chapter 
with reflections on how my research contributes to that endeavor.  
Methodology and Methods 
Although the methods—the techniques of data collection—will be familiar to 
most (e.g. interviews), my overall methodology departs from the typical deductive and 
positivist inquiry found in policy-related research. Therefore it is important to discuss the 
methodology at the beginning of the dissertation. The deductive approach reflects the 
scientific method, which starts with an established theory, derives hypotheses and gathers 
data to test that theory. It has been critiqued in the policy sciences for not only failing to 
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develop a useable body of predictive generalizations, but failing to supply effective 
solutions to our most pressing policy problems (Fischer, 1998). There are now several 
post-positivist guides to theory development and data analysis, including the extended 
case approach (Burawoy, 1998, 2009), the embedded case study (Scholz & Tietji, 2002), 
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2003), and theory-driven participant observation 
(Lichterman, 2002). To the ends of policy development, the four approaches are equally 
nascent and promising. Because of its direct applicability, this dissertation uses the 
extended case approach, developed by Michael Burawoy. 
The extended case approach builds on established theory in four sequential ways: 
to guide intervention into the participant’s experience, to understand a social process at 
work, to identify the social forces driving that process, and ultimately to reconstruct the 
theory. As Burawoy notes, reconstructing theory is not often realized in a single study. 
The extended case approach offers a distinctly different goal than strictly positivist social 
science research. The goal of a well-formulated extended case theory is to create 
“reconstructions that leave core postulates intact, that do as well as the preexisting theory 
upon which they are built, and that absorb anomalies with parsimony, offering novel 
angles of vision” (1998, p.16).  In this way, pre-existing theory is “extended” and 
possibly recombined with other theories in order to make it more empirically inclusive 
and therefore useful to the analyst. 
The extended case approach does not reject positivist science. It offers the 
researcher an alternative relationship with subjects in what Burawoy calls, reflexive 
science. Whereas positivist science seeks to distance the analyst and the observed subject 
to increase objectivity and replicability, reflexive science seeks an analyst who will be 
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self-reflective and influenced by the participants’ experience but always grounded by 
theory in his/her new inquiry. The analysis task is similar between the two sciences in 
that researchers must “reduce” to draw conclusions. Positivist science reduces by 
aggregating (hopefully) representative data into generalizable propositions from which to 
draw causal inferences. Reflexive science aggregates the situational knowledge collected 
from a small number of individuals to depict a social process. Therefore, it extracts the 
general from the unique, which allows the analyst to take into account more causal 
complexities, moving from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro’ and “connect[ing] the present to 
the past in anticipation of the future” (Burawoy, 1998, p.5). 
Burawoy describes positivist and reflexive science as Siamese twins, each born 
from a shortfall in the other. Positivist science fails to account for the macro context in 
which individuals are embedded by attempting to “hold constant” many aspects of the 
participant’s environment. On the other hand, in reflexive science’s aim to embrace 
context and dialogue with a participant, it cannot control for power dynamics that 
naturally exist between the analyst and participant and that influence the information 
offered. As a result, reflexive and positivist science are complementary in the extended 
case approach and the researcher should determine how best to balance their shortfalls.  
In this dissertation, I use some positivist methods to complement an overarching 
reflexive inquiry. As I will describe, the two-part study uses increasingly reflexive 
science with each component. Figure 2-1 shows the basic components of agglomeration 
theory. The theory posits that some degree of co-location among firms of a particular 
type, usually thought to be regional connections among small and large firms in the same 
industry, results in positive externalities and cost reduction, that generate more regional 
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economic growth. In the first part of my analysis, I extend agglomeration theory to a new 
geography and population of “firms.” I test the hypothesis that traditional entrepreneurs 
cluster at the neighborhood level. To do so, I use the conventional, quantitative tools of 
agglomeration research. Then I conduct semi-structured interviews with traditional 
entrepreneurs in cluster and non-cluster neighborhoods. I maintain the core postulate of 
positive externalities found in agglomeration theory and search for anomalies and ties 
between the theory and the extended setting. 
Figure 2-1. Simplified Cause and Effect Relationships in Agglomeration Theory 
 
The second part of my analysis relies more heavily on reflexive science in that 
data are collected through interviews, but without the formal direction of a hypothesis. I 
investigate a novel angle in the extended agglomeration case by combining 
agglomeration theory with regional resilience theory. Regional resilience describes the 
capacity of a city or metropolitan area to respond to social, demographic and economic 
change (MacArthur Foundation, n.d.; Resilience Alliance, 2007). Regionally co-located 
firms are associated with growth, but some evidence (describe later in this chapter) 
suggests they have little to do with regional resilience. Neighborhood clusters of 
entrepreneurs may or may not relate to growth, but I investigate their impact on 
resilience. Specifically, I conduct semi-structured interviews with entrepreneurs in an 
Regionally 
co-located 
firms 
Positive 
externalities 
Economic 
growth 
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economically ascendant region and a stagnant region to develop future testable 
hypotheses about the contribution of traditional entrepreneurs to regional resilience. 
Figure 2-2. Simplified Cause and Effect Relationships in Agglomeration Theory - 
Extended Case Approach 
 
In sum, I use the extended case method to expand the theory of agglomeration and 
combine it with resiliency theory (see Figure 2-2). In the extended case method, the 
researcher analyzes data (usually qualitative) to discover ties, anomalies and crossovers 
between existing theories and a particular setting or situation. My main proposition and 
extension of agglomeration theory is to suggest that traditional entrepreneurs cluster at 
the neighborhood (not regional) level and that they contribute to regional resilience 
capacity (not growth). Formally, I propose that traditional entrepreneurship is a function 
of neighborhood conditions (social and economic) and regional resilience is a capacity 
fostered by the interdependence of neighborhood entrepreneur clusters. 
Entrepreneurs and Clusters 
There was little policy interest in entrepreneurship as an economic development 
strategy, relative to business recruitment, until the 1980s (Elisinger, 1995). Scholars 
speculate the lack of interest in policy and urban research is the result of an economic 
theory of the firm that failed to incorporate the entrepreneur (Glaeser, Rosenthal, & 
Strange, 2010; Malecki, 1993). They represent uncertainty of markets, markets in 
disequilibrium and are outside the realm of mathematically-focused economic study. The 
technology boom and greater appreciation for innovation has started to stimulate this 
Neighborhood 
co-located 
firms 
Positive 
externalities 
Resilience 
capacity 
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interest. Joseph Schumpeter is credited for linking entrepreneurs and economic 
development. He theorized that it is precisely the disequilibrium of “creative destruction” 
that propels development of an economy, through enabling conditions for new markets, 
new products, new processes and new forms of organization (Schumpeter, 1934). Rather 
than competition that drives growth through productivity-enhancing efficiency gains, 
innovation drives long-term development through recognizing potential value and 
commercializing it. An entrepreneur, by Schumpeter’s definition, is one who recognizes 
and commercializes an innovation.  
The varied meaning of entrepreneurship may be a second reason that research in 
economic development policy has lacked an entrepreneur component. Malecki (1993), 
among others, notes that innovation requires receptivity to change, which makes small 
firms generally an important mechanism for regional development. Small firms receive a 
relatively high degree of attention in policy. At the federal level, the Small Business 
Administration promotes research, policy and procedures that facilitate small firm growth 
and development. At the local level, policy efforts to minimize taxes and regulations are 
in large part a small business development strategy. One problem with viewing these 
efforts as entrepreneur policy is that the standard definition of a small firm is one with 
500 or fewer employees. Glaeser, Rosenthal, & Strange (2010) outline five dimensions to 
entrepreneurship that are of interest to researchers: self-employment, small firms, firm 
ownership, new firm entry, and innovation. They argue that defining an entrepreneur as 
one with all five characteristics is too narrow. For example, a social entrepreneur may 
start a cooperative venture or nonprofit organization where ownership is ceded to a board 
(Amin, Cameron, & Hudson, 2003). The founders of Kiva—an online forum for micro-
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lending around the world—are unlikely to be the firm owners, but they are certainly 
innovative and self-employed (http://www.kiva.org/about/history).  
How entrepreneurship is measured usually relates to the research question. The 
most inclusive definition of the five is self-employment, because it captures all people 
who work for themselves, regardless of how profitable they are, whether they have 
employees and whether they are “innovative.” Self-employment measures also allow for 
individual analysis of owner attributes, which is more difficult with firm level data 
because firms can have more than one owner. In economic and policy studies, the 
research question often has to do with the relationship between entrepreneurs and 
regional economic growth. Therefore researchers define entrepreneurs as small firms 
(Acs, Parsons, & Tracy, 2008; Glaeser, Rosenthal, et al., 2010), although when assessing 
educational attainment, self-employment is a common measure in economic studies 
(Doms, Lewis, & Robb, 2010; Glaeser, 2007a). In some of these studies, they distinguish 
innovative from imitative small firms using the industry. For example, Glaeser (2007) 
divides self-employment in manufacturing into high and low skill entrepreneurship. He 
divides information services similarly. Aside from the five dichotomous depictions, self-
employment is also represented as a continuum because early in a venture, an 
entrepreneur could be employed full time and working for him or herself on the side. 
Again, the appropriate definition relates to the research question. For scholars looking to 
identify all entrepreneurial activity or the correlates of moving from nascent 
entrepreneurship (e.g. Davidsson & Wiklund, 2001), for example, a more fluid 
understanding of self-employment is necessary. 
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Industry and skill classifications of innovation are blurry. What constitutes an 
innovation is subject to a variety of categorizations. There are incremental and radical 
innovations, process and product innovations, the introduction of new knowledge or the 
recombination of existing knowledge, and so on (Rossi, 2002). Quite profitable 
innovations have come from small, specialized entrepreneurs in ostensibly low skill 
manufacturing work, such as footwear, metal goods, and textiles (Malecki, 1993). Much 
of the innovation literature, as with economic analysis in general, uses examples and data 
from the manufacturing sector, but the growing service sector has demanded attention 
from innovation scholars. In the service sector there is a greater focus on organizational 
and process innovations, relative to technology or mechanical advances that are 
predominant in manufacturing (Drejer, 2004). For example, the service sector has made 
advances in external relationship innovation, whereby a firm establishes a unique and 
productive relationship with partners, such as customers, suppliers or competitors (Djellal 
& Gallouj, 2001). Process and organizational innovations tend to be incremental rather 
than radical, which also explains why they have been overlooked in manufacturing 
studies. Lowe, Williams, Shaw, & Cudworth (2012) describe it as “splicing,” where 
innovation is “the creation of new capabilities through recombination of elements of 
existing organizational processes enriched by best-practice capabilities drawn from the 
local market.” A very profitable service innovation in the U.K. has been experience-
themed hotels, such as the wine school offered at the HduV, which was imitated in a rural 
setting with the garden kitchen theme at The Pig (Lowe et al., 2012). The diffusion of 
Japanese forms of organization with large reliance on subcontractors is another highly 
sought after and valued organizational innovation (Drejer, 2004).  
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In summary, entrepreneurship has been defined by the action or the outcome of a 
self-employed person, and what constitutes an innovative outcome has differed based on 
skill level and sector in which the entrepreneur works. Beyond definitional differences, 
there are generally two approaches to studying the cause of innovation and 
entrepreneurship (Mytelka & Smith, 2003). The first is the input approach, where the 
level of entrepreneurship is determined by the attributes and financial resources of 
nascent entrepreneurs. When measured as small firms, the input approach would look to 
the firm’s level of R&D spending. The second is the network approach, where 
entrepreneurship is determined through a social process. The debate between human 
capital and social capital is a particularly relevant culmination of the two approaches for 
this dissertation. Is education and experience more important to entrepreneurship, or are 
one’s social networks a bigger factor in success? For both, the relationship to 
entrepreneurship is usually positive, but results have been inconsistent. Some of the latest 
evidence shows that their relative influence depends on the stage of entrepreneurship: 
identifying a commercial opportunity, starting a business, or running a financially 
successful business  (Davidsson & Honig, 2003; Montgomery, Johnson, & Faisal, 2005). 
They found that human capital was important to identifying an opportunity, but social 
capital was more important for succeeding as a business.  
Interest in entrepreneur social networks is substantial and has grown considerably 
since the link between innovation and entrepreneurship was solidified (Hoang & 
Antoncic, 2003). Social networks can even be sources of human capital development. 
Innovation researchers have come to distinguish Science, Technology and Innovation 
(STI) from the Doing, Using and Interacting (DUI) mode of innovation (Jensen, Johnson, 
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Lorenz, & Lundvall, 2007). The STI mode is based on the production and diffusion of 
technical knowledge within a social network, while the DUI mode is based on informal 
learning processes and learning-by-doing experience. Ruef (2010) focuses on 
entrepreneur groups and accounts for STI or DUI learning, though he does not use the 
terms. He looks at high-tech and traditional ventures and uses social network theory to 
show how both types of ventures evolve through a group formation process, thereby 
countering the image of the entrepreneur as a rugged and heroic individual. Ruef argues 
that entrepreneurship is a set of commercial linkages and social relationships, through 
which critical information flows about business opportunities, resource availability, and 
labor market conditions, among other pieces of information. This is not to argue that most 
ventures are joint partnerships, but that entrepreneurs are necessarily embedded in a 
network characterized by social conditions such as trust (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). It is 
important to note that this perspective minimizes direct capital inputs mentioned earlier, 
such as a loan or training in how to write a business plan. Instead, networks illustrate the 
old adage: it is not about what you know, but who you know. 
Regional economic development policy focuses on the group process perspective 
on entrepreneurship in at least two ways. The first is innovation networks. Information 
does not flow everywhere equally and is instead conditioned by regional difference in 
organizational norms and institutions (Malecki, 1993). The importance of open social 
networks to innovation has been shown in successful industrial (manufacturing) districts 
(Russo, 1985; Boschma & Ter Wal, 2007) and regional high-tech hubs (Powell, Koput, & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996; Saxenian, 1994). Second, agglomeration studies have a long history 
of quantifying how concentrations of firms increase output and further regional growth 
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(Marshall, 1920). Agglomeration theory will be explained in Chapter 3, but it has grown 
from a study of the positive externalities occurring among co-located firms to a study of 
the co-location benefits for entrepreneurs or small firms specifically. Quantitative studies 
of agglomeration also find evidence of information “spillovers” in highly entrepreneurial 
regions using proxy measures of innovation networks (Acs & Armington, 2006; Glaeser, 
Kerr, & Ponzetto, 2010). However, they are concerned with non-innovation related 
positive externalities that occur due to co-location. 
Taken together, research on regional networks of innovation and agglomeration is 
what I call cluster theory. The term was made popular by Michael Porter in the late 1990s 
and has been criticized for its lack of precision, but I use it in an even more extended 
fashion to encompass somewhat different ideas about why entrepreneurs benefit as a 
group, and it is well known in the research and policy communities, both of which are the 
term’s advantages (Martin & Sunley, 2003). Cluster strategies are a significant departure 
from the still popular business recruitment strategies that rely on importing development 
capacity from outside the city. Cluster strategies include activities such as university 
technology transfer programs, regional industry associations, and business incubators to 
foster entrepreneurship by increasing interaction and the flow of information between 
potential innovators. They are also a significant departure from neo-classical economic 
development strategies because they emphasize the importance of business collaboration 
as much as competition in growing a local economy.  
Traditional Entrepreneurs Defined 
As it stands, most workers in the U.S. do not have a college degree. Although 
college graduates are over-represented in the entrepreneur ranks, the sheer size of the 
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non-college graduate population means that the majority of entrepreneurs (54 percent) 
have a high school diploma, but no college degree (Hipple, 2010).
1
 Educational 
attainment is associated with a number of other firm characteristics that, when taken 
together, create a portrait of the average non-college educated entrepreneur as somewhat 
distinct from the average college-educated entrepreneur. I define a traditional 
entrepreneur partly by their educational attainment, but also by their firm characteristics, 
industry and location.  
Firm structure. Traditional entrepreneurs are small operations, very small. From 
the standpoint of firm-based economic analysis, many are on the tail end of the size 
distribution. A standard economic definition of small business is one with less than 500 
employees, but almost two-thirds of business owners without a college degree have no 
employees at all (Survey of Business Owners, 2007).
2
 These single-employer or non-
employer firms, as they are called, are large in number but they comprise less than five 
percent of business receipts (Acs, Headd, & Agwara, 2009). Another way to look at the 
size of traditional entrepreneur ventures is shown in Table 2-1. Self-employment is 
divided into incorporated and unincorporated firms (typically sole proprietorships). A full 
86 percent of unincorporated firms—those disproportionately held by non-college 
graduates—have no employees (Hipple, 2010). Salons, eateries and other traditional low-
barrier firms that require physical, brick and mortar establishments may have up to 20 
employees (Servon, Fairlie, Rastello, & Seely, 2010), although a physical location is no 
                                                 
1
 Although there are several data sources for self-employment figures, this distribution is fairly consistent. 
For example, Doms et al. (2010) found a nearly identical distribution when they used the 2000 Decennial 
Census and limited self-employment to those who worked at least 1500 hours in the year and have no wage 
income.  
2
 Incidentally, the number is only slightly lower for those with a college degree. About 19 percent of single-
employer firms are in the Professional, scientific and technical services industry group (Acs et al., 2009). 
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certainty to have employees. Many female traditional entrepreneurs operate home-based 
businesses, such as child care or book-keeping and several male dominated traditional 
entrepreneurship avenues are “on-call” services with no physical location, namely 
construction subcontractors. About half of all self-employed males and the majority of 
females are home-based (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). The rate of home-based businesses 
by educational attainment is not available.  
Table 2-1. Type of Self-Employment by Educational Attainment, 2010 
Final educational 
attainment 
Total self-
employed 
(14 million) 
Unincorporated    
(9 million)  
Incorporated    
(5 million)   
College graduate   38% 32% 49% 
High school graduate  54% 57% 48% 
Less than high school  9% 11% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Hipple, S. (2010). Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey 
Traditional entrepreneurs are also more likely than their high-skill counterparts to 
operate partially or fully ‘off the books’ (Williams & Nadin, 2010). These goods and 
services go uncounted in official statistics for different reasons, for example when an 
entrepreneur barters his services, deals only in cash, or does not report taxable income 
(Losby et al., 2002). Though the good or service is not illicit or illegal (as say, gambling 
or drug dealing), the same cannot be said for the accounting practices. Furthermore, these 
studies show that entrepreneurs often combine formal employment with other formal or 
informal self-employment activities, which is called blended work. Given these structural 
factors, this dissertation defines entrepreneurship as someone that is self-employed. 
Local services. Innovation, if apparent among traditional entrepreneurs, will 
likely occur in the Doing, Using and Interacting mode and be apparent in incremental 
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process or organizational innovations, due to the concentration of traditional 
entrepreneurs in the service sector. Entrepreneurs without a college degree typically start 
businesses in industries with low barriers to entry. Bates, Lofstrom, & Servon (2011) 
define barriers by the necessary human capital and financial requirements for entry. They 
use the U.S. Census Characteristics of Business Owners to identify personal services, 
repair services, construction, transportation, and miscellaneous services as low-barrier, 
while high-barrier industries include manufacturing, wholesale, professional services, 
business services, finance, insurance, and real estate. Retail businesses lie at the cutoff 
between low and high capital and education requirements.  
Table 2-2. Self-Employment Market by Educational Attainment 
 
Average annual firm formation 
per 100 establishments 
Area served High school College degree 
Local businesses 12.22 8.60 
Local consumers 8.42 9.08 
Nonlocal markets 7.86 10.72 
Source: Acs, Z. & Armington, K. (2006), Table 4.6, p. 164. 
Using a similar categorization process for the service sector only, Acs & 
Armington (2006) find that those in low barrier industries (i.e. requiring just a high 
school degree) are more likely to start firms that serve local business needs such as office 
cleaning, truck rental and linen supply stores, while high barrier (college-educated) 
industries are likely to serve non-local markets (see Table 2-2). These groups are about 
equally likely to start businesses that serve local consumer markets. Although salons, 
child day care and sports club managers are typical low barrier industries serving local 
consumers that one might associate with traditional entrepreneurs, high barrier industries 
22 
 
serve local consumers through firms in the arts (dance, theater, etc) and special data 
services such as tax return preparation (Acs & Armington, 2006).  
Motivations and outcomes. Those in low-barrier industries start businesses out 
of necessity and opportunity. One view is that these represent two categories of 
entrepreneurs: true entrepreneurs who fit characteristics of the entrepreneurial type and 
those for whom self-employment was their best option (Servon, 2006). A second view is 
that deciding to start a business involves the need for more income and the opportunity 
for a more meaningful work life. For example, interviews with entrepreneurs in four 
cities revealed that economic necessity was the primary reason for starting an informal 
business (The Aspen Institute, 2004; Williams & Nadin, 2010), but the same interview 
respondents report that they were also motivated by the desire for more flexibility and 
autonomy; more control in an economy of routine firings; and dissatisfaction with formal 
employment options. Similarly, Bates et al. (2011) found that unemployment was 
statistically (positively) related to the likelihood of entrepreneurship in low-barrier 
industries, but unemployment was just as likely to be a factor in the self-employment 
decision of those in high-barrier industries. Because the latter individuals should have 
more reserve funds, it suggests that unemployment can present an opportunity for 
entrepreneurship that would not have been pursued otherwise.  
In addition to a potentially undesirable start, self-employment may not produce a 
livable income, it may be an inefficient use of the worker’s time, or it may require a 
stressful and difficult lifestyle. About 15 to 30 percent (depending on the industry) of 
those who are self-employed are in the bottom quarter of the income distribution 
(Glaeser, 2007a). Given the typical industries populated by traditional entrepreneurs, it is 
23 
 
unsurprising that they are less financially successful  and are more likely to leave self-
employment than college-educated entrepreneurs (Doms et al., 2010). For example, Acs 
& Armington (2006) found that the rate of new firm formation is equally predicted by the 
proportion of college-educated residents in the region as the proportion of high school 
dropouts. In some cases then, wage work may be a better situation for the entrepreneur 
and it is important that public policy does not rely on entrepreneurship as a social safety 
net program (Jurik, 2005). 
To help exclude instances in which entrepreneurship is primarily a necessity, I 
focus on people and places we may think of as working class rather than poor. Similar to 
my notion of a traditional entrepreneur, Lamont defines the working class as those with 
“stable employment and high-school diplomas, but no college degrees, which means they 
face severe barriers to jobs and other social benefits” (2000, p. 2). There is not a universal 
definition of the working class, but researchers acknowledge that blue-collar factory 
workers no longer capture the typical working class person (Kefalas, 2003; Lamont, 
2000; Zweig, 2005). The low end white-collar jobs of today are more similar to blue-
collar work than professional white-collar jobs in terms of pay and benefits (Kefalas, 
2003). Zweig argues that the working class spans all industries and races, men and 
women, and is better defined by their lack of power and ownership in work and 
production. Although being one’s own boss necessarily minimizes the issue of power and 
ownership, the breadth of Zweig’s description is appropriate and it hints at the more 
anthropologically-based definitions that describe working class as a culture and identity, 
“grounded in everyday life, in human interactions, and in the relationship between work, 
place and community” (Russo & Linkon, 2005, p. 9).  
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For the purposes of my research, I define an entrepreneur as a self-employed 
person, and ‘traditional’ entrepreneurs by the level of education and poverty in their 
residential area, which is closely tied to income level and industry choice, but which 
constitutes its own class identity that significantly influences with whom you socialize 
(Hyra, 2006; Lamont, 1992; Vallejo, 2009). For this reason, my definition of a traditional 
entrepreneur has a significant geographic component that constitutes the entrepreneur 
group in my dissertation.  
Role in economic development. Although traditional entrepreneurs are not 
studied for their impact on regional growth, a small literature on minority 
entrepreneurship views local business owners (non-chain stores) as an asset in 
community economic development. There are a number of reasons that local business 
owners foster neighborhood development. First, they are visible signs of neighborhood 
investment to outsiders, which promotes community identity and continued investment 
(Sutton, 2010). Community development theory focuses on the self-empowerment 
benefits of entrepreneurship, which may indirectly benefit the physical neighborhood 
when residents feel a sense of belonging and ownership (Ghorayshi, Graydon, & 
Kliewer, 2007). Second, local entrepreneurs can create jobs. The spatial mismatch 
hypothesis has long argued the problem of neighborhoods located far from employment 
opportunities (Holzer, 1996; Olof, Osth, & Zenou, 2010). Local owners may also sustain 
jobs if they internalize the costs to the community of relocating or reducing employment 
(Kolko & Neumark, 2010). Third, they increase the political capital of the area. Local 
business owners may engage in the political system to preserve the neighborhood 
business environment, such as through zoning laws (Sutton, 2010).  Finally, businesses 
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generally reduce vacancy rates and crime and increase tax revenue, which along with the 
other benefits are all mutually reinforcing for neighborhood revitalization  (Chapple & 
Jacobus, 2009). 
This literature typically focuses on areas of concentrated poverty in need of 
redevelopment. Entrepreneurship has been studied as a place-based development strategy 
in the U.S. (Bates & Alicia, 2008; Sutton, 2010) and E.U. (Welter, Trettin, & Neumann, 
2008).  As such, it has been subject to the place-based versus people-based debate. Place-
based strategies target investments to dilapidated areas to directly affect the economic 
conditions there, while people-based policies give individuals more choice in job-related 
decisions, including their mobility among places. People-based policies make it difficult 
to recoup city investments when residents move out of the neighborhood, which also 
makes them inefficient neighborhood redevelopment policies; place-based policies do 
better at redevelopment, but are critiqued for their gentrification impacts, labor migration 
inefficiencies, and inability to improve the economic outcomes of original residents 
(Elvery, 2009; Glaeser, 2007b; O’Sullivan, 2009).  
There are also people-based programs aimed at traditional entrepreneurs, at least 
more so than are activities like technology transfer in the universities. They include state 
micro-finance programs, the self-employment training option in the Workforce Initiative 
Act’s unemployment assistance centers, and free business mentoring programs sponsored 
by the Small Business Administration. These programs are far from directed economic 
development efforts. Financing that is based on the projected job creation potential of the 
new firm may be considered development-oriented, but more often the programs are 
viewed as workforce development or poverty alleviation strategies (Jurik, Cavender, & 
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Cowgill, 2006; Servon & Bates, 1998). Still, it is important to note that in the case of 
poverty-alleviation programs, there are some efforts to build social capital among 
participants, which mimics the design of regional cluster strategies (Jurik et al., 2006). 
Regional Resilience and Entrepreneurs 
For all the interest in clusters and entrepreneurship, traditional entrepreneurs are 
rarely studied as a networked group. Considering clusters are of value to policymakers 
for their economic growth effects, the likely reason is that traditional entrepreneurs are 
not typically exporting firms, nor do they have employees, so their impact on growth is 
assumed to be negligible. There is some evidence to call that assumption into question. 
For example, Acs & Armington (2006) found that job growth was more strongly 
associated with the proportion of high-school educated residents in a region than college-
educated ones. They surmise that the overall education level of the population (i.e. high 
school grads versus dropouts), not high levels of education in a small segment, is what 
matters to growth.  
In terms of economic development objectives and regional prosperity, economic 
resilience is just as important as growth. Regional resilience describes the capacity of a 
city or metropolitan area to respond to social, demographic and economic change 
(MacArthur Foundation, n.d.; Resilience Alliance, 2007). Such a policy goal may sound 
self-evident, but it is a dramatic shift from the dominant paradigm of economic growth. 
Cluster research is of interest in economic development because clusters relate to regional 
growth (Acs & Armington, 2006; Beaudry & Schiffauerova, 2009). A good development 
strategy (clusters included) is evident by its impact on the growth trajectory of jobs, 
income, tax revenue or some other economic measure (Blair & Carroll, 2009).  
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The narrow focus on growth started to expand in the mid-2000s. The most 
immediate cause of the shift was the global financial crisis and string of natural disasters 
that occurred during that time (Christopherson et al., 2010). Urban scholars sought ways 
to minimize the impact of these acute shocks. They adapted the resilience concept from 
environmental studies where it is used to describe the biological capacity to adapt to 
adverse conditions. The biological definition transfers well to mitigate shocks, but also to 
regional problems that build over time from slow, accumulating change, such as 
deindustrialization. By either definition of change, it turns out that high growth regions 
say little about their resilience capacity. For example, looking over twenty years and 
using two different measures of regional resilience, Chapple & Lester (2010) found that 
few Sunbelt cities (known for their high growth) made the list of resilient labor markets 
and some unexpected Rustbelt cities did. Regarding the recent downturn, Christopherson 
et al. (2010) note that some older industrial regions (Rustbelt cities) have fared the best 
because they did not experience the housing boom and had more diversified industrial 
base. Thus, the factors that contribute to economic growth may be different, or even work 
against regional resilience in the long run. 
There are several streams of research under the broad goal of building regional 
resilience capacity. For example, The MacArthur Foundation’s resilience project looks 
into infrastructure resilience to determine if our roads, bridges and buildings have the 
capacity to withstand significant population and environmental change (MacArthur 
Foundation, n.d.). The Foundation also researches what aspects of urban governance can 
positively influence an area’s resiliency. Fiscal or budget resilience refers to financial 
planning that accounts for unexpected change (Hoene & Pagano, 2013). The Resilience 
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Alliance’s (2007) framework emphasizes natural resource resilience, such as a city’s 
ability to manage fuel, water, energy and other inflows with natural limits through times 
of stress or change.  
Clearly all of these factors affect regional economic resilience, but they are 
distinct from the body of literature that examines the economy directly. Economic 
resilience, like economic growth, is concerned with indicators such as jobs, income and 
productivity. In Chapter 4, I discuss these different indicators at length and the specific 
arguments for why a healthy level of entrepreneurship could increase a region’s ability to 
avoid, or recover more quickly, from regional economic challenges. It bears mentioning 
that resilience is also studied as an individual capacity (Luthans, Avolio, Avey, & 
Norman, 2007). Traditional entrepreneurs may be more resilient to their own economic 
hardships than other entrepreneurs or than wage workers, for example. In this study, 
resilience is taken to mean a firm level (which in this case is one person), community 
level or regional level capacity.  
Traditional Entrepreneurs and Economic Development Policy 
Exploring entrepreneurship as a group phenomenon and for its relationship to 
regional resilience offers the unique advantage of connecting economic interest in 
innovation to entrepreneurs from across the education spectrum. Traditional 
entrepreneurs, as I have described them, have been largely absent from economic and 
policy studies of regional development, especially the literature on industry clusters. This 
is problematic for an economic development strategy based on innovation. Drawing on 
Schumpeter’s theory, Cooke, Uranga, & Etxebarria (1997) argue emphatically that 
innovation policy and research must move beyond the subset of companies that use 
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science and technology innovations to improve their products. The value of innovation, 
as it relates to regional prosperity including jobs, is also in its ability to open new markets 
and try new organizational arrangements. The change that is needed from organizations is 
not only technological, it is in their behavior and habits and the way they interact with 
other agents in the economic system. The key question of effective innovation policy, 
according to Cooke and company, is the extent to which the policy it is indeed systemic. 
If cluster strategies leave the majority of entrepreneurs unaffected or excluded, they 
cannot be systemic. 
One of my goals in this research is to contribute to the movement for more 
bottom-up policy implementation strategies. This is a goal that innovation scholars would 
share because it allows for more ideas from more people, which is one way to gain more 
systemic change. Bottom-up strategies mean decentralizing authority over development 
decisions from the few elected officials, business elite and lobbying groups to the many 
people whose daily interactions and decisions determine a wide variety of development 
patterns (Innes & Booher, 1999). That does not necessarily mean abandoning land use 
laws and other centralized governing mechanisms. It could simply mean allowing more 
participation in the process in an ongoing way. For example, one question in cluster 
development is whether implicit incentives for firm self-organization (bottom-up) is more 
effective than explicit cluster policies implemented through regional authorities (top-
down) (Fromhold-Eisebith & Eisebith, 2005).  
The very promotion of entrepreneurship (provided it is an opportunity afforded to 
residents of all means) is one way to think of economic development being driven by a 
bottom-up strategy. Rather than providing incentives to corporations to generate regional 
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growth, policies should be focused on growing the capacity of local entrepreneurs. 
Another way to think of bottom-up development is to invest more power in the hands of 
neighborhoods. Neighborhood residents can more quickly identify opportunities for 
economic development that correspond to current conditions and capacity. This is 
especially true for the large number of neighborhoods that are not in extreme poverty, but 
are not upwardly mobile. These neighborhoods and residents can be overlooked in policy 
research because community and housing programs target high-poverty areas (Wacquant, 
2008).  
Despite the interdependencies of cities and their component neighborhoods (Hill, 
Wolman, & Ford, 1995; Phelps, 2004), neighborhood development and regional growth 
objectives are taken as separate tasks. Community (neighborhood) economic 
development by local governments and community development corporations is 
undertake with little interest in the regional context (Gottlieb, 1997). Conversely, city and 
state economic development leaders determine strategies for regional growth, but as 
indicated by post-recession policy efforts, their tools are often limited to financial 
incentives to attract business (Osgood, Opp, & Bernotsky, 2012). There are likely 
politically motivated reasons for the disconnect between regional growth strategies and 
neighborhood economic development (e.g. NIMBY, the city growth machine mentality), 
as well as empirical difficulty in measuring interdependent and recursive processes, such 
as the relationship between cities and their component neighborhoods. 
Scholars have advocated the value of understanding (or even creating) a link 
between top-down and bottom-up economic development, but the task has been difficult. 
Woolcock (1998) argues that social capital should be leveraged for both. He identifies 
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two distinct but shared types of social capital across bottom up and top down 
development: embedded and autonomous social ties. Embeddedness from the bottom up 
perspective refers to intra-community ties, such as the social capital shared in ethnic 
enclaves. From a top down perspective, embeddedness refers to the internal relationships 
between city government officials responsible for economic or community development. 
Autonomy in the bottom up perspective refers to extra-community networks, the kind 
most likely used in innovation networks. Top down, autonomy refers to institutional 
capacity and credibility built through government relationships with industry (including 
nonprofits). The resulting two by two matrix represents four different types of social 
capital, the balance of which impacts transmission of economic prosperity between the 
national and local levels or in our case, between the city and neighborhoods. The 
appropriate balance is a function of the present development level of the city, but because 
the top-down and bottom-up social capital build on one another, there is no clear place to 
start, much less evaluate the effects of an intervention.  
Woolcock’s framework is useful for thinking more critically about the role of 
social capital and innovation networks, but it does not offer ways to build those cross-
linking capital stocks. Gottlieb (1997) argues that urban development research has failed 
to link the two goals and needs to be more practitioner-oriented and normative to make 
headway in the policy world. He recommends two areas for action-oriented research. The 
first is a better understanding of the mismatch between communities in need of jobs and 
where those jobs are located in the city. The second is to determine how the theories and 
techniques of cluster development need to be customized to the neighborhood. If so, can 
inter-firm linkages and network economies be created among neighborhood businesses? 
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His main concern with the idea, which I believe to be a valid one, is that these businesses 
will not be able to generate job creation at the scale needed in the neighborhood.  
This dissertation essentially takes up Gottlieb’s call and determines, not only if 
neighborhood clusters of entrepreneurs can be identified, but just as importantly, if they 
could and should be created as a potential bottom-up innovation strategy. It tries to 
situate the neighborhood in its regional context by exploring ways that traditional 
entrepreneurs stabilize neighborhoods and possibly the region through external 
challenges. Rather than see neighborhood and economic development objectives as 
inevitable trade-offs, the work of traditional entrepreneurs may offer a synergy between 
the two in resilience. While this dissertation only takes initial steps in the direction of 
identifying synergies, creating development policies that capitalize on them would 
represent a truly systemic innovation policy, and one that ensured the spirit of 
entrepreneurialism remained an enduring American value.  
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CHAPTER 
3 - NEIGHBORHOOD CLUSTERING AND TRADITIONAL ENTREPRENEURS 
The Literature 
Agglomeration economies are the growth enhancing effects of businesses locating 
near one another. Alfred Marshall (1920) theorized that firm cost reductions, realized 
through positive externalities are what explain the empirical observation that firms in 
specialized industries tend to co-locate. Developing and supporting so-called ‘clusters’ is 
of great interest to policymakers because clusters are thought to be associated with 
regional economic growth (Martin & Sunley, 2006; Porter, 1998). The source of positive 
externalities, the precise meaning of proximity, and how, together, they generate regional 
economic growth are major areas of theorizing in urban economics and economic 
geography. The growing interest in innovation over the past two decades has also led to a 
fruitful exploration of entrepreneurship and inventor social networks in clusters.  
In this chapter, I draw on economic studies of growth and sociological studies of 
networks to document the importance of clusters to regional growth and to argue that 
traditional entrepreneurs and neighborhood-level clustering constitute a significant gap in 
empirical studies of clusters. In the first section, I review cluster theory, which includes a 
large (mostly economic) literature on agglomeration economies, recent developments on 
spinoff clustering, and how clusters relate to entrepreneurship. Next, I offer some 
empirical evidence derived from cluster studies and conclude that they have not looked 
for clustering effects among traditional entrepreneurs. In the final literature section, I 
draw on sociology and urban studies to derive two hypotheses to determine whether 
neighborhood social networks foster clustering among traditional entrepreneurs. The next 
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two sections contain the analysis broken into two parts. Part one is a quantitative study 
that describes my data sources, statistical techniques and results of the analysis. Part two 
is a qualitative study that describes my neighborhood site selection, interview protocol 
and results of the analysis. The last section is a brief summary and conclusion. This 
chapter uses concepts developed in Chapter 2, with a summary of definitions provided in 
Appendix 1. 
An economic theory of clustering. Scholars have identified a number of 
potential reasons that clusters occur. None have strayed far from Marshall’s original triad 
of labor pooling, shared inputs and information spillovers, but Duranton & Puga (2004) 
offer a potentially valuable theory-based classification. They group sources of 
agglomeration into sharing, matching and learning mechanisms, each of which has a 
distinct explanation for the positive externalities that characterize agglomeration 
economies (see Table 3-1). Until recently, sharing and matching have garnered the most 
attention. Sharing captures the ability of co-located firms to minimize costs by sharing 
indivisible goods like production facilities, to maximize benefits by a wider variety and 
more specialized suppliers (who exist due to their ability to access a larger final goods 
market), and to minimize the impact of risky undertakings. Matching mechanisms 
capture the greater access co-located firms have to a specialized labor market, which 
improves either their probability of finding a match or the expected quality of matches.   
Table 3-1. Sources of Agglomeration Economies 
Agglomeration 
source Example of mechanism generating positive externality 
Sharing 
The ability of co-located firms to minimize costs by sharing 
indivisible goods like production facilities 
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Matching 
The greater access that co-located firms have to a specialized 
labor market, improving their odds of finding a qualified worker 
Learning: 
 
-Ideas 
Generation of new ideas or knowledge through the interaction of 
co-located firms 
-Skills 
Transfer of skills between differently skilled workers in co-
located firms 
-Information Diffusion of information among co-located firms 
 
Interest in learning mechanisms, also called knowledge ‘spillovers,’ has increased 
with the economic transition away from manufacturing industries. Within learning 
mechanisms, Duranton & Puga (2004) distinguish three types of spillover: the generation 
of ideas (new knowledge), the transfer of skills, and the diffusion of information. 
Spillover means that a positive externality is produced for the cluster by the investment of 
one firm. The generation of ideas is one of the most philosophical areas of theorizing on 
spillovers, as it goes to the heart of creativity and out-of-the-box thinking. For example, 
the theory of generative relationships describes how the innovation process requires 
individuals to maintain ontological uncertainty and participate in constructing large-scale 
transformations of agent-artifact space (Lane & Maxfield, 2005). Duranton & Puga 
(2001) take a more classic agglomeration perspective on idea generation. They formalize 
a theoretical model showing that diverse city environments facilitate idea generation by 
allowing new firms to test product development in a variety of different production 
processes and therefore better identify commercial-ready ideas.  
Diffusion of skills is the second and potentially more intuitive and verifiable 
interpretation of spillovers. Skill diffusion is the production benefit that occurs by 
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proximity between people or firms of different skills. Through co-location, they acquire 
incremental skills based on tacit knowledge that is ambiguous and so more easily 
developed through experience learning than through formal education (Acs & 
Armington, 2006). For instance, Russo's (2000) analysis of the ceramics industrial district 
in Italy demonstrated that proximity to many high skilled workers facilitated skill 
transmission to unskilled workers, raising group productivity, an idea also supported in 
aggregate analysis (Glaeser & Resseger, 2010).  
Thirdly, information diffusion builds on models of social learning that capture 
word-of-mouth type information exchanges that facilitate norms (Sobel, 2000). 
Information diffusion may be behind the ‘entrepreneurial culture’ hypothesis for why 
rates of entrepreneurship vary by city (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004; Glaeser, 2007a).  
Evolutionary economic geographers have focused on learning mechanisms to 
explain agglomeration, but they do not necessarily support that clusters occur through 
economically rational spillovers. These scholar attribute the co-location of firms to 
historically grown (path dependent), spatially concentrated types of knowledge embodied 
in firm routines (Boschma & Frenken, 2006). Firm ‘routines’ are created by the history 
and culture of a geographic area, which supports a particular way that firms are 
organized, the way they interact, and the way they interface with government institutions 
(Cooke et al., 1997). Silicon Valley and Route 128 in Boston demonstrate regional firm 
routines. Although both Silicon Valley and Route 128 had the requisite technical capacity 
for success, one theory is that the Valley pulled ahead in the global competition for high-
tech industry in the 1980s because of its organizational routines of openly shared 
information versus the traditional hierarchical organization and relationships in Boston 
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(Saxenian, 1994). Firms will learn these routines from one another, which is necessary 
for success in that region. Another popular theory in evolutionary economic geography is 
that clusters occur through the high rate of new firms that ‘spinoff’ from a successful 
parent company (Buenstorf & Klepper, 2009). This spinoff phenomenon is an important 
and relatively new line of theorizing in cluster development that I will discuss further in 
the empirical review. It is distinct from agglomeration because a high rate of spinoffs can 
occur despite no positive externalities realized in the cluster. 
The source of positive externalities in agglomeration is just one puzzle. There are 
also several debates about what exactly constitutes a cluster of firms. For example, one 
long-standing question in agglomeration research is about the industrial scope of a 
cluster. Thus far we have referred to clustering among firms in a specialized industry. 
Jane Jacobs' (1969) observations of New York neighborhoods are often used to support 
the notion that learning mechanisms operate on a much wider industrial scope. She 
argued that the interaction of different types of firms and people within diverse city 
environments generate economic growth through innovation, or as she said it, the 
invention of ‘new work.’ The industrial scope question has come to be called the Jacobs - 
M-A-R debate. M-A-R refers to three macro economists (Marshall, Arrow and Romer) 
who argued that related firms and the spillover of specialized knowledge is a more 
important source of agglomeration than the benefits of diverse knowledge found in large 
cities. The economic success of large cities was known to agglomeration theorists before 
innovation and knowledge spillovers were popular and the debate on the growth-
enhancing advantages of each takes a number of names, as shown in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2. Equivalent terms for the Debate on the Industrial Scope of 
Agglomeration Economies 
Positive externalities between firms 
in the same industry 
Positive externalities between firms 
in the unrelated or related industries 
Intra-industry linkages/spillover 
M-A-R externalities 
Specialization 
Localization economies 
Inter-industry linkages/spillover 
Jacobs externalities 
Diversification 
Urbanization economies 
 
The geographic scope of clusters is as puzzling as their industrial scope. To 
understand why geographic scope matters, we have to think about how spillovers occur in 
the real world. Marshall (1920) said it was simply more ideas ‘in the air,’ but researchers 
have since developed concrete possibilities. Inter-organizational collaborations, 
particularly with universities are probably the most well-studied explanation (Bruneel, 
D’Este, & Salter, 2010; Powell et al., 1996). Trade organizations or other professional 
networks for interacting is another candidate, and labor mobility across related firms is a 
third (Breschi & Lissoni, 2003). Another approach is to view the entrepreneur him/herself 
as the mechanism of a spillover (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004). This makes the individual 
the unit of analysis, which is not the standard in firm-based economic studies and creates 
a host of conceptual problems (or opportunities). For one, entrepreneurs do not exist 
exogenous to the cluster; their decision to appropriate their knowledge within an 
organizational structure or to set out on their own has to do with the cluster environment. 
I will return to this issue, but on the point of how information gets from one firm to 
another, agglomeration theory must also account for the extent to which the firms must 
be near one another. That is, the issue of proximity needs to be better specified.  
Interestingly, it was the idea of learning mechanisms that first directed innovation 
research from the national to subnational level (Cooke et al., 1997). However, the actual 
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distance between economic agents over which spillovers could be expected to occur is 
not clear. This is a major criticism of the cluster concept: that clusters are said to operate 
anywhere from the district to the metropolitan to the state level with no theory to guide 
the geography assessed (Martin & Sunley, 2003). Agglomeration sources are typically 
studied at the metropolitan level (Rosenthal & Strange, 2004). Spillovers via labor 
mobility, trade organizations and inter-organizational collaborations could all occur fairly 
easily within a metropolitan area. Indeed, metro boundaries are drawn for their cohesive 
labor markets and other vital institutions for creativity are at the  metropolitan scale 
(Scott, 2006). Most of these geography arguments are like the first: metropolitan areas 
are more important labor markets than national boundaries. But just how close must 
people be for spillovers to occur? Glaeser and company’s well-referenced quote is useful 
here  (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 1992). They remarked that intellectual 
breakthroughs must travel across hallways easier than across oceans. Consequently, other 
authors have suggested that a better theoretical framing of the issue is to say that 
agglomeration economies diminish with a firm’s distance from a cluster (Rosenthal & 
Strange, 2003).  
Geography is one variant of the proximity needed for learning mechanisms to 
operate. Cognitive, organizational, social, and institutional proximity may also effect 
spillovers and cluster development (Boschma, 2005). To reduce uncertainty, firms first 
look for knowledge processes similar to their own. Some basis for shared understanding 
makes useful knowledge easier to recognize, absorb and act on. This is called cognitive 
proximity. Organizational proximity refers to the degree and formality of connections 
within and between organizations. Close proximity could be demonstrated by the 
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hierarchical organization of a firm and contractual relationships with other firms, while 
distant proximity could be the on-the-spot interactions between organizations in the 
market. Close proximity is useful for reducing the transaction costs of sharing 
information, and according to Williamson (1975) is the very reason that certain economic 
functions are undertaken under hierarchical rather than market institutions.  
Social proximity draws on Granovetter (1985) and refers to the embedded social 
relationships that increase trust in interpersonal interactions, while institutional proximity 
is a similar concept at the group level and refers to the shared cultures and values that 
work to increase trust. Unlike geographic proximity, the other forms have limits, past 
which they constrain cluster development. For example, too much cognitive proximity 
reduces the benefits of spillover because the information is too similar to generate new 
knowledge. Thus the advantage of learning in an intra-industry setting is that knowledge 
is more easily absorbed, while between industries information is more likely to clash and 
be a source of radical innovation (Lowe et al., 2012). Additionally, the other forms of 
proximity are unique to learning mechanisms. Geographic proximity is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for sharing and matching mechanisms to operate, but it may be 
neither necessary nor sufficient for learning mechanisms (though it likely facilitates 
learning) (Boschma, 2005). 
Introducing the entrepreneur. The last puzzle in agglomeration theory is how 
clusters generate regional economic growth. The most direct effect of agglomeration is 
increased productivity at the firm level, but because these data are hard to come by, 
agglomeration is often measured indirectly according to employment growth (Beaudry & 
Schiffauerova, 2009; Rosenthal & Strange, 2004). This artifact is not without its 
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problems because increasing returns mean that the overall economic effect of 
agglomeration is more than the sum of increases in individual firm productivity so it is 
difficult to empirically connect the two. Nonetheless, employment growth is measurable 
and of practical concern. An alternative to general employment growth, and the most 
direct way that clusters have been related to entrepreneurship, is to measure growth in the 
birth of new firms (Rosenthal & Strange, 2004). Sorenson states the theoretical claim 
here quite well. He argues that “production centers provide individuals with more 
opportunities to acquire knowledge of the business, form critical networks, and build 
confidence in their ability to open a new venture” (2000, p. 442). Thus clusters do not 
persist because their established firms are more productive or less likely to fail; 
competition for scarce resources among similar, co-located firms makes this unlikely 
(Sorenson, 2000). It is that new business ventures are more likely to start in established 
agglomerations. 
Alternatively, and of greater interest in this dissertation, is that entrepreneurs are a 
key input to agglomeration economies. Large firm agglomeration is a collection of firms 
with a common focus that realize gains through collective action (Audretsch & Feldman, 
2004). But entrepreneurs actively organize resources and institutions to support their 
work and the work of emerging entrepreneurs (Feldman, Francis, & Bercovitz, 2005). 
Further, an environment of many small scale suppliers (versus vertically integrated firms) 
is more hospitable to starting a new venture because the entrepreneur has easier access to 
resources he needs (Chinitz, 1961). In a slightly different view, economic churning in the 
form of high rates of small business entry and exit is the creative destruction process at 
work (Acs & Armington, 2006). It is this activity that results in faster regional 
42 
 
development, but also growth, a main reason being that small firms add more 
employment than large firms (Acs et al., 2008). These three ideas on entrepreneurs could 
be tied together through a multi-stage cluster development theory where initial 
entrepreneurs organize latent resources and ultimately allow an environment of churning 
(Feldman et al., 2005). In any of these explanations, the reasoning quickly turns to a 
literature on the cause of entrepreneur clusters (or variation in region entrepreneurship 
rates). Of course the relationship between entrepreneurship and cluster growth is most 
likely endogenous and so the circular causation argument is hard to escape: certain 
regional factors make entrepreneurship more likely and many of those factors relate to 
the current supply of entrepreneurs.  
One implication of focusing on entrepreneurs is that the growth question 
becomes: do clusters of entrepreneurs contribute to regional growth more than non-
clustered entrepreneurial activity (Rocha, 2004)? There is also greater attention to 
structural and network issues related to firm size rather than to industry scope. For 
example, one hypothesis is that an abundance of small firms lowers the cost of entry into 
self-employment for the next entrepreneur because suppliers and competitors are more 
equivalently resourced compared to new firms (Rocha, 2004). Another is that higher 
human capital stocks in any industry contribute to entrepreneur clusters (Glaeser, Kerr, et 
al., 2010). A third is that stable relationships in clusters, better information about 
opportunities, and lessened social stigma for failure reduces uncertainty in starting a 
business and increases its likelihood (Romero-Martínez & Montoro-Sánchez, 2008).  
We are in the early stages of theorizing about the scope of agglomeration 
(geographic, industrial, etc.) and its source (sharing, matching, learning mechanisms) 
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when considering the entrepreneur, or even a startup firm, as the key input. In the U.S., 
the entrepreneur’s unique position in the local economy has been somewhat neglected. In 
their review of two major urban economics journals, Glaeser and company found fewer 
than 70 mentions (much less full articles) of entrepreneurs since the 1970s (Glaeser, 
Rosenthal, et al., 2010). There are a variety of potential ways to link agglomeration 
economies and entrepreneurs, but little theorizing exists on why proximity among 
traditional entrepreneurs could benefit regions. That is why this dissertation, though 
exploratory, is a bold and necessary step in cluster research. Even aspects of cluster 
theory that could easily be applied to a wider array of entrepreneurs are not applied in 
empirical work. And this leaves significant space for adapting and extending the theory. 
Empirical evidence of clustering. Empirical studies of agglomeration theory 
must document three things, but they are almost never undertaken within the same study. 
First, they must document clustering among some economic units, such as small firms or 
related industries. This is often done with a measure of spatial concentration, with the 
appropriate geography and industries accounted for. Second, agglomeration studies must 
relate firm clustering to firm productivity or regional economic growth. Third, they must 
identify the cause of the cluster as a source of agglomeration and not some natural 
locational advantage for the industry, such as solar energy production occurring in the 
southwest or export industries clustering near a port.  
The largest body of empirical work documents the first two of these tasks: the 
scope of agglomeration across industries, locations and time, and their relationship to 
economic growth (Rosenthal & Strange, 2004). Economists are much less likely to take 
on the third, an investigation or comparison of sources of agglomeration economies (this 
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is more common in economic geography and sociology). However, economists are 
certainly apt to rule out other likely suspects, including differences in the natural 
advantage of geographic areas and in the supply of entrepreneurs (e.g. entrepreneur 
clusters in the state of Florida because self-employment becomes more likely with age). 
In this section, I draw on different synthesis articles to discuss the state of knowledge on 
the scope and effect of clustering and to demonstrate the overwhelming focus on high 
skill workers in high tech and other exporting industries. This leads me to conclude that 
there is a gap in our knowledge of the clustering behavior of traditional entrepreneurs 
who often work in local services and have no employees.  
In a comprehensive review of 67 agglomeration studies from around the world, 
Beaudry & Schiffauerova (2009) weigh in on the localization-urbanization debate. Which 
is more conducive to growth? The evidence is about equal for both and, as the authors 
conclude of economic findings in general, ‘it depends!’ They make a number of useful 
observations from the data about what industrial and geographic facts matter. First, 
service and high tech manufacturing clusters are more likely to grow through 
urbanization economies while localization economies are more strongly associated with 
lower tech manufacturing growth. Second, clustering at small levels of geography (zip 
code level and highly populated spots in metropolitan areas being the smallest variety 
studied) reveals a larger influence on growth than clustering at the county, metropolitan 
area or state level. At smaller geographies, both localization and urbanization economies 
are more likely to be related to growth, which makes the localization-urbanization (i.e. 
Jacobs-MAR) debate less important in sub-regional analyses. Third, both types of 
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clusters are significantly related to new firm births, but small firms benefit much more 
from localization economies than large firms, whether new or not.  
There are many fewer economic studies that answer the specific question of 
whether entrepreneurs (or at least small firms) cluster to a degree that generates regional 
growth, partly due to the problem of isolating the direction of causality in situations of 
cumulative causation such as agglomeration. But for the few that have tackled the 
question, the evidence is positive. Acs & Armington (2006) document the relationship of 
entrepreneur clusters to employment growth extensively. Glaeser, Kerr, et al., (2010) use 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the metro area-industry level to measure entrepreneur 
concentration. They find that clusters of small (employer) firms lead to more (employer) 
startups, in all sectors but especially in manufacturing. Although they call the causal 
relationship inconclusive and they do not directly compare the different agglomeration 
mechanisms, the authors hold the most hope for the relationship being caused by lower 
costs for entrepreneurship in clusters (rather than greater returns). To my knowledge, 
there are no quantitative studies that operationalize clusters as self-employed people and 
also include firms with no employees or entrepreneurs working from home. In a related 
empirical inquiry, Glaeser (2007) shows that higher rates of self-employment in 
metropolitan areas correlate with growth. He finds little support for the idea that those 
high rates (usually caused by high rates in one or more specific industries) correspond to 
more entrepreneurship in other industries, as a learning mechanism might suggest.   
Why co-located firms see cost-reductions or exhibit positive externalities (i.e. the 
source of agglomeration) is not well known. Equally unknown is why entrepreneur 
clusters see cost-reductions. In an unusual study that compares (proxies) for different 
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agglomeration sources in manufacturing clusters, Rosenthal & Strange (2001) show that 
labor market pooling has the most robust effect on new firm entry, positively influencing 
clustering at the zip code, county and state level. Audretsch & Feldman (1996) use the 
locational Gini coefficient to measure geographic concentration in a number of industries 
and find that innovation activity is highly clustered. By ruling out the explanation that 
this is due to clustered manufacturing firms (producers), they demonstrate the existence 
of knowledge spillovers. A third study more directly compares services and 
manufacturing clusters and upon finding stronger growth effects in service firms, shows 
that it is most likely due to knowledge spillovers (Bosma, Stam, & Schutjens, 2009). 
Compared to manufacturing, service activities can be produced in small quantities and 
still be efficient, so new, often small entrants contribute more easily to productivity 
improvements. These studies suggest that if agglomeration economies exist in services, 
they are of the learning mechanism variety rather than labor pooling or cost sharing.  
Agglomeration theory is not the only reason for clustering. An alternative theory 
explains clustering as the evolutionary process of spinoffs—where an employee of a 
successful company leaves to start his or her own business—and there is a surprisingly 
large amount of empirical work on this issue. Important for this dissertation, there seem 
to be fewer differences between service and manufacturing industries according to the 
spinoff theory of clusters (Boschma & Frenken, 2011). Klepper (2010) uses historical 
data on the birth of new firms to show that spinoffs are a likely cause of clustering in 
Silicon Valley’s semiconductor industry and Detroit’s automobile industry, two of the 
largest clusters in American history. Though his study does not test the alternative 
hypothesis that agglomeration caused the cluster, he remarks that the superior performers 
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were not firms attracted from other areas and their success appears to be based on firm 
capacities present at the time of entry rather than a benefit of co-location. These reasons 
argue against agglomeration. Sorenson (2000) finds a similar spinoff phenomenon in the 
clustering of shoe manufacturers in different U.S. regions. She attributes the high rate of 
spinoffs to the fact that entrepreneurs who previously worked in that industry know the 
players and local conventions for establishing trust. A rather large number of industry 
studies in Europe, including cars, fashion design, tires, semiconductors, banking and 
publishing, also support the spinoff theory of clustering (as cited by Boschma & Frenken, 
2011). Like Klepper’s, these studies do not identify what it is that spinoffs inherit. Some 
likely candidates are knowledge, organizational capabilities, network relationships, or 
even reputation (Boschma & Frenken, 2011; Dahl & Sorenson, 2012). In any case, to 
explain regional growth, the spinoff theory would need to identify what the spinoff is 
doing differently than the parent firm because otherwise it is merely changing the 
organizational form in which some production is happening (Klepper, 2010).  
Neighborhood clustering. Traditional entrepreneurs have received almost no 
attention under cluster theory. We know little about how these very small-scale service 
providers operate as a group, despite the preceding literature review that suggests groups 
of entrepreneurs can be an important unit by which to measure economic success. One 
reason is that cluster studies in the U.S. have interpreted the learning mechanism as 
scientific knowledge transferred in ideas and skills (refer to Table 3-1). As Audretsch & 
Feldman (2004) point out, in the North American context, learning capacity has been 
operationalized as the proportion of workers with advanced degrees, while in the 
European context learning has been studied in specialized small firms in traditional 
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industries such as apparel and metalworking. U.S. studies have found that clustering 
happens in knowledge-based industries and among high skill workers and entrepreneurs. 
One study that makes a direct comparison of skill level is Gabe & Abel (2010) who find 
that employees in low skill industries are not as likely as those in high skill and creative 
industries to cluster in metropolitan areas. Specifically, they use a locational Gini 
coefficient to show that workers in the social sciences, engineering, physical sciences and 
arts are the most geographically concentrated groups, while those in personal services 
and sales, clerical positions, mechanical occupations, and low-skilled labor are more 
spread out across metropolitan areas.  
There are a number of explanations for why regional clustering and positive 
externalities would not be apparent in traditional entrepreneurship. The first is that human 
and financial capital are only weakly associated with new business formation in low 
barrier industries (Bates et al., 2011). In contrast, the availability of financial and human 
capital inputs are some of the most important determinants of entrepreneur clusters in 
mainstream economic models. Second, traditional entrepreneurs are likely to have few or 
no employees. That means the role of labor pooling and matching incentives to cluster 
are weaker than in studies of entrepreneurship in general. Third, traditional entrepreneurs 
are less likely to fit the portrait of a profit-maximizing firm seeking the best location (e.g. 
land prices, crime rates) upon generating a novel business idea, and more likely to locate 
close to home due to family and friend networks that support their business (Dahl & 
Sorenson, 2009). Finally, traditional entrepreneurs are unlikely to produce export goods 
or services. Clusters at the city level are conventionally taken to indicate a primarily 
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exporting group of firms (Kolko & Neumark, 2010). Low barrier industries, such as 
personal services and home remodeling serve more localized markets.  
While it is reasonable to think traditional entrepreneurs would not cluster in 
particular regions, research from sociology and urban studies indicate they maintain local 
social networks that directly and indirectly effect entrepreneur success. Ruef (2010) 
studied traditional and high-tech entrepreneurs to show that in both cases, entering and 
maintaining an entrepreneur venture largely depends on one’s social ties. He argued that 
entrepreneurship is necessarily a group process, where nascent groups are formed, 
evolve, adapt over time, and may or may not result in a new venture, but act collectively 
when they do. These networks though, tend to be smaller and less diverse for 
entrepreneurs with less education (Schutjens & Völker, 2010). Studies of minority 
(Valdez, 2011) and women (Loscocco, Monnat, Moore, & Lauber, 2009) entrepreneurs 
indicate family members are one of the most important sources of support, for example 
by providing unpaid labor. Strong social networks may explain why some studies have 
found formal education is important for starting, but not succeeding (profiting) at a new 
venture (Davidsson & Wiklund, 2001; Montgomery et al., 2005).  
I argue that social networks that influence business in traditional trades may be 
more accurately captured at the neighborhood level. A large literature on ‘neighborhood 
effects’ finds that regardless of individual characteristics, such as education, the fates of 
low income residents (e.g. the ability to find a job) tend to rise or fall together (Clampet-
Lundquist & Massey, 2008; Forrest & Kearns, 2001; Guest & Wierzbicki, 1999; 
Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002; Woolcock, 1998). Whether intentional or 
not, neighborhood social capital influences economic success. This thinking has been 
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applied to entrepreneurship in the Survey of the Social Networks of Entrepreneurs in the 
Netherlands, which surveyed 385 entrepreneurs in any industry that are home-based or 
work within their neighborhood (i.e. a ten minute walk or less). They find that the more 
highly educated entrepreneurs have more network ties, but the medium educated ones 
have more neighborhood ties (Schutjens & Völker, 2010). Moreover, in statistical tests of 
the survey, neighborhood ties were found significantly (positively) associated with job 
satisfaction and employment growth (though not profits).  
Few agglomeration studies are conducted at a geography smaller than the city. 
Rosenthal & Strange (2003) produced the seminal study in this regard. They found that 
new businesses are most likely to cluster within a mile of the zip code of other firms in 
their industry and the effects drop off sharply by five miles distance. That is, new firms 
born in 1997 were most likely to spring up in close proximity to similar firms clustered in 
1996, for the six industries they studied (e.g. software, manufacturing). Their study 
excluded low-barrier industries because one criterion of selection was that the industry 
must have a national or international sales scope and their data did not allow them to 
capture entrepreneurs without employees or a physical location. Nevertheless, they 
provide some of the only evidence that firms cluster at the neighborhood level. There is 
also evidence of neighborhood entrepreneur clustering among specific groups, such as 
artists (Stern & Seifert, 2010) and immigrants (Fong & Shen, 2010). Given the 
importance of social networks to traditional entrepreneurs and the types of networks 
maintained, the first hypothesis relates to the geography of traditional entrepreneur 
clusters. 
Hypothesis 1: Traditional entrepreneurs cluster at the neighborhood level. 
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Applying cluster theory to neighborhoods suggests some interesting mechanisms 
by which groups of traditional entrepreneurs would either be more productive themselves 
or generate growth through an environment hospitable to new firm entry and spinoffs. 
Learning-based agglomeration, specifically the generation of ideas and the diffusion of 
information are good places to start. Entrepreneurial succession is a well-documented 
contributor to the propensity for entrepreneurship, especially among middle-class 
families (Valdez, 2011). As Valdez says, those with a family history of business 
ownership “reveal a confidence in pursuing entrepreneurship as an alternative to wage 
work that is unique when compared to their peers without such experience” (p. 51). In 
one study, having family and neighbors who are entrepreneurs fully doubled the odds of 
going into self-employment (Davidsson & Honig, 2003). If traditional entrepreneurs tend 
to stay in the neighborhood they grew up in, learning through succession could create an 
entrepreneur cluster over time. 
Information diffusion and idea generation among co-located entrepreneurs may 
also foster cluster growth. Glaeser (2007) argues that erstwhile customers may ‘learn’ 
from a local entrepreneur and become one him/herself. Though he does not find support 
at the regional level, the type of services supplied by traditional entrepreneurs are highly 
localized, so customers are more likely to come from the immediate area and may 
therefore demonstrate clustering. Along these lines, Sassen (2001) finds that 
entrepreneurs in the informal economy serve local demand for services that are not 
offered by the mainstream economy, such as home-based child care and gypsy cabs 
which sprung up in New York’s low income neighborhoods that formal companies 
refused to serve. An entrepreneur’s customers are important networks for idea generation 
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and information (Boschma & Ter Wal, 2007; Glaeser, 2007a; Porter, 1998; Rosenthal & 
Strange, 2004). Monitoring consumer demand and how it might be supplied with 
available resources is specific information that may only be accessed by living within the 
community and moving in the same social circles. These agglomeration arguments 
parallel those made about local information within an established firm generating spinoff 
entrepreneurs (Audretsch & Feldman, 2004).  
Sharing mechanisms also constitute some possibilities for clustering in traditional 
entrepreneurship. Bartering and trading services is a common occurrence among 
entrepreneurs in the informal economy (Losby et al., 2002; Williams & Nadin, 2010). 
These activities help entrepreneurs start their business and operate on thin margins during 
tough times. Being part of a group could make the difference for business survival. 
Another potential sharing mechanism among traditional entrepreneurs with physical 
establishments is to share the cost of political action. Whereas mobile entrepreneurs can 
select their location from across the metropolitan area, low-barrier services are more 
closely tied to their neighborhood customer base. At the same time, to stay viable, 
working class neighborhoods must organize against the economic development interests 
of the city, which include siting new infrastructure and market-based redevelopment that 
lures outside investors into a decaying community using land use and tax incentives 
(Logan & Molotch, 1987; Turner, 1999). Individual entrepreneurs in a neighborhood will 
have little political power, but Sutton's (2010) case study of a New York neighborhood 
showed that acting collectively, neighborhood small businesses have been able to access 
resources to prevent land use decisions that would be detrimental to their businesses.  
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These potential mechanisms for agglomeration among traditional entrepreneurs 
suggest several insights. First, inter-industry linkages are likely a stronger source of 
agglomeration at the neighborhood level. This is consistent with the empirical findings on 
services, although those studies often refer to publishing or design rather than low barrier 
services (Boschma & Frenken, 2011). On the other hand, the empirical meta-analysis also 
suggested that small firms are decidedly more influenced by intra-industry relationships. 
But many traditional entrepreneurs are not only small, they have no employees or 
physical establishment, thus inter-industry linkages should be more common. Second, the 
lack of employees means that matching mechanisms are less likely than other 
agglomeration sources such as sharing and various types of learning. Therefore the 
second hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Traditional entrepreneurs cluster due to inter-industry learning and 
sharing. 
Neighborhood social networks, whether intentionally fostered for business success or not, 
could result in clusters of traditional entrepreneurs in some neighborhoods and not in 
others. I explore these hypotheses quantitatively and qualitatively in the next sections. 
Quantitative Methods and Analytic Tactics 
Data sources. To determine the extent of neighborhood clustering, I use publicly 
available self-employment data from the American Community Survey (ACS), 
previously the Decennial Census long form. Like the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
used in several studies of entrepreneurship, the annual ACS asks a nationwide sample of 
workers 16 and older whether they are employed by the government, a for-profit 
company, nonprofit company or are self-employed. Specifically, they are asked at which 
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job they spent the most hours last week, which means self-employed persons may also 
have a part time wage job. Unlike the CPS, the ACS is available at the Census Tract 
level, the boundary commonly used for neighborhood research in public policy (e.g. 
Galster, Quercia, Cortes, & Malega, 2003); and unlike establishment level data 
commonly used in agglomeration studies, ACS captures home-based entrepreneurs and 
informal entrepreneurship. Schneider (2002) estimated that the informal economy in the 
U.S. varies between seven and nine percent of Gross Domestic Product, depending on the 
year.  
To ensure statistical reliability comparable to the decennial census, the ACS 
makes Census Tract level data available as 5-year composites of their annual survey 
estimates. This study uses the first 5-year file, the 2005-2009 ACS (hereafter 2007*). 
Although more recent surveys are available, the 2007* file uses 2000 tract boundaries, 
which can be linked to the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses using commercial data files 
produced by Geolytics. I accessed these data through public libraries and used them to 
create a three-year, neighborhood level panel dataset to measure change in neighborhoods 
over time. According to the ACS, the major variables in my analysis are measured 
identically in the three periods, except where I note in the findings section. 
I report neighborhood self-employment information for 12 regions that are 
representative of the U.S. census divisions and vary on important economic development 
measures, including population size, population growth rate, and self-employment rate 
(see Table 3-3). I have grouped them by population growth to facilitate interpretation of 
the results. Stagnant regions declined in population in the 1990s or 2000s, while 
ascendant regions grew over 20 percent in one or both periods. 
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Table 3-3. Regional Statistics 
Metropolitan statistical area 
Population 
2009 
Growth rate  Self employ-
ment rate 
2009 
 
1990 – 
1999 
2000 – 
2009 
Ascending 
    Raleigh-Cary, NC 1,125,827 28.8  41.2  8.6 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 4,364,094 34.6  34.2  9.7 
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO  2,552,195 22.1  17.1  10.8 
Maintaining 
    Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice, FL 688,126 12.4  16.6  14.8 
Spokane, WA 468,684 13.4  12.1  11.1 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 2,171,896 7.9  8.1  7.5 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, 
CA 12,874,797 10.4  4.1  12.8 
New York-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 19,069,796 3.2  4.1  9.9 
Stagnant or declining 
    Abilene, TX 160,070 2.4  (0.1) 9.7 
Flint, MI 424,043 1.6  (2.8) 9.8 
Dayton, OH 835,063 0.8  (1.5) 7.3 
Scranton, PA 549,454 (4.2) (2.0) 7.2 
     Average of all 366 MSAs 703,156 10.0  10.0  10.0 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Historical Estimates Data; U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 
 
Working class neighborhoods. I use neighborhood data for the 12 counties in 
which these cities are located (i.e. the county seat). This ensures that I capture 
neighborhoods with residents of modest means, which are commonly formed between the 
central cities and suburban periphery. Using the county seat also helps exclude 
agricultural-based areas, which have similar education levels to my neighborhoods of 
interest and high rates of self-employment, but have a distinct class culture from that of 
traditional entrepreneurs.  
Because the ACS is a neighborhood-level database, I cannot identify traditional 
entrepreneurs directly. Instead, I focus on neighborhoods in which traditional 
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entrepreneurs are likely to live and/or work. For ease of communication, I call these 
working class neighborhoods. Working class neighborhoods are those with a below 
average rate of college attainment but average poverty level (see more on the definition in 
Chapter 2). The downside of this approach is that it restricts what can be said about 
‘traditional entrepreneurs’ to a potentially non-representative sample of traditional 
entrepreneurs who live in neighborhoods of a particular character. There is also no way to 
verify the extent of sample selection bias and whether it could be improved upon by 
better operationalizing a ‘typical’ working class neighborhood. I take steps to make this 
process as data-driven as possible, as I explain shortly, but it is a limitation of using the 
ACS. Another limitation is that the ACS is a household level survey so the location of 
self-employed respondents reflects their residence, not business (if they work outside of 
their home). The upside of starting with neighborhood characteristics is that many local 
and federal community economic development programs also target neighborhoods of a 
certain demographic. Therefore, the findings can more accurately be applied to place-
based development strategies.  
Working class neighborhoods are primarily operationalized as those where the 
proportion of college graduates in the neighborhood falls between 10 and 30 percent. The 
national college graduation rate is 33 percent (by age 25), so the upper bound for a 
working class neighborhood was set at slightly less than the national average. For many 
of the counties, the 30 to 35 percent interval was also the point at which the 
neighborhood poverty rate dropped more dramatically than in any other five percentage 
point interval. A lower bound was set because below a 10 percent college attainment rate 
corresponded to high poverty rates on average. For many of the counties, a population of 
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10-15 percent college graduates was the first five point interval at which the median 
neighborhood was no longer in concentrated poverty. For public policy purposes, 
concentrated poverty is defined as an area with a greater than 20 percent poverty rate 
(Kingsley & Pettit, 2003). Counties that do not fall as neatly into the upper and lower 
education cutoffs are likely to capture more poverty neighborhoods than less.
3
 To better 
target traditional entrepreneurs in desirable self-employment situations and 
neighborhoods, I also exclude very poor neighborhoods, despite their education levels. 
This also helps exclude gentrifying neighborhoods and potential artist clusters. Extreme 
poverty is defined as an area with a greater than 40 percent poverty rate (Kingsley & 
Pettit, 2003). However, the economic downturn has meant more neighborhoods fit the 
definition of concentrated poverty (Kneebone, Nadeau, & Berube, 2011). Therefore 
(somewhat arbitrarily) I exclude neighborhoods with poverty rates greater than 30 
percent. 
From this population of neighborhoods, I exclude ethnic enclaves because 
immigrant clusters are known for their entrepreneurialism (Fairchild, 2010). There is no 
accepted statistical definition of an ethnic enclave. In fact, every study I reviewed used a 
relative measure. I have defined ethnic enclaves as neighborhoods with more than 20 
percent of the population foreign born, which is much higher than the national average of 
13 percent foreign born and is used to define other types of residential ‘concentration,’ as 
discussed above. Immigration rates vary substantially by county and so this process had 
little effect in some of the regions and major effects in others, eliminating many 
neighborhoods in New York and Los Angeles Identifying working class neighborhoods 
                                                 
3
 I do not use high school education rates to define working class because I found that most of the variance 
in the 12 counties is explained by the negative correlation between high school graduate rate and rate of 
foreign-born.  
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at the outset is important to help exclude college educated entrepreneurs. Further, non-
working class neighborhoods may inflate cluster estimates because college educated 
workers are more likely to be entrepreneurs, and neighborhoods are stratified by socio-
economic factors so a high rate of entrepreneurship in a neighborhood could simply 
represent a large number of college educated residents living there (Kneebone et al., 
2011).  
Table 3-4. Sample Demographics 
 Average 
Working class  
neighborhoods 
County seat 
B.A./ 
graduate 
degree rate 
Poverty 
rate 
Foreign 
born rate Number Percent 
Scranton, Pennsylvania 22 15 4 38 66 
Flint, Michigan 17 20 2 71 55 
Abilene, Texas 20 19 4 18 51 
Sarasota, Florida 29 10 11 42 51 
Dayton, Ohio 22 18 3 70 48 
Spokane, Washington 26 15 5 46 43 
Cincinnati, Ohio 30 18 4 79 35 
Phoenix, Arizona 27 15 17 178 27 
Raleigh, North Carolina 46 12 12 14 13 
Denver, Colorado 40 18 15 14 10 
Los Angeles, California 27 16 35 120 6 
Brooklyn, New York 28 20 36 27 4 
      County average 28 16 12 60 34 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 
The results of identifying working class neighborhoods are shown in Table 3-4. In 
total, the dataset includes 4,491 census tracts with non-zero employment, 717 of which 
are working class according to my definition. Within the 717 tracts are 1.5 million 
employed workers. Consistent with my inclusion criteria, t-tests reveal that working class 
neighborhoods have lower average rates of college attainment (nine percentage points), 
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poverty (six percentage points) and foreign born status (22 percentage points). The 
differences were statistically significant at the .05 level. Additionally, labor market 
statistics such as labor force participation and unemployment are negligibly different 
(less than a percentage point or non-significant). Self-employment is three percentage 
points lower in working class neighborhoods on average and is statistically significant. 
This is not unexpected because although traditional entrepreneurs make up a large 
percentage of the self-employed population, those without a college degree have a lower 
rate of self-employment (not rate of entry) than those with a college degree. Still, an 
important caveat to the apparent difference in rates of self-employment in working and 
non-working class neighborhoods is that it is within the margin of error of the underlying 
survey data. Using calculations by the American Community Survey of the margin of 
error on reported self-employment (unincorporated only) at the neighborhood level, I 
found the neighborhood average is four percent in my sample counties, with a high of six 
percent in Brooklyn. As the number of neighborhoods included approaches the full 
county, those errors decrease to a one percentage point error or less, but for counties with 
few working class neighborhoods, the average neighborhood self-employment rate 
suffers from imprecision.   
Measure of concentration. Clustering within working class neighborhoods is 
measured with the locational Gini coefficient, similar to that constructed by Gabe & Abel 
(2011) and others. A locational Gini coefficient measures the extent to which self-
employed people are equally likely to live in any working class neighborhood (adjusted 
for the total number of employed people in that neighborhood) or whether they cluster in 
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certain neighborhoods. It is calculated for each county k’s working class neighborhoods, 
as follows: 
      
 
  
 
where, 
       
 
        
         
 
            
i,j     = working class neighborhoods
4
 (i ≠ j) 
u      = mean of    
      = neighborhood i’s (j’s) share of self-employment / neighborhood i’s (j’s) 
share of total employment 
n      = number of working class neighborhoods 
The calculation results in values between 0 and .5 depending on whether the 
county’s aggregate entrepreneur rate is evenly represented in each neighborhood (0) or 
perfectly concentrated in one neighborhood (.5). The Gini coefficient is most common 
statistic to measure employment concentration (rather than industry/firm concentration) 
(Beaudry & Schiffauerova, 2009). The two major criticisms of the Gini are that it does 
not account for random variation in spatial patterns and it is sensitive to the number of (in 
my study) self-employed workers (Kim, Barkley, & Henry, 2000). The former is less of a 
concern in my application because it refers to the fact that certain industries are likely to 
operate in large scale, so some degree of employment concentration is related to 
differences in average plant size rather than agglomeration forces. The latter issue is a 
potential limitation in my study. Kim and co-authors identify a threshold at which the 
                                                 
4
 The notation for a neighborhood is both i and j because it must represent the average absolute deviation 
about a fixed Xi for all other X’s, noted by Xj. 
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Gini coefficient will be biased (upwards). Bias occurs when (in my study) the number of 
self-employed people is smaller than the number of neighborhoods. This is never the 
case, as the number of self-employed is always in the thousands. However, sensitivity to 
sample size may be an issue when the number of self-employed people and 
neighborhoods are small. Bertinelli & Decrop (2005) showed that when comparing Gini 
coefficients over two time periods, regions that started with few plants showed large 
changes in their coefficients due to the entry or exit of just one plant. The problem of 
small sample bias also holds true for other popular measures of concentration, such as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and Ellison and Glaeser’s 1997 index. 
The next section presents the findings of the statistical analysis. I find that the 
level of clustering is very similar among the 12 sample counties. While the concentration 
of self-employed workers in neighborhoods is not high, traditional entrepreneurs are not 
equally spread across working class neighborhood, and this finding implies some degree 
of clustering. A multilevel model of the association between regions, neighborhood 
socioeconomic characteristics and neighborhood self-employment reveals little about 
why rates of entrepreneurship vary by neighborhood. Site visits and interviews with 
entrepreneurs will be used to investigate whether neighborhood social networks and 
potential agglomeration mechanisms explain the differences. 
Findings from Statistical Analysis 
First, I present the locational Gini coefficients for the major employment groups, 
regardless of region (see Table 3-5). As expected, wage and salary workers in for-profit 
firms are almost (.037) uniformly divided across neighborhoods. Entrepreneurs who have 
formally incorporated their business (suggesting they have paid employees) are the most 
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highly clustered worker type, with a coefficient of .245. This means their spatial 
distribution is at the halfway mark between being equally spread across all 
neighborhoods and concentrated entirely in one neighborhood. Minor clustering also 
occurs among the unincorporated self-employed, at a level similar to government and 
nonprofit workers and the unemployed. Comparing Gini coefficients to one another as I 
have done, has become the conventional method for interpreting when clustering above 
zero is particularly noteworthy (Bertinelli & Decrop, 2005; Ellison & Glaeser, 1997). 
Another useful comparison is between worker types and occupations. For example, the 
coefficient of for-profit worker clustering is similar to Gabe & Abel's (2011) lowest 
coefficient in regional occupation clustering, which is secretaries (.037 compared to 
.052)
5
; self-employment clustering (.162) is comparable to engineer (.189) and scientist 
(.154) clustering; and the most concentrated occupation was shoe machine operators at 
.490, nearly twice the most concentrated worker type at the neighborhood level.
 
  
Table 3-5. Neighborhood Clustering by Type of Worker in All Study Counties 
Type of worker  
Workers         
(in 000s) 
Percent of 
total 
workforce 
Locational 
Gini 
coefficient 
For-profit 1,086 65.0 0.037 
Government 225 13.5 0.126 
Nonprofit 106 6.4 0.144 
Self-employed 88 5.3 0.162 
Self-employed (inc.) 42 2.5 0.245 
Unemployed 122 7.3 0.141 
    Total 1,670 100.0 NA 
Source: Author’s calculations; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community 
Survey 
Note: 717 neighborhoods in 12 counties 
                                                 
5
 Research using a different index of concentration found that the average level of concentration at the 
district level compared to the township level was .04 and .02, respectively, and concluded that smaller 
geographies are likely to reveal more spatial concentration, all else equal (Bertinelli & Decrop, 2005). 
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An improvement on the descriptive statistics I report is to use significance tests of 
the locational Gini coefficient to determine how slight changes in the underlying data 
effect it or whether differences in the coefficients (such as between self-employment and 
nonprofits) are statistically significant. Currently, there is no one test for any of the 
spatial concentration indices, and the variance calculation needed to test the hypotheses 
that the coefficients are statistically different is fairly complicated according to 
statisticians and economists working on the problem, and not yet a standard practice in 
concentration analyses (Bertinelli & Decrop, 2005; Davidson, 2009; Ellison & Glaeser, 
1997; Giles, 2004). Faster computational methods based on Ordinary Least Squares exist, 
but their accuracy and robustness have been called into question in many papers (see 
Davidson, 2009 for review) and they have not yet been applied to the locational Gini. 
Future research on neighborhood self-employment should monitor the progress on 
statistical analyses of concentration measures. As for the current project, I follow the 
precedence set by (Gabe & Abel, 2010, 2011) who draw conclusions from metropolitan 
level Gini coefficients despite no significance tests and small variation among their 
coefficients (a standard deviation of .1 around a mean Gini coefficient of .2 in the 
industries they study). In addition, after reporting the findings, I conduct other 
comparison tests to determine the reliable of the coefficients. 
Note that the aggregate self-employment Gini coefficients could be heavily 
weighted by counties with many census tracts and workers. To look more closely at 
neighborhood self-employment clustering, I turn to the regional analysis of Gini scores. 
In these tables, I combine incorporated and unincorporated self-employment except 
where noted. Table 3-6 shows that all but one coefficient falls between .11 and .16, which 
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demonstrates a very minor degree of clustering. Brooklyn is an outlier with a coefficient 
of .24, but it is also the region with the fewest self-employed persons so the score may be 
rather unstable. Although the primary purpose of this research is to investigate the scope 
of potential agglomeration economies, according to the theory these figures would be 
more meaningful if they demonstrated a relationship to economic growth on some level. I 
use the word relationship purposely because the self-reinforcing cycle of agglomeration-
related growth makes it nearly impossible to identify causality. Therefore, at this stage I 
merely seek to demonstrate relationships or patterns. In the remainder of this analysis, I 
investigate such patterns. I also take an initial look at other potential explanations for 
clustering that could rule out agglomeration theory.  
Table 3-6. Neighborhood Clustering and Regional Population Growth 
County seat 
Working class 
neighborhoods 
Self-
employed 
workers 
Locational 
Gini 
coefficient 
Ascending 
   Raleigh, North Carolina 14 3,650 0.13 
Phoenix, Arizona 178 46,756 0.12 
Denver, Colorado 14 1,911 0.13 
Maintaining 
   Sarasota, Florida 42 12,297 0.11 
Spokane, Washington 46 8,031 0.14 
Cincinnati, Ohio 79 10,375 0.15 
Los Angeles, California 120 22,104 0.15 
Brooklyn, New York 27 1,583 0.24 
Stagnant or declining 
   Abilene, Texas 18 2,373 0.15 
Flint, Michigan 71 8,646 0.12 
Dayton, Ohio 70 7,776 0.16 
Scranton, Pennsylvania 38 5,176 0.13 
Total 717 130,678 NA 
Source: Author’s calculations; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community 
Survey 
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In Table 3-6, I sort the coefficients (at the two digit level to facilitate pattern 
recognition) by the rate of population growth in the regions. While population is a gross 
measure of economic growth, it has been unambiguously related to the rate of new firm 
formation (Acs & Armington, 2006; Reynolds, Storey, & Westhead, 1994). I find no 
evident pattern of entrepreneur clustering in working class neighborhoods and the 
region’s overall growth. Indeed, given these data, it is easier to claim that high growth 
conditions reduce clustering, rather than clusters facilitating growth! For instance, we 
might hypothesize that the similarly low coefficients among the ascending areas are the 
result of neighborhoods that have too much churning for neighborhood networks to 
develop (although the correspondence between clustering and the remaining region types 
calls this hypothesis into question).  
A more direct relationship may be found between the degree of clustering and the 
regional self-employment rate. Agglomeration theory predicts that more clustered regions 
offer a better atmosphere to spawn entrepreneurs (and conversely, more entrepreneurs 
increase the benefits of clustering). Thus higher neighborhood cluster scores should 
correspond to higher self-employment rates. An even more direct connection would be 
higher entrepreneurship rates within working class neighborhoods. After all, working 
class neighborhoods are just a portion of all neighborhoods. Table 3-7 ranks the regions 
by their locational Gini coefficient. Consequently, the self-employment rates should 
generally fall in descending order. Neither the region nor neighborhood self-employment 
rate shows a clear relationship to the cluster score. In fact the least clustered region, 
Sarasota, has the highest rate of entrepreneurship in working class neighborhoods and 
neighborhoods overall. 
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Table 3-7. Neighborhood Clustering and Self-employment Rates at the Regional and 
Neighborhood Level 
 
 
Self-employment rate 
County seat 
Locational 
Gini 
coefficient 
All 
neighborhoods 
Working Class 
neighborhoods 
Brooklyn, New York 0.242 8.7 5.2 
Dayton, Ohio 0.156 6.9 6.0 
Los Angeles, California 0.154 12.9 9.2 
Abilene, Texas 0.148 9.5 8.7 
Cincinnati, Ohio 0.146 8.0 6.5 
Spokane, Washington 0.138 10.2 9.1 
Raleigh, North Carolina 0.133 9.2 8.0 
Scranton, Pennsylvania 0.129 8.3 7.8 
Denver, Colorado 0.125 10.8 8.1 
Flint, Michigan 0.124 8.4 8.2 
Phoenix, Arizona 0.123 9.9 8.5 
Sarasota, Florida 0.111 17.6 14.9 
    Average 0.144 10.0 8.4 
Source: Author’s calculations; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community 
Survey 
Note: Includes 717 neighborhoods and 131,000 workers 
 
The preceding analysis reveals no evidence of neighborhood agglomeration in a 
cross-sectional snapshot. The most precise test of the theory may be to reveal a 
relationship between neighborhood cluster growth and cluster score. If clustering is 
caused by agglomeration, regions with higher Gini scores should be associated with 
greater increases in neighborhood entrepreneurship. These data cannot capture the 
dynamic measure of firm births used in many studies, but linking 2007* working class 
neighborhoods to 2000 and 1990 data allows a basic measure of self-employment 
change.
6
 In this analysis, self-employment statistics are limited to unincorporated firms 
due to constraints in the 1990 Census. Table 3-8 shows the results. The second and third 
                                                 
6
 The * symbol is used to indicate that the 2007 data file includes data from 2005-2009. See the methods 
section for more explanation. 
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columns show changes in the self-employment rate over the preceding period (2000). 
Self-employment was about equally likely to grow as to decline in each region. That is, 
about 50 percent of neighborhoods in each region saw their entrepreneurship grow. More 
to the point, the variation that does exist does not correspond to the Gini score. This 
conclusion also holds when change is measured by degree: clustered regions do not see 
larger increases (and smaller decreases) in their neighborhood entrepreneurship rate on 
average. The far right columns, show the same analysis, but this time I draw on an earlier 
reference period to simulate a lag between entrepreneurship growth in the 2000s and the 
cluster score determined in 2007*.  
Table 3-8. Neighborhood Clustering and Self-employment Growth in Working 
Class Neighborhoods 
 
 
Change in self-employment rate (unincorp.)  
 
2007* 2007* - 2000 2000 – 1990 
County seat 
Locational 
Gini 
coefficient 
Percent 
of 
neighbor-
hoods 
that grew 
Percentage 
point (avg.) 
growth/ 
decline  
Percent 
of 
neighbor-
hoods 
that grew 
Percentage 
point (avg.) 
growth/ 
decline  
Brooklyn, NY 0.242 25.9 -0.59 55.6 0.73 
Dayton, OH 0.156 50.0 0.02 40.0 -0.40 
Los Angeles, CA 0.154 51.7 0.56 50.8 0.01 
Abilene, TX 0.148 50.0 0.34 27.8 -2.01 
Cincinnati, OH 0.146 48.1 -0.32 53.2 0.20 
Spokane, WA 0.138 50.0 -0.05 26.1 -1.26 
Raleigh, NC 0.133 57.1 0.88 35.7 -1.05 
Scranton, PA 0.129 47.4 -0.20 44.7 -0.27 
Denver, CO 0.125 64.3 1.08 50.0 -3.40 
Flint, MI 0.124 47.9 0.18 42.3 -0.11 
Phoenix, AZ 0.123 44.9 -0.15 37.6 -1.02 
Sarasota, FL 0.111 35.7 -1.00 52.4 -0.03 
      Average 0.144 47.8 0.06 43.0 -0.72 
Source: Author’s calculations; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community 
Survey; 2000 Decennial Census and 1990 Decennial Census 
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Note: All calculations are based on the 717 neighborhoods identified as working class in 
2007*  
 
It is important to remember that these data are far from definitive on the 
relationship between neighborhood clustering and neighborhood change. Several factors 
that are unrelated to cluster growth effect change in neighborhood self-employment. For 
example, an increase in unemployment among former wage workers, all else equal, 
would artificially increase the self-employment rate because the total neighborhood 
population employed (the denominator) would decrease. Residential mobility is another 
factor that could effect self-employment rates and erroneously suggest cluster growth. 
Change analysis also introduces problems with small sample sizes. Regions with few 
working class neighborhoods (Brooklyn, Raleigh, Abilene and Denver all have fewer 
than 30) are more effected by change in just one or two neighborhoods. For instance, if 
just two neighborhoods in Denver had shrunk rather than grown their entrepreneurship 
rate since 2000, it would not be the outlier (64.3 percent positive growth) in the lineup 
that it is. In fact, for the columns showing change since 2000, the values become more 
sequential when the four small regions are removed. I investigate this issue of size and 
stability towards the end of the quantitative analysis. 
Other explanations of clustering. No pattern of neighborhood clustering is 
evident at the neighborhood or regional level according to these economic indicators. The 
results suggest two potential conclusions about agglomeration theory. Either extending 
the theory to the neighborhood level does not have the predicted effect of better growth 
outcomes, or the variation in Gini coefficients is not caused by agglomeration sources. I 
investigate the former in Chapter 4 where I posit a relationship between entrepreneurs 
and local area resilience rather than growth. As for the latter, several conventional 
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explanations for entrepreneurship variation could be at work. Perhaps the coefficients are 
somewhat an artifact of how neighborhoods operate in these regions more generally. For 
example, Fairchild (2008) found that neighborhood segregation stifles entrepreneurship 
among African Americans. There is no broad measure of neighborhood sorting, but the 
dissimilarity index is one indicator of neighborhood culture in regions. Frey (2012) 
reports the dissimilarity index for the largest 100 metropolitan areas. The index scores the 
regions by their level of black-white neighborhood integration. These scores are available 
for eight of my 12 regions, and they do indicate a relationship to the locational Gini 
coefficients. Brooklyn has the highest dissimilarity score and highest Gini of the eight. 
Cincinnati, Dayton and Los Angeles have the next highest scores and though their Gini 
coefficients do not follow that order, the three have some of the largest coefficients.  
A more natural degree of sorting that occurs in cities could also explain the level 
of clustering seen. Glaeser, Kerr, & Ponzetto (2010) call this a difference in the ‘supply’ 
of entrepreneurs because certain demographics are associated with a higher likelihood of 
self-employment. For example, as Glaeser and co-authors note, entrepreneurship is more 
prevalent among older people. Thus retirement type communities in regions like Florida 
with a higher average age could account for more clustering. To determine whether there 
is a correlation between clusters and demographic characteristics, I run a simple ordinary 
least squares model. The model (see Table 3-9) determines the impact of neighborhood 
poverty, college education, immigrants and race (white residents) on the rate of self-
employment. It also controls for the percentage of residents 16 years or older who are not 
in the labor market, which includes stay-at-home parents and the unemployed who are no 
longer looking for work, but helps account for retirement communities and the effect of 
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age on self-employment. All five of these factors are known to be positively associated 
with self-employment, as discussed in the literature review. Lastly, I control for the 
percent unemployed and include region as a fixed effect to account for repeated measures 
on neighborhoods. Note that this model does not predict the locational Gini coefficient 
nor does it identify a neighborhood cluster versus non-cluster. Rather, it is a first step in 
ruling out demographic factors that could explain why neighborhood self-employment 
varies.  
Table 3-9. OLS Model Predicting Neighborhood Self-employment Rate 
Independent variables Coefficient 
Standard 
error P-value 
Percent in poverty -0.005 0.030 0.863 
Percent with college degree 0.059 0.033 0.069 
Percent foreign born -0.021 0.049 0.665 
Percent non-Hispanic white 0.049 0.009 <.0001 
Controls 
   Percent unemployed 0.010 0.049 0.836 
Percent not in the labor market 0.031 0.015 0.047 
Fixed effects 
   Region (12)       
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: 717 neighborhoods 
 
The results of the model indicate that demographic characteristics do little to 
explain variation in neighborhood self-employment. At the .05 level, the percentage of 
residents in poverty, college-educated, and foreign born are all statistically insignificant. 
The percentage of white (non-Hispanic) residents is statistically significant, but no 
predictor variable affects the self-employment rate by even a tenth of a percent. The 
employment control variables and region variables show a statistically significant 
relationship to self-employment accordingly. Taken together, the model explains a mere 
quarter of the variation in self-employment rates, with an adjusted R-squared of .26. This 
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basic model shows that neighborhood self-employment rates are not simply a byproduct 
of demographic composition, which suggests that agglomeration theory is still a 
candidate to explain the minor differences in level of entrepreneur clustering. However, it 
also suggests that neighborhood clustering does not have the predicted effect of better 
economic outcomes. 
Robustness tests. To make inferences between neighborhood clustering and 
regional conditions, one would hope that the order of Gini scores in the regions (if not the 
actual score) is robust to data specifications. In the last part of this analysis, I conduct two 
tests to better understand the reliability of the locational Gini coefficient. The first test is 
to compare clustering in working class neighborhoods to clustering across all 
neighborhoods. We would expect the locational Gini coefficients to increase, but the 
ordering of regional scores to remain similar. They should increase because they now 
potentially include ethnic enclaves and better-educated neighborhoods where 
entrepreneurs may naturally cluster due to higher rates of self-employment among this 
group. In calculating the locational Gini for all neighborhoods (not shown), I found that 
the study regions show more clustering than working class neighborhoods alone, with the 
exception of Brooklyn. Brooklyn, an outlier to begin with, is less concentrated (.18) and 
comparable to the other regions. For the most part, the regions saw their coefficients 
increase by about .02. However, the ordering of regions changes significantly, indicating 
uncertainty in the underlying phenomenon that the Gini measures in this circumstance.  
Comparing clustering among different types of neighborhoods is an imperfect 
way to test the reliability of the Gini scores because changes in the rank order could 
reveal something distinct about certain regions’ neighborhood compositions and 
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traditional entrepreneurship. For example, Dayton might offer a great neighborhood 
environment for traditional entrepreneurs but not high skill entrepreneurs, while Phoenix 
neighborhoods are positive environments for high skill entrepreneurs but not traditional 
ones. It is interesting to note that changes in the order occur mostly due to scores in fast 
growing Sunbelt regions. Raleigh shows almost no change in its clustering score, 
indicating no difference in entrepreneur clustering in working and non-working class 
neighborhoods. Phoenix, on the other hand, shows the largest change in clustering, rising 
from .12 in the initial analysis to .17 across all neighborhoods. This suggests that the 
variation in region’s working class and non-working class clustering is systematic, but a 
product of neighborhood compositional changes and not evidence of something inherent 
about neighborhood ‘cultures’ in regions. 
A second test helps address the problem of churning regions more directly. This is 
by comparing the Gini coefficients for working class neighborhoods to their 2000 
benchmark. Determining 2000 Gini coefficients has the potential to reduce measurement 
error in two ways. Every ten years the census tract boundaries are redrawn (if necessary) 
to better reflect ‘neighborhoods’ in terms of population size. Therefore the 2000 figures 
may be more precise than 2007* for fast changing regions. Furthermore, the 2007* 
figures represent data collected between 2005 and 2009, years with very different 
economic conditions. This is likely to disproportionately effect fast growing regions 
because their housing markets were more volatile. If fast growing regions create unique 
problems for the reliability of Gini coefficients due to rapid changes in who lives in 
which neighborhoods, it would be indicated by stable Gini coefficients in maintaining 
and stagnant regions and unstable ones in ascent regions. 
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Table 3-10. Neighborhood Clustering Over Time 
 
Locational Gini Coefficient 
County seat 2000 2007* Difference 
Ascending  
  Raleigh, North Carolina 0.082 0.133 -0.05 
Phoenix, Arizona 0.129 0.123 0.01 
Denver, Colorado 0.151 0.125 0.03 
Maintaining  
  Sarasota, Florida 0.121 0.111 0.01 
Spokane, Washington 0.120 0.138 -0.02 
Cincinnati, Ohio 0.121 0.146 -0.03 
Los Angeles, California 0.141 0.154 -0.01 
Brooklyn, New York 0.136 0.242 -0.11 
Stagnant or declining  
  Abilene, Texas 0.130 0.148 -0.02 
Flint, Michigan 0.117 0.124 -0.01 
Dayton, Ohio 0.137 0.156 -0.02 
Scranton, Pennsylvania 0.122 0.129 -0.01 
Sources: Author’s calculations; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community 
Survey; 2000 Decennial Census  
Note: Includes 717 neighborhoods identified as working class in 2007*. The total self-
employed workers increased from 109,000 in 2000 to 131,000 in 2007*.  
 
Matching the 2007* working class neighborhood IDs to 2000 data, I report the 
results in Table 3-10. They reveal less clustering (slightly lower coefficients) in 2000, 
almost across the board. Ascendant Phoenix and Denver do buck this trend and show 
slightly more clustering in 2000, as does another somewhat fast growing region, Sarasota. 
Moreover, the fast growing Raleigh region shows one of the largest differences between 
2007* and 2000, but it is in the opposite direction than expected. Thus, Table 3-10 
generally supports the notion that the 2007* Gini coefficients are less reliable in fast 
growing regions.
7
 The 2010 Decennial Census will provide an excellent opportunity to 
                                                 
7
 The biggest difference between 2000 and 2007* scores are in Raleigh and Brooklyn. Although previous 
research could suggest that this is due to their relatively small number of neighborhoods (Bertinelli & 
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rule out measurement error as a source of change and determine theoretically-driven 
explanations of regional variation in clustering and cluster change over time. The present 
robustness analysis indicates that county level Gini coefficients are too unstable to draw 
valid conclusions about their relationship to regional outcomes. 
In summary, the quantitative analysis lends little support to the first hypothesis 
that neighborhood clustering occurs among traditional entrepreneurs. At the same time, 
quantitative information does not allow us to consider factors like the entrepreneur’s 
industry or whether it is a home-based operation. Perhaps one-man home improvement 
workers are highly networked with other tradesman for project-based work, but the salon 
owner has no routine collaborators for learning or sharing. The quantitative analysis also 
required a rough approximation of a neighborhood. Business-related social networks may 
be more neighborhood-based in smaller census tracts. Conversely, social networks may 
be less neighborhood-based in regions that are heavily car dependent. In the next section, 
I revisit the hypothesis that traditional entrepreneurs cluster in neighborhoods with 
qualitative evidence. I also investigate the second hypothesis about potential sources of 
agglomeration and clustering.  
Qualitative Methods and Analytic Tactics 
Recall from Chapter 2 that this research uses the extended case method (Burawoy, 
2009). The overall approach and purpose in the present chapter is to take insights from 
cluster theory and extend them to traditional entrepreneurship at the neighborhood level. 
In part one, I used quantitative methods to demonstrate a very minor degree of 
neighborhood level clustering, though regional variation lends little support to the fact 
                                                                                                                                                 
Decrop, 2005), other places with comparably few neighborhoods (i.e. Abilene and Denver) do not exhibit 
wild swings in their Gini score. 
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that clustering is due to agglomeration. Part two of the analysis uses interviews with 
traditional entrepreneurs to determine whether and how agglomeration and spinoff 
theories might produce neighborhood clustering. Specifically, I collect information about 
the social networks of traditional entrepreneurs in cluster and non-cluster neighborhoods. 
The cluster neighborhoods are from two regions, Dayton, Ohio and Raleigh, North 
Carolina. Two regions, an ascendant and stagnant one, were necessary for the second 
research question on resilience and the relevant data are used in this analysis. However, 
the non-cluster neighborhoods are from Dayton only to allow some neighborhood 
comparisons without confounding them with regional differences (see Table 3-11).  
Neighborhood selection. From the analysis in part one, I used the U.S. Census 
Bureau data to identify working class neighborhoods, meaning that they had a below 
average rate of college graduates for the country, but also fell above the ‘high poverty’ 
thresholds used to target federal funding to depressed areas (see part one for exact 
definition of sample neighborhoods). From the 70 working class neighborhoods in 
Dayton and the 14 in Raleigh, I selected two cluster neighborhoods in each region. A 
cluster neighborhood was one with an above average self-employment or self-
employment growth rate between 1990 and 2007*. Averages were calculated by region. 
Two non-cluster neighborhoods were also selected to offer a point of comparison and aid 
in drawing causal inferences about the relationship between social networks and self-
employment rates. A non-cluster neighborhood was one with a below average self-
employment or self-employment growth rate between 1990 and 2007*. The non-cluster 
comparisons are limited to Dayton to simplify confounding regional influences and 
reduce data collection time. In selecting the six neighborhoods, I avoided neighborhoods 
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on the extreme ends of the poverty and education distribution, though Table 3-11 shows 
that the non-cluster neighborhoods have fewer people in poverty on average. Given 
differences in local tax and incentive structures, another criterion was to select a 
neighborhood in the city limits and one in the inner-ring suburbs for each of the three site 
types shown in the table. 
A small handful of neighborhoods fit the above requirements. When I arrived in 
the regions, it became clear that the administrative boundaries of a Census Tract were 
often not distinct enough to reasonably believe that residents would perceive any 
difference. Therefore a final criterion of selection was that the clusters and non-clusters 
had a more visible boundary like a major thoroughfare, and/or were neighbored by tracts 
with dissimilar self-employment rates.  These steps helped to ensure that the biggest 
demographic difference between the neighborhoods is the self-employment rate.  
Table 3-11. 2007* Average Site Characteristics 
    Region 
Number of sites 
 
Dayton Raleigh 
Neighborhood type 
Cluster 2 2 
Non-cluster 2   
      Region 
Self-employment rate Dayton Raleigh 
Neighborhood type 
Cluster 9.1 10.1 
Non-cluster 2.3   
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    Region 
College education rate Dayton Raleigh 
Neighborhood type 
Cluster 14.5 16.0 
Non-cluster 18.5   
      Region 
Poverty rate 
 
Dayton Raleigh 
Neighborhood type 
Cluster 19.5 16.5 
Non-cluster 9.0   
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2009 American Community Survey 
Interviewee selection. I conducted over a dozen site visits to the neighborhoods 
between March and August of 2012. I walked into establishments of low-barrier 
industries to meet the founder/owner and solicit an interview. Accessing traditional 
entrepreneurs with no physical establishment was naturally much more difficult. I called 
the numbers on business cards left in the area for subcontractors and other services and I 
called the phone numbers on work trucks parked in the driveways of the neighborhood 
after business hours. I investigated between 22 and 46 businesses in each of the six 
neighborhoods. Some were determined to be non-local. Others did not return my call or 
email. Very few potential candidates refused to participate once I introduced the study, 
with the most common reason being that they were too busy.  
In the end, I conducted 27 interviews that averaged an hour in length (see 
Appendix 2 for list of interviewees). There is no way to determine the extent to which the 
sample represents the self-employed population in these neighborhoods because 
demographics of entrepreneurs are not available at the neighborhood level. I sought 
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representation from many demographic sectors, such as race, gender, immigrant status 
and age, and from a variety of industries (see Table 3-12 for sample characteristics), and 
the results are reasonable. For example, the neighborhoods are likely about 50 percent 
female, but females are significantly under-represented in the entrepreneur population so 
it is not unreasonable that about 20 percent of my sample is female.  Though I only 
encountered a few business owners with a college degree who lived or worked in the 
neighborhood, as expected given the neighborhood selection criteria, I did not exclude 
them because I was interested in their relationship to a predominately non-college 
educated area. Despite my efforts, it was difficult to access home-based traditional 
entrepreneurs and they are likely under-represented in all three site types of my sample. 
Home-based businesses are thought to be about half of all male entrepreneurship, while 
about one-third of my sample in each neighborhood type is home-based.  
Table 3-12. Demographic and Firm Characteristics 
Entrepreneur 
 Age (average) 47 
Female 19% 
Foreign-born 15% 
Non-white 37% 
College degree 19% 
Firm 
 Business start (average) 1996 
Has full-time employee(s) 30% 
Home-based business 33% 
Industry 
 Lawn/cleaning service (commercial and residential) 15% 
Salon/Barber 15% 
Auto service 11% 
Food or alcohol sales 11% 
Martial arts 7% 
Remodeling 7% 
Other 33% 
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  Interview length (average) 61 min 
 
The study design of the full dissertation means that two-thirds of the sample is 
from the Dayton area and one-third is from Raleigh. Firm characteristics are relatively 
similar between the neighborhoods. For example, the average start year of firms in the 
Dayton cluster was 1994 and 1995 in the Raleigh clusters, but it was 1998 in the Dayton 
non-cluster. There is some demographic variation between the three site types in the 
study (i.e. Dayton cluster, Dayton non-cluster and Raleigh cluster), most notably with a 
high proportion of African-Americans in Raleigh. Where a finding on behavior 
differences may be an artifact of the sample demographic characteristics, it is noted in the 
finding.  
In the report, pseudonyms are used to protect the confidentiality of the 
entrepreneur. The interviews were semi-structured and revolved around two themes: what 
people and organizations have been important to your entrepreneurship and how has your 
entrepreneurship changed over the years (see Appendix 4 for interview protocol). Most 
interviews were conducted in-person, but a few were over the phone after I had met the 
entrepreneur. I recorded the interviews using an iPhone and transcribed them in full. 
Analysis was completed with the online, mixed methods software package, 
Dedoose.com. I coded the interviews for specific information, such as the source of 
important social networks, which I could then cross-referenced with the entrepreneur’s 
location to determine if there were marked differences between the neighborhoods and 
regions.  
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Findings from the Interviews 
1. Inter-industry learning and sharing are the most common potential sources 
of clustering among traditional entrepreneurs. 
About two-thirds of the Dayton and Raleigh interviewees offered one or more 
examples of social networks that demonstrate a potential source of agglomeration (see 
Table 3-13). Important business networks were more often in related industries than 
within the same industry. This is consistent with findings from regional analyses of the 
service sector. Earlier agglomeration studies also suggest that at smaller geographies, 
both urbanization and localization economies (inter and intra-industry relationships, 
respectively) are evident. And in these data too we find several (nine) instances of intra-
industry networks, in addition to the 13 examples of inter-industry networks. Learning 
mechanisms were the most common source of clustering mentioned. Recall that learning 
mechanisms take three interpretations: idea generation, skills transfer and a more social, 
information diffusion process (see Table 3-1. Sources of Agglomeration Economies). 
Interviewees discussed all three. A classic example of inter-industry learning is the local 
lawn equipment store owner who invested in a uniquely knowledgeable management 
staff, a characteristic that has allowed them to compete with Home Depot and Lowes. 
This investment has been passed on to the benefit of hundreds of local lawn care 
entrepreneurs who are now paired with the most reliable, cost-effective equipment, 
according to George and Kenneth, the owner and a lawn service customer, respectively. 
Table 3-13. Number of Dayton and Raleigh Interviewees that Discussed a Type of 
Clustering (N=27) 
Cluster type Result 
Agglomeration 
18 of 27 interviewees (67%) offered at least one example 
of being part of a learning or sharing spillover 
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Inter-industry 
13 of 18 interviewees offered at least one example where 
the spillover was between related or unrelated industries 
Intra-industry 
9 of 18 interviewees offered at least one example where 
the spillover was within the same industry 
Spinoff 
11 of 27 interviewees (41%) offered at least one example 
of generating or being the product of another venture 
 
The more counter-intuitive learning examples involve intra-industry relationships 
because they require collaboration with competitors. For instance, Ed and Vincent have 
relationships with other local mechanics and pass their knowledge on to help these 
competitors solve their car troubles. Sam had a local pastor ask for his advice on starting 
a convenience store and not only did Sam offer advice, he worked with his suppliers to 
make sure the pastor got the same deals he negotiated for his own store. When I asked 
why these entrepreneurs were willing to help competitors, they often simply cited 
confidence in their own abilities or the right to an open playing field in the free market.  
Twenty-two percent of interviewees also discussed a strong customer loyalty in 
traditional trades and services, which may explain why networking with competitors was 
not as much of a threat as economic theory would predict. Kenneth describes both 
sentiments in the lawn care industry: 
Jen: Do you have any problem giving [others in your industry] advice? 
Kenneth: No I don't. Because I want to see them do as good, as well, as I have done. And 
in that way, you're doing something for yourself. And you'll have your own. 
On working with competitors: 
Kenneth: …That means that if I've called one of the guys in and said look, this is 
something that, both of us might be interested in working together on this project. And I 
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go over and introduce them to the, you know, customer or future customer. Then I may 
get a call and they say, well such and such came back over asking me about the job, that 
he can do it for this amount or that amount. Kind of like undercutting basically. But they 
didn't get far. Because once you've built up a relationship with a customer, or say by your 
character or appearance, nine times out of ten it doesn't work when they try to do that. 
Phil’s customer loyalty pushed him into hiring mechanics so he could be the face of the 
business. 
Jen: How do you think you became so popular? 
Phil: I got word of mouth and advertising. But my thing is, if somebody calls and I don't 
answer the phone, they'll call back. They won't talk to anybody else. So it got to the point 
that I couldn't work on cars and try to talk on the phone so that's when I gave up working 
on cars. 
Loyalty and reputation demonstrate another potential agglomeration source: 
sharing. Reputation has been studied as a learning spillover between current and future 
transactions with a customer (Mayer, 2006) and as a resource passed down from a parent 
company (Dahl & Sorenson, 2012). But viewing reputation as a sharing mechanism 
makes it a candidate for clustering. Sharing reduces costs because one investment is 
spread over more entrepreneurs, rather than learning from one another where some 
individually-acquired knowledge/skills spill over in a positive externality to others. The 
typical examples in regional analyses are firms sharing (or supporting) the cost of 
intermediate suppliers such as accountants and even janitorial services by locating in a 
city center.  
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The present analyses revealed two unusual and important avenues for these cost 
reductions in traditional entrepreneurship. They are sharing a positive reputation and 
sharing work under one physical or contractual structure. Often these occur together. 
Entrepreneurs were emphatic that their success was dependent on their reputation passed 
on through word of mouth advertising about their quality and honesty. According to 
interviewees, a good reputation is built over time and once acquired, the entrepreneur is 
very protective of it and acts as a gatekeeper for customers. As a result, the referral of 
another successful and well-respected entrepreneur can be invaluable, particularly when 
starting out, but also in growing a reputation collectively.  
The importance of sharing reputation was indicated time and again in interviews. 
Kenneth works with others in lawn service and also in related trades like stump removal; 
Derrick and Simon work with other construction workers in home remodeling and also 
electricians and bricklayers; Ellie linked up with another residential cleaner as she got too 
old to complete the largest houses herself; William’s photography business refers a 
handful of wedding DJs and they refer his photography services. In each case, the 
entrepreneurs either cross promoted the service of trusted individuals or pulled together a 
project-based team of skilled and honest workers. The entrepreneur guaranteeing a 
service then, assumes a large share of the reputation risk, even if one team member fails 
to come through.  
It was somewhat surprising to hear given their status as low barrier industries, but 
finding skilled and quality workers is a problem in traditional trades (discussed by nine 
interviewees), as it is in high skilled work. Derrick and Simon, for example, worry about 
the number of subcontractors on the market who make significant structural mistakes, 
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while Greg avoids hiring people who worked for a corporate employer in his industry 
because their standards for quality cleaning are far below Greg’s own standards. 
Reputation is a critical resource for entrepreneurs, both in identifying collaborators and in 
gaining or maintaining customers. 
Traditional entrepreneurs share more than their reputation with other 
entrepreneurs. Gwen shares her venue for those on consignment with her military 
paraphernalia store. Two or three interviewees brought up the economic benefits of these 
consignment arrangements and they reveal an interesting collaboration between home-
based producers and traditional entrepreneurs with an establishment. Sharing a formal 
contract is another more tangible type of sharing. A successful entrepreneur can end up 
with more work than he/she can complete, and the customer or contract must be passed to 
a trusted colleague. For instance, Simon has been able to maintain a high volume of home 
remodeling by sharing his reputation, but he also sees more direct economic benefits to 
sharing, as he explains: 
Simon: Like I said I'm working 16-18 hours. Now I'm down to like 10-12 hour days. So it 
doesn't leave a lot of time for paper work. 
Jen: Is it less now because you have a year under your belt? 
Simon: Yeah. Plus like I said, I've found some other contractors that I can use. That's 
really helped out with my work load. I don't have to do two houses a month. Now I got 
someone else who does a house and I make a little bit of money off his jobs. 
Jen: Because you're the one getting the business? 
Simon: Right. 
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Eli’s customer at the barber shop passed him a contract for transportation services. Eli 
plans to buy a van and start the work part-time. More often, Eli’s shop and reputation 
serve the broader entrepreneur community, reducing the hiring risk and associated costs 
by connecting quality entrepreneurs and workers.  
Jen: Well what about, do [your friends in business for themselves]say stuff, specific 
[stuff], like any business advice? 
Eli: I guess, the biggest headache, like I say, is good help. Most of the time if you get 
good help, your business will flourish. If you can't get good help, you have to deal with it 
as it comes. So I guess the main thing is good help. 
Jen: So do you guys end up referring people you know to each other? 
Eli: Oh I definitely do. Actually we all do. I send my buddies a lot of business through the 
barbershop. And they do the same for me. Because I know five of everybody that does 
everything. Seriously. I'm like a network man…I'll put it like this, due to the economy 
there's been a lot of people in and out of jobs. And I've got a couple people jobs just from 
people I know. You know what I'm saying? A couple people that didn't have jobs and I 
say, call so and so and so and so. And they call them and possibly, most of the time, well 
half the time they might get a job through someone I knew. So that kind of thing comes 
back to me. 
Jen: Oh wow. And do they just come in the next time like, ‘thank you so much’? 
Eli: Oh, 'Thank you so much!' I have guys that call me and just be like, I do appreciate 
you. I've had that happen a couple of different times. 
Jen: That's kind of cool. Do you have any criteria for who you're going to help? 
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Eli: Yeah because if I see you're not one that, I guess your morals aren't all there, I kind 
of shy away from it. But if you're a people person. Good people. Most of the people I've 
been cutting for years so I know who to lead in the right direction, who I can just be like, 
deal with a little differently. 
The collaborative relationships described here have helped entrepreneurs alter 
their services when times got tough (usually through learning) and kept them afloat when 
their own advertising efforts were not producing (usually through reputation sharing). 
They do not necessarily explain cluster or firm growth, but they point to why some areas 
see fewer firm exits and therefore have more entrepreneurs than other areas. Then again, 
we must bear in mind the information source. It could be that networks are important for 
starting a new business, but because most of the interviewees were established 
businesses, they might not readily recall the people and information that helped them get 
started. There are also supportive environmental factors in a cluster, of which individuals 
would be unaware. For example, fewer large firms and more individual service providers 
could make for easier entry into the market. But no one entrepreneur would likely 
identify this as a beneficial local condition. Sam hinted at this fact when he discussed 
getting out of the convenience store business when Wal-Mart’s ‘neighborhood’ stores 
come to his area. 
2. Clusters grow through spinoffs rather than positive externalities described 
by agglomeration. 
New firm spinoffs are the most consistent phenomenon to explain cluster growth 
among traditional entrepreneurs. Just over 40 percent of interviewees in Dayton and 
Raleigh (11 of 27) were either themselves a spinoff venture or they have passed along 
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vital information or resources so an employee could start a company. High tech parent 
firms, such as found in Silicon Valley, and low tech ones such as the Netherland’s 
footwear industry, have passed on knowledge and reputation benefits that made their 
spinoffs more successful than start-ups with no prior affiliation (Dahl & Sorenson, 2012; 
Klepper, 2010). So too, traditional entrepreneurs pass on knowledge, reputation, supplier 
strategies and more that have contributed to success in traditional fields like convenience 
stores, martial arts Dojos and optical shops.  
Following Boschma & Frenken (2011) point that spinoff theory does not explain 
what parent firms pass along (e.g. knowledge, network relationships, reputation), the 11 
interviewees described different types of ‘inheritances.’ Jim fits most squarely in 
traditional views of spinoffs. He accessed vital knowledge from chemical engineers as an 
employee at Monsanto, which gave him the in-depth understanding of break fluids and 
their downsides to start his car repair shop with an edge on the local competition. 
Inheriting industry knowledge was also evident in less conventional ways. Fred passed 
his optical shop’s supplier strategy to an apprentice who recently started his own eye 
glass shop about 30 miles away. As Fred says it, the critical reason he is able to procure 
eye glass frames so inexpensively is that he buys in massive quantities (e.g. 60,000 
frames if he can get the right price), always pays in cash and always pays early. Given the 
ease of entry into the industry, his reliability as a buyer has allowed him unique access to 
a discounted supply. He started his apprentice off on the right foot by selling the former 
employee his first batch of frames under the same rules.  
In addition to industry-related knowledge, parent firms passed business norms, 
industry relationships and their reputation (e.g. convincing their supplier to sell to a new 
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entrepreneur) to employees to aid in their startup success. Business norms are perhaps the 
most interesting, though they are the least common. Unlike knowledge that relates 
directly to sales, norms can be thought of as values that indirectly affect business success. 
Nick, for example, credits much of his success to the stellar staff at his craft beer store 
and sandwich shop, an asset he has maintain due to a norm instilled by his former boss 
over 30 years ago:  
Nick: But Mr. [boss name omitted], he would walk around and he knew everybody's 
name. And I thought that was really neat. Danny was the janitor and he was a mentally 
disadvantaged person. Mr. [omitted] was standing there in a nice suit and Danny came 
by and took the broom right across his shoes. And the foreman started chewing Danny 
out. And Mr. [omitted] says, don't do that. He was just doing his job. I was in his way.  
Jen: Do you have any other examples of someone who owned their own business who 
was kind of influential like that? 
Nick: Yeah. As a matter of fact, here was another. We went to lunch, went up to a local 
bar, it was Monday night football…Mr. [omitted] and a bunch of engineers came in with 
a buyer…They sat down with us. And this guy, the salesman, told the waitress to get 
everybody a beer except for me…And she dropped off their drinks and Mr. [omitted] was 
sitting across from me. And I'm just a peon making three something an hour. And Mr. 
[omitted] looked at me and said, did you want a drink? And I said, uh, I wasn't offered 
one. He turned red in the face and looked at that sales man and said you either buy one 
for everyone or you don't buy for anyone…I was a peon, but Mr. [omitted] would not 
allow it. Those kinds of things really soak into my head. Everybody's a part of it.  
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Similarly, Sam says he owes the success of his convenience stores to his work 
ethic, a business norm passed to him by a former employer. Fifteen years later, he still 
remembers seeing the millionaire owner at his first convenience store job personally 
clean a bathroom that had been abused by a customer. He asked him why he didn’t just 
call someone to take care of it and the owner said it would take too long: “He says listen, 
the day you think you're too good for work, you're history. Doesn't matter what you own, 
doesn't matter how much money you have. Any day comes and you think you're too good 
to work, you're history.” 
With regard to cluster theory, spinoff firms appear to be the most likely 
contributor to cluster growth. Agglomeration through learning and sharing mechanisms 
are also evident, as discussed next, but they more often demonstrate why a cluster does 
not decline through firm exit (an issue explored further in Chapter 4), rather than how it 
might facilitate growth through production or employment. Taken together, the first two 
findings offer some support for hypothesis Two, that inter-industry sharing and learning 
are potential agglomeration sources among traditional entrepreneurs. And the findings 
add that learning and sharing with former employees better explains growth because the 
traditional entrepreneurs did not often attempt to grow the size of their own firm in a 
sustained way. Identifying potential sources of agglomeration, however, is only half the 
equation. Hypothesis One stated that the neighborhood was the key geography to 
facilitate learning and sharing among these entrepreneurs. I next show that this 
hypothesis should be rejected based on the qualitative evidence, as well as the 
quantitative from part one of this chapter.  
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3. There are few systematic differences between traditional entrepreneurs in 
cluster and non-cluster neighborhoods. 
Collaboration with other local business owners seems to be an important factor in 
the success of traditional entrepreneurs, but the relationships discussed in the previous 
findings were not predominately within the neighborhood. Eli’s barber shop is one of 
very few clear examples where customers (and the owner) came from the same local 
neighborhood and the learning and sharing that occurs between traditional entrepreneurs 
frequenting the shop has a highly local component.  From a qualitative standpoint, it was 
apparent that the spinoff companies discussed did not share the same residential or 
business neighborhood as their parent, nor were the industry collaborations very often 
with neighbors. For example, Ellie’s cleaning assistant, Ed and Vincent’s work with other 
mechanics and William’s referrals from and to other entrepreneurs in the wedding 
industry are not relationships that were fostered by living or working near one another in 
the same neighborhood. It is also apparent that for the intra-industry collaborations, a 
larger geography helps explain why they persist despite competitive pressures. 
After asking entrepreneurs about people or organizations that were important to 
their business in a very open-ended way, I specifically asked whether they interacted with 
the local businesses in their neighborhood, or other home-based entrepreneurs or even 
potential employees from their neighborhood. The neighborhoods I visited are very 
unlike the walking-friendly neighborhoods of New York City studied by Jane Jacobs and 
other scholars of innovation, and much more similar to the vast majority of mid-sized, 
car-dependent cities. My interview sites are primarily low-density residential, with one 
main thoroughfare of local and corporate businesses. Entrepreneurs had varying levels of 
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responses to using ‘local’ resources. Simon’s home-based remodeling business has the 
potential to serve the local area and to meet other potential handymen to network with or 
learn from. Greg’s home-based kitchen equipment business has a smaller potential for 
neighborhood networks. Though neither entrepreneur expressed much connection to the 
neighborhood, it seems that some industries are more conducive to neighborhood-based 
relationships beneficial to the business.  
For entrepreneurs with a physical location, it is approximately equal effort for 
neighborhood residents to travel to their ‘local’ business as it is to travel to one in the 
next neighborhood over because both would most likely be done via car. Two 
neighborhoods had small business districts and these entrepreneurs had a greater potential 
to develop positive externalities among the group due to their co-location. Hanna was 
glad that her sewing and alternations business is located in their small business district 
(approximately two blocks) because she easily accessed supplies and personal items. She 
also held FedEx packages for a neighboring barber shop, which allowed that entrepreneur 
to hold limited hours that corresponded with the volume of business he maintained. Nick 
is also located in a business district and leads the district business association. His 
investment in video surveillance likely benefits the whole block and therefore represents 
a positive externality closer to the spirit of cluster theory. Locating in a business district 
was beneficial for these and other reasons, but a qualitative assessment of the interviews 
did not reveal clear neighborhood-based connections, and both Hanna and Nick were 
located in areas with low levels of self-employment.  
The research design allows for a more quantitative look at the question of whether 
there are systematic differences that could explain neighborhood entrepreneur clustering. 
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Perhaps the examples offered did not demonstrate a neighborhood network, but the more 
networked or collaborative interviewees are also more likely to live in a neighborhood 
cluster. The following results draw on the Dayton sample only to compare entrepreneur 
behavior between the cluster and non-cluster neighborhoods I visited. Limiting the 
analysis to Dayton helps interpret any neighborhood differences because it ‘controls for’ 
regional influences that might be apparent between Dayton and Raleigh. Table 3-14 is 
similar to Table 3-13, but uses the Dayton subsample to show that interviewees who 
collaborate with or ‘spinoff’ other traditional entrepreneurs are not more likely to come 
from a cluster neighborhood. The counts indicate some neighborhood differences in the 
number of inter-industry networks and spinoffs in the expected direction. Cluster 
neighborhoods have a higher number of the group dynamics theorized to facilitate 
entrepreneurship. Results from the Raleigh cluster support the relationship as well (not 
shown). Still, the qualitative evidence that described relationships as non-neighborhood 
based and the small sample size suggest cautious optimism regarding this result.  
Table 3-14. Percentage of Dayton Interviewees that Discussed a Cluster Type, by 
Neighborhood Type 
Cluster type 
Cluster 
(n=9) 
Non-cluster 
(n=9) 
Inter-industry linkage 5 3 
Intra-industry linkage 2 3 
Spinoff 4 2 
 
Another way to examine the question of neighborhood differences is to determine 
where important social networks come from if it is not neighborhoods. Systematic 
differences in networks between the two neighborhood types would support the notion 
that entrepreneur relationships effect entrepreneurship rates. Table 3-15 shows the most 
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common types of networks discussed by interviewees. On the whole, I find no consistent 
difference in the networks of entrepreneurs in cluster and non-cluster neighborhoods. The 
counts include instances of agglomeration already discussed, as well as other network 
relationships that entrepreneurs said had been helpful to them, such as learning something 
useful from a corporate competitor. The largest difference is in those reporting a family 
member who was an entrepreneur; however, we would expect the opposite relationship. 
Family entrepreneur norms are expected to foster clusters and instead interviewees in 
non-cluster neighborhoods were more likely to report a family entrepreneur (five 
compared to two in the cluster neighborhoods).  
It is interesting that entrepreneurs living in a cluster were twice as likely as non-
cluster entrepreneurs to network with industry competitors, while non-cluster 
entrepreneurs were three times as likely to network in service organizations. Statistics in 
the Raleigh cluster also support that high self-employment is related to a relatively high 
rate of competitor networking and relatively low rate of networking in service 
organizations (not shown). These relationships are especially interesting because those in 
cluster neighborhoods are not more highly networked than non-cluster entrepreneurs 
overall. 
Table 3-15. Percentage of Dayton Interviewees that Discussed the Network, by 
Neighborhood 
Network  type 
Cluster 
(n=9) 
Non-
cluster 
(n=9) Example 
Business organization 4 3 
Got a new business idea from another 
member- Chamber of Commerce, 
Transmission Association 
Customer or supplier 3 4 
Learned of a new, top-selling product for 
the local market from a customer 
 3 3 Met a business partner in trade school  
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Former colleague 
Industry competitor 4 2 
Got new customer through a competitor 
referral  
 
Succession 2 5 Had a parent/close relative entrepreneur 
Service organization 1 3 
Accessed new markets through the 
group- Knights of Columbus, Veterans 
Club, church 
Other networks 5 7 
Acquired money from friend/family; 
learned of available real estate from 
Licensing Board rep  
 
If industry relationships do not explain why some neighborhoods have 
consistently high (or low) self employment rates, there may be factors related to the 
natural advantage of the area or economic factors such as high crime and low rent. 
Having spent several months in the neighborhoods, there is no obvious evidence that 
these other explanations are at work. There is one potential reason for consistently low 
self employment areas: government workers. Until recently, city employees in Dayton 
were required to live within the city limits. One non-cluster neighborhood I chose 
happened to be the most desirable and furthest from the city core. According to long time 
residents, the neighborhood had a disproportionate number of police, fire-fighters and 
EMTs. The second non-cluster neighborhood visited in Dayton is near the Wright 
Patterson military base so it may also be explained by an unusually high number of 
government workers.  
4. Sub-regional geographies offer unique insights to traditional entrepreneurs’ 
success  
In this last section, I revisit the earlier findings to discuss what these interviews 
did reveal about the relationship between traditional entrepreneurs and their geographic 
location. Pulling together several smaller pieces from the above analysis hints at an 
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important role for sub-regional geographies in understanding traditional entrepreneurs. 
These findings are suggestive, and though less conclusive than earlier discussions, they 
have the benefit of offering next steps in how to facilitate entrepreneur and place-based 
economic development.  
One potential sharing mechanism at work in a Dayton cluster is bartering. Adam 
started an electronic component and computer repair business near his home at the height 
of the recession, after his former employer went out of business and he was unable to find 
another job that paid enough to support his family. Other interviewees from this cluster 
did not engage in bartering so it seemed unlikely that sharing was a major factor in the 
high rate of self-employment in this area. Nonetheless, Adam’s comments suggest it was 
more than physical proximity that helped him benefit from his location in a cluster. 
Adam: So it's a lot of bartering too to get me to where I've been because I haven't had the 
money in my pocket to really spend out for anything. 
Jen: And people seem pretty receptive to that around here? 
Adam: Yeah. I think that's a bonus of being in a lower income neighborhood probably. 
Because I come from West Carrolton, Miamisburg area and it's a lot different here. But 
I've always been kind of a barterer, I haven't had a problem talking with people. I kind of 
fit in here with the way I look. I used to be a tattoo artist when I was really young so 
that's why I got all the tattoos. Mainly on the left hand side of my body, that's the stuff I 
did, just playing around and learning. For the area, it doesn't hurt me in this area. But 
whenever I go to nicer areas and stuff, I put on, you can't see anything whenever I go in. 
And I cut my hair usually. But it's been. You can't do enough to get people to like you I 
should say. You do whatever it takes and hopefully the other people are receptive to you. 
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I've never had anybody get upset for saying, hey you want me to help you out? What do 
you have laying around your house that's electronic? Because sometimes people do that 
and we can fix what they brought into us because they think it's junk. And we're honest 
with um. Hey, if it's been sitting around your house, it's been sitting there for a year, we 
can put it to good use. I've gotten tools that way too. Things that I need for tools for 
fixing the computers…. Yeah, this type of area will bend over backwards for you more. 
They're a little more understanding too. The people with the money say, well I can buy 
whatever I wanna buy, they don't want to wait 2-3 days. They expect it to be number one 
right on top. So here people are a little bit more understanding. So it's probably a benefit 
for me to be here first and eventually step out toward a little bit nicer areas to see how it 
works. 
For the variety of reasons Adam discusses here, working class neighborhoods 
may offer a unique environment for burgeoning entrepreneurs. The analysis of 
entrepreneur networks also recommends looking at specific neighborhoods (rather than 
the region as a whole) to identify social resources for traditional entrepreneurs. Table 
3-15 listed different types of networks entrepreneurs identified as important to their 
business and Table 4-4 shows the percentages for the full sample of Dayton and Raleigh 
interviewees. What is notable is the frequency with which informal networks such as 
customers and competitors are important sources of information or resources. Research 
on high skill regional clusters emphasizes the trade organizations and formal networks to 
facilitate cluster growth. Indeed, many regions have started cluster membership 
associations, and the Small Business Administration’s cluster initiative is focused on 
improving these formalized organizations (Demiralp, Turner, & Monnard, 2012). 
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Although 44 percent of the Dayton and Raleigh entrepreneurs (12 of 27) noted that they 
benefited from a formal organization operating at the city, regional or national level, 
higher proportions in both places noted that they preferred to avoid these types of 
organizations, particularly those at the city and regional level. Some interviewees 
distrusted the formal organizations and others simply felt their goals were not well 
aligned. The entrepreneurs’ reliance on members of service organizations in which they 
took part, though not nearly as frequent, is especially relevant in this light. The service 
organizations discussed by interviewees were all city-level chapters of national 
organizations or church affiliations.  
The existence of these less business-oriented service networks may contribute to 
successful entrepreneur clusters. And their location and geographic representativeness in 
terms of membership would help identify relevant sub-regional geographies to study 
traditional entrepreneurs. This is further supported by the importance of other informal 
networks. Customers and suppliers are the most consistent and unquestionable source of 
vital information, mentioned by 56 percent of the full entrepreneur sample (89 percent in 
Raleigh). Although their customers are not all (or even majority) from the local 
neighborhood, they are far from randomly located throughout the metropolitan area. This 
appears to be less a product of travel distance than of network-based advertising. Almost 
70 percent of interviewees (18 of 27) discussed the importance of word of mouth 
advertising over public advertising, which means that initial business leads have resulted 
in specific types of neighborhoods and customers. The home-based entrepreneurs I spoke 
with were willing to travel where ever the client happened to be. But Simon, for example, 
gets much of his remodeling business through a real estate company buying abandoned 
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and foreclosed properties. Similarly, Hugh has a lawn care service niche in a housing 
development near the military base due to neighbor referrals. It started by giving a good 
price and quick service to a friend from a military-related service organization called the 
American Legion.  
It is reasonable to see how referrals for home-based workers could lead to a client 
network with some geographic constraints, as when your neighbor’s remodeled porch 
causes you to ask who did the work. Entrepreneurs with physical establishments showed 
some of the same geographic bias. They talked about their customers coming from “all 
over.” Yet they often listed other working class parts of town. Moreover, the 
entrepreneurs that (re)opened in a second location—including Rebecca, Harris, Phil and 
Jim—all located in another working class area, according to my study definition of these 
areas. Their reasons included not wanting to drive far between locations, not wanting to 
move too far from clientele and of course reasonable rents.  
Regional cluster studies have identified customers as a source of innovation 
(Boschma & Ter Wal, 2007; Porter, 1998; Saxenian, 1994) and firms even seek out ways 
to leverage technology to use customers in co-production for innovation (Auh, Bell, 
McLeod, & Shih, 2007). Conversely, traditional entrepreneurs in this study have built 
strong social ties with customers organically through word of mouth advertising and 
ongoing face-to-face interaction. What these informal networks suggest is that cognitive, 
social or institutional forms of proximity seem to be more important than geographic 
proximity for explaining important business connections among traditional entrepreneurs. 
However, given neighborhood sorting by socioeconomic classes, these other forms of 
proximity have spatial implications that should not be ignored.  
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Conclusion 
This analysis has relied on mixed research methods to characterize and to a lesser 
extent quantify the degree of traditional entrepreneur clustering. In this case, the multiple 
forms of evidence did not point uniformly in one direction. This means we should be 
extra cautious with the small sample size used to draw inferences about clusters. There 
are several aspects of a firm and owner known to effect business outcomes and behavior, 
and though I meant to draw commonalities from the inclusion of many types, I also lost 
the ability to account for intervening factors, such as industry and gender of the 
entrepreneur, because there were too few cases in each subcategory. Furthermore, as with 
studies of agglomeration in general, any quantitative evidence of clustering associated 
with social networks does not answer whether the presence of entrepreneurs allowed 
positive networks to develop or networks created an environment for more entrepreneurs. 
That said, some tentative conclusions can be made from the analysis. 
The purpose of the chapter was to determine how and the extent to which 
agglomeration theory is appropriately extended to the neighborhood level for traditional 
entrepreneurs. By talking to traditional entrepreneurs, I found some support for 
hypothesis Two, that positive externalities exist among them in the form of sharing and 
learning mechanisms. As expected, sharing and learning occurred more between 
entrepreneurs in different industries (inter-industry linkages), but there was an interesting 
degree of collaboration among direct competitors, intra-industry linkages. These 
relationships seemed most beneficial for navigating tough times and maintaining a 
positive reputation and new referrals. Indeed, simply staying in business could be a more 
important indicator of success in these highly competitive local services with low barriers 
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to entry, than growing one’s business. This conclusion means that the Schumpeter theory 
of innovation and economic development is less applicable to traditional entrepreneurs 
and their trades because he theorizes significant business entry and exit (i.e. creative 
destruction) is what fosters the development of an economy. Instead, neighborhood 
clusters may grow through spinoffs, regardless of positive externalities. Passing a useful 
resource to an employee who started his or her own business was quite common among 
entrepreneurs in this study.  
On the other hand, I found little support for hypothesis One, that these spinoff 
firms or the firm linkages are neighborhood-based. With the quantitative analysis, I found 
that traditional entrepreneurs cluster more than other worker types, such as government 
workers. But the regional variation in clustering does not have the expected relationship 
to economic outcomes suggested in agglomeration theory, and there is some evidence 
that variation in self-employment rates is partly explained by neighborhood 
characteristics. Interestingly, regional growth demonstrates a slight, but consistent non-
linear relationship to clustering (in 2007* and 2000) and to regional self-employment 
rates; stagnant regions show the least self-employment and clustering activity, the values 
increase in maintaining regions, and they fall slightly in ascendant regions. This suggests 
that positive self-employment outcomes occur during eras of regional economic stability, 
though the direction of causality is unknown.  
The qualitative analysis supports the quantitative, that traditional entrepreneurs 
are not primarily clustered in neighborhoods. According to the entrepreneurs’ 
descriptions of who and what is beneficial to their business, and an analysis of systematic 
differences in the responses of entrepreneurs in cluster and non-cluster neighborhoods, 
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there is little evidence to show that neighborhood networks or environments explain 
variation in traditional entrepreneurship. For example, employees did not necessarily 
come from the local neighborhood, project/home-based workers did not necessarily team 
with neighborhoods in related trades, and those in physical establishments did not often 
network with the business owner down the street, unless they were in a small business 
district.  
The interviews revealed that unique networks develop in working class 
neighborhoods, even if they are not confined within one neighborhood, and these 
relationships are useful extensions of cluster theory to traditional entrepreneurs. Sharing 
one’s reputation with other entrepreneurs has not been identified as a source of positive 
externalities in the high skill arena, but among entrepreneurs in traditional trades 
reputation is a vital resource and referrals can be a source of cost saving. Learning was 
also a source of positive spillovers and thus is usefully extended to traditional 
entrepreneurs. As mentioned, these networks did not appear to relate to cluster or 
regional growth. However, the extension of cluster theory to regional resilience outcomes 
is promising.  
Learning networks offered some entrepreneurs ideas to diversify their business 
during tough economic times, which suggests their importance for resilience. These 
networks are likely to come from informal sources, such as customers, rather than trade 
and industry organizations. In addition, more flexible methods of exchange (e.g. 
bartering) or service options (e.g. paying in weekly installments) provided on an as-
needed basis were discussed by interviewees as benefits to themselves and/or the area in 
which they are located. These sub-regional relationships could support entry and survival 
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of traditional entrepreneurs over corporate competitors in working class neighborhoods. 
They could help these areas maintain a positive quality of life through economic 
challenges in the region, even if they do not ultimately transform them into high growth 
components of the region. This idea is explored in the next chapter on traditional 
entrepreneurs and regional resilience. 
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CHAPTER 
4 - TRADITIONAL ENTREPRENEURS AND REGIONAL RESILIENCE 
The Literature 
How regions develop and change are some of the most difficult questions to 
answer in the social sciences because they are shaped by a nearly infinite number of 
forces (Storper, 2010). Yet these are precisely the questions most important for public 
policies which seek to preserve certain economic outcomes and transform others. Urban 
economics primarily explains local economic development by the location decisions of 
firms and workers (Storper, 2010). The field has been less interested in endogenous 
change caused by entrepreneurship, partially due to the conventional modeling methods 
of the field and partly due to the failure to account for the entrepreneur in the modern 
theory of the firm (Glaeser, 2007a; Malecki, 1993). In Chapter 3, I described a growing 
interest in how regional entrepreneur clusters increase economic growth due to the 
positive externalities they generate by, for example, learning from one another. I argued 
that traditional entrepreneurs have been overlooked in these studies and I found that they 
do indeed demonstrate some of the same learning behavior described in high skill 
entrepreneurship.  
In the present chapter, I look more closely at whether and how traditional 
entrepreneurs, as a group, help a region maintain its resilience to internal and external 
challenges. It is closely related to Chapter 3 because the ability to bounce back from 
challenges could be an alternative positive outcome of entrepreneur clusters (an 
alternative to regional growth). Many of the concepts used here (e.g. traditional 
entrepreneur) were developed in earlier chapters, thus a brief summary of definitions is 
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provided in Appendix 1. It departs from Chapter 3 in that it is more exploratory. It seeks 
a deeper understanding of processes so that, eventually, we may link clusters of 
traditional entrepreneurs to regional resilience. As such, the section on theory describes 
two systems perspectives that are the framework used to illuminate the role of traditional 
entrepreneurs in regional resilience in this research. The next literature section describes 
some empirical work on regional economic resilience, including comparisons of 
entrepreneur behavior in different regional contexts. I then describe the two regions under 
study in this dissertation and the research methods. The findings section offers the 
qualitative results of interviews with entrepreneurs in the two regions. I conclude with a 
brief summary of the chapter. 
A framework to study regional resilience. I draw on two systems perspectives 
to illuminate the role of entrepreneurs in regional resilience. The first is evolutionary 
economic geography (EEG), which is primarily a European-based research effort, 
especially popular in the Netherlands, the U.K. and Germany. It has sought to understand 
economic development processes over time and space and to integrate findings from 
micro, meso and macro level research on regional economic change (Boschma & 
Frenken, 2006). I also draw on complex adaptive systems (CAS), which is an attempt 
across several disciplines to create a universal framework for understanding macro level 
outcomes from their source in micro level interactions (Lansing, 2003) and has recently 
been applied to regional economic change (Martin & Sunley, 2007; Pendall, Foster, & 
Cowell, 2010). 
Before describing system properties that are theorized to produce resilience, we 
must grapple with the fundamental question of what phenomenon resilience is describing. 
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Regions develop and change, but when is change (or lack thereof) an indicator of 
resilience capacity? One of the most straightforward approaches to recognizing resilience 
is found in Pendall et al. (2010). They create a simple 2x3 matrix to show how evidence 
of resilient regions differs depending on the nature of the challenge faced and 
assumptions about the underlying urban dynamics—the resilience lens (see Table 4-1). 
First, they make a useful distinction between a region’s resilience to acute shocks, such as 
a plant closure or natural disaster and to chronic slow-burns, which are best represented 
by the long term effects of deindustrialization. Acute shocks are exogenous to the system 
whereas slow-burn challenges as endogenous, an important observation I will return to. 
These help sort out one of two important questions, resilience ‘to what’? 
Table 4-1. Evidence of Resilience under Different Resilience Frameworks and Types 
of Challenges 
  Resilience lens 
Type of regional 
challenge 
Single 
equilibrium 
Multi-
equilibria 
Complex 
adaptive systems 
Acute shock 
Return to 
normal 
Establishment 
of new normal 
Continual 
adaptation 
Chronic slow-burn 
Maintenance of 
'natural' norms 
Performance 
improvement 
Continual 
adaptation 
Source: Pendall, Foster, & Cowell (2010), Figure 4, p. 77 
In general, we might say a region is resilient if its response to either type of 
challenge results in maintaining or even increasing ‘good outcomes.’ However, both what 
constitutes an outcome and what is good is not given by the theory a priori. As Pendall 
and company note, determining that a city has ‘recovered’ or an economic system is 
‘stable’ presumes that the analyst pays attention to some outcomes but not others. A 
second question that must be answered is, resilience ‘of what’? Resilience of income or 
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in the growth of average incomes in an outcome that urban scholars would likely agree is 
necessary to claim regional resilience. Some have even used persistent income inequality 
growth as a non-resilient outcome (Chapple & Lester, 2010), though it could easily be 
assessed as a potential contributor to diminished resilience along another measure, such 
as the inability to maintain stable employment levels.  
In addition to ambiguity over outcome indicators, there is no theoretical ground to 
describe what is good: good compared to what? Many would agree that returning to the 
standard five percent unemployment rate would be a good outcome, but would a resilient 
region have even fallen far from the good outcome in the first place? Pittsburgh is a 
classic Rustbelt region because the large number of companies in the steel industry left 
high unemployment in Pittsburgh when the economy shifted toward the service sector 
(Treado & Giarratani, 2008). Pittsburgh has not exactly ‘bounced back’ to its population 
and economic growth highs of the post-war period, but by the 2000s it had transformed 
its quality of life by lowering pollution and crime levels and even increasing per capita 
income (Pendall et al., 2010). Pittsburgh must be resilient in some sense of the word. 
Some of this ambiguity is resolved by conceptualizing regional resilience as a 
process rather than a ‘normal’ outcome to be achieved. Much like people do not achieve 
‘health’ but rather maintain a healthy or unhealthy lifestyle, regions may evolve through 
processes that can only be compared to a recent previous state. Said another way, if we 
view the local economy as having a single, stable equilibrium, we look for regional 
resilience in quick returns to pre-shock income growth rates, for example; or for slow-
burn challenges, we assume some natural state and watch that it is maintained, such as 
‘full employment’ (Pendall et al., 2010). Alternatively, urban systems have been 
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conceptualized as having multiple equilibria with varying degrees of stability. A region 
may achieve a steady state of development for a time, but a strong enough external shock 
can move it to a new equilibria. These are known as basins of attraction because the ebb 
and flow of resources within some range make it harder than normal to disrupt and 
destabilize the system, but once disrupted change is quick and dramatic. Multiple 
equilibria is a view consistent with phenomena such as neighborhood racial tipping points 
or policy concerns over avoiding thresholds. A region that settles into a higher income 
growth trajectory given post-shock conditions and the story of Pittsburgh are two 
examples of regional resilience under the multiple equilibria resilience lens. Detroit is an 
example of movement to a suboptimal equlibrium. In this view, Detroit has lacked 
regional resilience capacity because decline of the auto industry (a chronic slow burn 
challenge) initiated movement of the average income to a flatter growth trajectory.  
Resilience theorizing in economic development is relatively new. Christopherson, 
Michie, & Tyler (2010) have remarked that it is primarily a U.S. effort to create urban 
policies that mitigate the effects of recessions and disasters. But theorizing the problem of 
rigid regions, stuck in a suboptimal equilibrium, is not new. Regional path dependence 
and lock-in are used to describe a period in the evolution of a region in which it is no 
longer producing economic benefits, but the institutional structure of the area (meaning 
the formal and informal rules that govern economic actors) has grown so interdependent 
and complex that the pattern of regional decline is unusually difficult to reverse (Martin 
& Sunley, 2006).  
The idea of regional lock-in was taken from the market context where it described 
how certain technologies, despite their known inefficiencies, came to dominate due to 
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network effects (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985). So its applicability to regions is not always 
comfortable. For example, it may make more sense to talk of negative lock-in of an 
industry, such as the auto industry in Detroit, than to use it to describe an entire region 
(Hassink, 2005; Martin & Sunley, 2006). Yet the regional metaphor has clear intuitive 
appeal as suggested by the wide-spread use of the term Rustbelt. In Germany’s 
‘Rustbelt,’ Grabher (1993) identified three forms of regional-level lock-in based on the 
many supplier relationships and complementary industries and activities associated with 
the Ruhr area’s steel and iron industry. Functional lock-in describes hierarchical firm 
relationships, while cognitive lock-in has to do with knowledge and world-views. 
Political lock-in described the state-sponsored institutional environment, such as 
regulations and political relationships. These types of political, economic and social 
rigidities have long been used to describe the rise and fall of whole nations (Olson, 1984). 
It bears mention that cluster theory suggests that some degree of interdependence is what 
allows for regional growth in the first place. Positive externalities caused by co-located 
firms sharing resources and knowledge describe a period of lock-in with positive growth 
outcomes.  
Thresholds for path dependence with positive versus negative outcomes are of 
consequence for policy. Its application in technology markets suggests that only an 
exogenous shock can push a region traveling down a suboptimal path onto one with 
‘better outcomes’ (Martin & Sunley, 2006). Alternatively, its application to clusters and 
regions suggests that endogenous reinvention, perhaps like Pittsburgh’s, is also a means 
of attaining a new equilibrium. Indeed, Martin and Sunley argue that the seeds for a new 
round of agglomerative growth could be in the legacy institutions and capabilities of the 
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region rather than the result of historical ‘accidents’ as scholars who formalize path 
dependence theory are apt to claim (Storper, 2010; Arthur, 1989). 
In theory, different avenues to lock-in could also be used to understand a region’s 
ability to respond to acute shocks, but most path dependence research is concerned with 
longer time horizons and an inability to respond to slow-burn challenges. Recall that 
Pendall et al. (2010) described slow-burn as an endogenous challenge. More specifically, 
they consider slow-burn both a challenge and an outcome. They offer some examples: 
one measure of resilience to the forces of deindustrialization may be the extent to which 
the region reindustrializes; or a current immigrant influx could indicate resilience to the 
previous period’s level of immigration. To account for these endogenous processes, 
Pendall and company offer a third view of urban dynamics in which no equilibrium state 
exists (see Table 4-1). Regions should be thought of as constantly evolving and this is the 
perspective taken in the analysis of the interview data I collect. In such a world, regional 
resilience would be indicated by a redistribution of resources that sustains ‘acceptable’ 
job levels after an acute shock, for example, and less volatility in unemployment say, 
through slow-burns. Martin and Sunley (2006) agree and argue that it is likely 
unproductive to distinguish endogenous and exogenous forces in both acute and chronic 
changes because the forces are so recursive, priority cannot be assigned to one source of 
cause over the other.  
Assuming an urban system with no equilibrium shifts the theoretical lens from 
how an economy is resilient to simply how it adapts and transforms (Simmie & Martin, 
2010). Change is not only the result of adaptation to external challenges, it is also self-
generated adaptation, or as complex adaptive systems (CAS) says, it is self-organizing. 
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Self-organizing systems display stable patterns that are not centrally planned but instead 
emerge through the interaction of actors (or some other system subunit, like firms). 
Actors in self-organized systems search for new solutions and new ways of combining 
knowledge when they are dissatisfied with their current returns (Metcalfe, Foster, & 
Ramlogan, 2006). This act of searching, learning, and adapting propels growth and helps 
avoid lock-in past the point of good outcomes. At the same time, self-organizing systems 
adapt to external challenges with minimal disturbance to macro patterns. Self-organized 
systems are said to strike the balance between connectivity that fosters growth and 
autonomy that allows for responsiveness. They are ‘stable’ in that they do not collapse 
when confronted with external challenges and that they continually self-renew. Self-
organized systems in nature can ‘collapse,’ such as a fishery whose stock is eradicated by 
polluted waters. Cities are more prone to enter a ‘vicious cycle’ of decline than to 
collapse. Thus, although CAS theory is based on descriptive evidence of various natural 
systems, in urban studies it has a normative character to maintain or improve upon ‘good 
outcomes’ (Christopherson et al., 2010; Lindsay, 2005).  
How can we ensure our complex urban systems behave like CAS, able to avoid 
lock-in or respond positively to acute challenges? Looking across social and biological 
systems, Axelrod & Cohen (1999) have made headway on what makes CAS able to do 
both. Although different characteristics of complex systems have been proposed by 
various authors, I use Axelrod and Cohen’s analysis because it is intended for systems 
whose actors can intentionally make changes (adapt) and it has a prescriptive component. 
First, they define variety as a key ingredient to CAS because it provides the raw material 
for adaptation. They refer to variety in agent types, some detectable feature shared by a 
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subset of agents in the system. The frequency of types in the system is altered through 
several mechanisms, such as births and deaths, imitating, imitating with error (i.e. 
mutation) or recombining. Consequently, the degree of interaction among diverse types is 
a second key ingredient to healthy adaptive systems. The degree of interaction could be 
measured by the number of different types of agents interacting or the depth of 
interaction, for example. According to Axelrod & Cohen, selection is a major force acting 
to alter the frequency of types, but selection can operate at multiple levels 
simultaneously. Market competition, for example, could select on firm types and firm 
strategies. The authors also pose a trade-off between searching for more variety upon 
which to adapt (exploration) or exploiting and furthering the successful type in its current 
form. To ‘harness complexity’, they recommend taking advantage of variety by balancing 
exploring and exploiting behavior and better understanding the basis for interaction 
among agent types to potentially affect it. Scott Page (2007) offers a nice analogy to the 
benefits of variety (diversity) when he says that agents sharing similar mental maps may 
work together to reach the peak of their proverbial mountain (exploiting), but it takes 
exploring the valley for diverse perspectives to eventually find the even higher peak on 
the next mountain.   
Applied to regional economic development, Martin and Sunley (2007) conclude 
that complexity’s required variety and interaction of types must refer to the rules and 
connections between new ideas. This is premised on the notion that regional economic 
evolution is driven by (spatially-confined) advances in knowledge. They describe the 
exploit-explore balance as inertia-innovation, where inertia describes the inevitable decay 
of current knowledge and innovation describes the product of a search for new 
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knowledge. To test this application of CAS theory to economic development, they 
suggest the following research question: Are the most successful economies those which 
show the highest rates of innovation, and highest rates of global and local search, or is it 
those which are able to apply new innovations within relatively stable (inert) knowledge 
structures?  
Many other applications of CAS to economic development theory are possible. 
Important lines of inquiry in EEG are easily mapped to the CAS framework. For 
example, understanding the appropriate degree of interaction between types would 
benefit from Boschma's (2005) investigation of different ways in which agents are ‘close’ 
to one another (e.g. geographically, cognitively). Similarly, EEG considers firm routines 
to be the ‘genetic material’ that is passed and adapted through search and selection. Firm 
routines are the unique behaviors of the firm, the product of tacit knowledge transfer and 
learning-by-doing knowledge generation (Winter & Nelson 1982). Firm routines are a 
clear instance of agent type variety upon which selection acts to change the extent of 
variation in the system. These and other interpretations of a complex, adaptive economic 
system will be developed based on the interview data.  
The major difference between the CAS and EEG adaptation frameworks, 
according to Martin and Sunley (2007) is the relative weight put on selection forces. CAS 
is much less interested than EEG in how market selection shapes the distribution of types 
in an economy and it is much more interested in how self-organization or search efforts 
initiate new spatial patterns of firms and industries. For example, system ‘failure’ could 
occur because agents adapt to local conditions, but ignore the broader competitive forces 
that will effect them. In this sense, the dissertation focus is closer to the EEG than CAS 
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framework. The idea that change is primarily motivated by self-organization is 
problematic for EEG scholars because it does not explain how external challenges impact 
firms and ultimately the variety available (Martin & Sunley, 2007).  
Of course other research tracks in different academic disciplines could be 
described in terms of CAS components, such as sociology’s interest in the need to 
balance bridging (exploring) and bonding (exploiting) social capital for economic benefit. 
The difference is that other research tracks are not typically interested in the 
macroeconomic (regional) effects of such interactions, although there are clear 
exceptions (e.g. Woolcock, 1998). Both CAS and EEG seek to account for the effects of 
individual and collective action on the regional economy, as well as constraints on that 
action posed by slow-burn challenges. O’Sullivan, Manson, Messina, & Crawford state it 
succinctly when they say that what is novel about a systems approach is its “sustained 
attempt to grapple with the ‘bottom up’ emergence of aggregate behaviour on the one 
hand, and the top down impact of emergent structures on the behaviour of constituent 
elements on the other” (2006, p. 614).  
CAS and EEG are frameworks for theorizing about development and change, 
more than they directly suggest testable hypotheses (Simmie & Martin, 2010; Boschma 
& Frenken, 2006). As described early, the tenants of a resilient system, such as agent 
connectedness, needs to be operationalized in a real system before hypotheses about 
resilience outcomes can be tested. In general, adaptation models suggest that path 
dependent decline in Rustbelt regions and growth in other regions are not deterministic 
conditions. “[P]ath dependence is a probabilistic and contingent process: at each moment 
in historical time the suite of possible future evolutionary trajectories (paths) of a 
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technology, institution, firm or industry is conditioned by (contingent on) both the past 
and the current states of the system in question, and some of these possible paths are 
more likely or probable than others” (Martin & Sunley, 2006, p. 402). The analytic 
question is what is different about the adaptive capacity in regions currently on a growth 
versus decline trajectory. The value of exploratory work on system adaptation is to 
ultimately suggest new hypotheses about regional resilience for empirical testing 
(Swanstrom, 2008).  
System approaches to urban development and regional resilience are not without 
their critics. CAS largely avoids early urban systems’ critiques that the current structure 
of low-income workers and poor neighborhoods is functional for the larger development 
purpose of the city (Castells, 1979; Logan & Molotch, 1987). But CAS’ basic assumption 
of autonomous, interacting agents does little to recognize the power inequalities that 
shape the selection of institutional and organizational landscapes (Martin & Sunley, 
2007). Furthermore, centralized policy action is already part of the interdependent fabric 
in a complex system such as an economy. Some argue that the major instigator of the 
housing bust was in fact a repeal of a ‘centrally coordinating’ policy that limited interest 
rates on first-lien mortgages (Swanstrom, 2008). Similarly, Pearson and Sweetman 
(2011) submit that resilience policy discussions tend to romanticize the ability of women 
in poverty to remain resilient in the face of the recent global economic crisis. Extolling 
the resilience advantages of a ‘self-organizing’ system should not come at the expense of 
needed social supports for poor men and women. For the present analysis, systems 
frameworks have advantages over other policy-related approaches to urban development 
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because they allow for a clearer understanding of how policy interventions can affect 
change within a system of historical context and cumulative causation. 
Empirical research on regional resilience. Several factors are under 
investigation for their contribution to resilience capacity. For example, Christopherson et 
al. (2010) list a strong regional system of innovation, strength in factors that create a 
learning region, modern productive infrastructure, skilled and entrepreneurial workforce, 
supportive financial system and diversified economic base, as some good starting places 
to assess reliance. Martin & Sunley (2006) also cite a diversified economic base, but from 
the standpoint of ‘de-locking’ a path their list is slightly different and includes diversified 
economic agents, social networks and technologies; indigenous creation of new firms and 
technologies; the transplantation of new organizational forms and technologies; and 
upgraded technologies in the older industrial base. The MacArthur Foundation-funded 
Building Resilient Region’s research network developed an resilience capacity index to 
rank regions that includes some of the indicators already mentioned, as well as the extent 
of civic participation and income inequality (MacArthur Foundation, n.d.). With a wide 
range of research agendas, I will discuss a set of related resilience mechanisms with long 
histories in industrial and labor research, and a connection to entrepreneurship. Most of 
the cited studies have their roots in neoclassical or single-equilibrium studies of economic 
growth, but they nonetheless address the need for variety in adaptive systems. 
One line of inquiry with a significant empirical history is the proposition that a 
diversified industrial base allows for quicker adaptation and greater resistance to regional 
economic challenges. As described in Chapter 3, this began as the Jacobs – M-A-R 
debate on economic growth, with the former indicating the growth benefits of industry 
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diversity and the latter the benefits of specialization (Boschma & Frenken, 2011; Glaeser 
et al., 1992). Recently, the benefits of industry diversification have been advocated as a 
portfolio strategy to protect regions from external shocks. This research has found that 
the presence of specialized or at least related industries in a region results in more 
growth, but the existence of unrelated industries reduces the risk of decline (via 
unemployment) after a recession (Frenken, Van Oort, & Verburg, 2007), a finding 
consistent with the need for variety in CAS. A second area of inquiry focuses on the role 
that intermediate suppliers play in resilience. Conventional wisdom in the U.S. and 
abroad suggests that intermediate suppliers closely linked (or even vertically integrated) 
with a major local producer make the region more vulnerable to lock-in and decline than 
a cadre of independent suppliers (Chinitz 1961; Sadler 2004). In CAS terms, suppliers 
and producers that are too connected reduce regional resilience to slow-burn challenges.  
The third and perhaps most consistent area of study is the role of high skill 
workers in resilience. From a CAS perspective, one could view high skill workers as 
offering greater variety in knowledge due to niche specializations. Chapple & Lester 
(2010) found that high skill workers were related to a region’s ability to reverse a below 
average or downward trend in earnings per worker over several decades. Similarly, 
Glaeser et al., (2011) found a close connection between college-educated workers and the 
ability of regions to grow despite many economic challenges over the long-run. St. Clair 
et al. (2011) looked at 1,500 regional employment shocks between 1978 and 2007 and 
found that a low proportion of college-educated workers increased the likelihood of 
suffering a downturn. Interestingly, they also found that a high proportion of high school 
educated workers increased the ability of a region to recover from an economic downturn 
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(as opposed to not suffering a post-shock downturn in the first place). Acs & Armington's 
(2006) work is also useful here. They found that the proportion of college educated 
workers significantly predicted new firms in the service industry in early and late 1990s, 
but a few years after the short 1991 recession, educational attainment was much less of a 
factor in new firm startups. The discrepancy suggests that high skill (or low skill) 
workers effect regions differently depending on the type of external challenge in 
question. From a CAS perspective, the skill variety needed for regional resilience could 
stem from a healthy mix of different skill types. 
An undercurrent in many of the resilience mechanisms just described is the role of 
the entrepreneur. Small, entrepreneurial firms constitute the independent intermediate 
suppliers and make possible the wide diversity of industries in regions. They found the 
technology start-ups and other high skill worker ventures in places like Silicon Valley. At 
the individual firm level, entrepreneurs are thought to foster regional resilience through 
their deliberate deviation from established paths of commerce (Garud & Karnøe, 2001), 
ability to generate local knowledge and link it to local capacity (Malecki, 1993), quick 
response to changes in local conditions (Feldman et al., 2005) and reduced likelihood of 
shedding employees for short term gains (Kolko & Neumark, 2010). Most commonly, 
entrepreneurs are recognized for their role in Schumpeterian innovation, which is the 
antidote to already locked-in regions. Empirical research that specifically relates 
entrepreneurs to regional (slow-burn) resilience, however, is limited. And drawing 
conclusions from this literature suffers from the many definitions of an entrepreneur (e.g. 
new firm, small firm, someone who files a patent).  
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 Glaeser & Kerr's (2009) statistical analysis of new employer firms found that the 
lack of entrepreneurship in Rustbelt regions partly explains their differing economic 
circumstances from Sunbelt regions. They find different entry rates have mostly to do 
with the current industry structure and educational attainment in the cities, which of 
course is a legacy of previous periods. Clark’s et al. (2010) descriptive study of 
entrepreneurship and resilience separates innovation by large versus small (down to one-
man) firms and offers a more nuanced picture of successful regions than the Rustbelt-
Sunbelt dichotomy. They create a typology of innovation regions using the overall level 
of patenting and the proportion of small firm patenting in the 81 most innovative U.S. 
regions. Using descriptive statistics they find that average GDP per capita is highest for 
regions with a large proportion of entrepreneur patenting (e.g. Raleigh, San Diego, 
Boston). It is lowest among regions with little patenting by both large firms and 
entrepreneurs (e.g. Dayton, Jacksonville, San Antonio). These ‘least innovative’ regions 
tended to have more diversified industry strengths (i.e. low concentration of patent filing 
in any one technology class) and so despite low incomes, the authors conclude they may 
still represent resilient regions that are better able to mitigate external shocks than they 
are at combating slow-burn challenges.  
Comparative studies offer some of the most consistent findings that entrepreneurs 
are vital to regional resilience. They also offer more in the way of what are the important 
types of variety and patterns of interaction in entrepreneurs that produce regional 
resilience capacity. Saxenian's (1994) comparison of organizational relationships in the 
faltering Boston and ascending Silicon Valley technology industries in the 1990s; and 
Chinitz's (1961) comparison of entrepreneur-corporation relationships in the growing 
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New York versus faltering Pittsburgh of the 1960s are great examples. Both studies found 
that the inability of faltering regions to adapt to technology changes (and demonstrate 
resilience) lay in small-scale and open (non-hierarchical) interaction patterns of 
entrepreneurial actors. Treado & Giarratani (2008) recently surveyed intermediate 
suppliers in Pittsburgh’s steel industry and found that consultant, engineer, and machinist 
firms that had been closely linked to corporate producers in the region were eventually 
able to rebound as viable clusters by growing their national and global steel market or 
adapting their services for buyers outside the steel industry. Simmie & Martin (2010) 
compared the economic histories of two British cities, innovative Cambridge and 
faltering Swansea. They found that Cambridge’s home-grown university-sponsored 
entrepreneurs built the region’s resilience capacity (to recessions and ultimately slow-
burn challenges) more than Swansea’s short term success with attracting foreign-owned 
(mostly Asian) technology innovators. The reason, they argue, is that Cambridge 
entrepreneurs were continually able to branch out into new specialized industrial sectors 
given their solid foundation in advanced mathematics and computing. 
Traditional entrepreneurs and resilience. The present analysis also compares a 
stagnant and ascendant region, but is a unique contribution to the resilience literature 
because it focuses on traditional entrepreneurs. The earlier findings on high and low skill 
workers hint at a potential role for traditional entrepreneurs in resilience, but none of the 
cited studies theorizes or tests such a relationship. At a basic level, traditional 
entrepreneurship puts adaptive capacity in the hands of more workers because there are 
many more ‘low skill’ service providers than high tech startup companies. Thus, more 
workers can respond directly to challenges. Similarly, a resilience framework suggests 
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that areas of little entrepreneur activity could have a larger than expected effect on the 
rest of the region’s local business climate due to neighborhood interdependence (Hill et 
al., 1995). Entrepreneurship that is more evenly spread across different parts of town 
could prevent a drag on economic activity. Also from a resilience perspective, it is 
important that traditional entrepreneurs represent variety in the human capital available in 
a region. Jacks-of-all-trades with a balanced skill set are more likely to become 
entrepreneurs than specialists with expert competency in one area (Lazear, 2002). Rather 
than formal knowledge, traditional entrepreneurs bring labor attributes such as 
perseverance and a high tolerance for risk (Wadhwa, Aggarwal, Holly, & Salkever, 
2009). 
More specifically, they may introduce needed variety through their structure, 
organizational routines and functional relationships with other firms that would set them 
apart from high skill entrepreneurs and medium or large firms. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
major structural characteristics that distinguish traditional from other types of 
entrepreneurs are that they have low capital requirements and often blend work types so 
they are more practiced at coming in and out of self-employment. They have no 
employees and sometimes work out of a house or work truck, which are both unlikely in 
export-oriented businesses. These features increase firm flexibility and could contribute 
to more or faster adaptation to acute shocks and slow-burn challenges.  
The involvement of traditional entrepreneurs in the informal economy may also 
provide needed flexibility. Observing the informal economy in New York and other 
global cities, Sassen (2001) notes four ways in which traditional entrepreneurs may 
contribute to regional resilience. The neighborhood subeconomy serves local demand for 
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services that are not offered by the mainstream economy, such as home-based child care 
and gypsy cabs which sprung up in New York’s low income neighborhoods that formal 
companies refused to serve. The use of immigrant labor is a second informal economy 
that affords ‘formal’ companies flexibility in labor costs. These informal economies are 
often co-located and industry specific, such as New York’s garment district. Gentrified 
neighborhoods develop a third type of informal economy, as they seek artifacts of middle 
class consumption from the nearby (formerly local) residents, such as high end wood 
work. Lastly, Sassen describes informal supply chains comprised of firms operating 
under the radar, often in violation of various city codes, but that allow small, formal 
businesses in manufacturing and services to compete with large ones. Some of these 
factors may be specific to global cities, but they offer a real world account of how 
traditional entrepreneur behavior may help combat slow-burn challenges. 
As for acute shock resilience, much of the recent research has simply tried to 
determine if entrepreneurship grows or falls during these periods. Given the broader 
purpose of these studies, they speak to traditional entrepreneurship a bit more than the 
earlier studies of high skill entrepreneurs. A study of single-employer firms, very 
common in traditional entrepreneurship, found they are more likely to increase during 
periods of high unemployment, while employer startups are more likely to decrease (Acs 
et al., 2009). Shane (2011) points out that despite entries, exits meant that the net stock of 
entrepreneurs actually fell from 10.2 million people in November 2007 to 9.8 million 
people in June 2009. Traditional entrepreneurs may increase resilience capacity more 
than other entrepreneurs, but they do not seem to prevent a downturn. The closest to 
answering the question of entrepreneurs and acute shock resilience is a study of employer 
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firms. Kolko & Neumark (2010) find that the headquarters of locally owned chains 
(multi-establishments) are less likely to reduce employment than non-local, non-
headquarter firms when the economy experiences a recession. And, local single 
establishment firms help stabilize employment during regional economic shocks, but they 
themselves are more likely go fully out of business (rather than lay-off employees) after a 
shock. Kolko & Neumark (2010) conclude that we cannot reject the theory that local 
firms weigh the costs of lay-offs to the community more than non-local firms, but given 
the mixed evidence, they argue there must be more to the story. 
In sum, there are few studies that look directly at the role of traditional 
entrepreneurs in regional resilience. Traditional entrepreneurs appear vulnerable to acute 
shocks, but potentially less so than larger firms with employees and physical 
establishments to maintain, which can make them an asset in resilience capacity. 
Furthermore, they may play a role in resilience to slow-burn challenges through the 
informal economy, or again, by flexibility to changes in the business environment. But 
this has only been studied comparatively through the behavior of high skill entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurship is indeed lower in stagnant regions than ascendant ones, but 
endogeneity makes it very difficult to tease out when favorable regional conditions 
produce more entrepreneurs and when entrepreneurs produce the right conditions for 
regional adaptation. The various definitions of entrepreneurship and the limited literature 
argue for a more exploratory analysis than a hypothesis-based one. Unlike the 
comparative studies mentioned above, my purpose is not to determine if traditional 
entrepreneurs are the cause of the regions’ divergent paths. It is to determine how the 
unique features of traditional entrepreneurship interact with the macro environment in 
123 
 
ways that could promote regional resilience. In the next section, I introduce my regions 
and research methods and then offer findings in the final section. 
Research Methods and Analytic Tactics 
The stagnant manufacturing titan and ascendant tech-hub. Dayton is a mid-
sized region (800,000 inhabitants) located in southern Ohio, just north of Cincinnati. 
Since the late 1800s, it has been an important site for defense and aerospace. It is 
considered the birthplace of aviation, as it was home to the Wright Brothers who invented 
the first controlled airplane. At that time, the region was a hub of invention and patenting 
that spawned several manufacturing companies. The first cash register and resin coated 
flexible substrates for printing are two of the major industries born from Dayton 
inventions (City of Dayton, n.d.). Wright Patterson Air Force Base has long been a major 
regional asset. One of the largest and most diverse bases in the U.S., it employs nearly 
30,000 military, civilian and contract workers. The region also houses two major 
universities, University of Dayton and Wright State University. 
Nonetheless, Dayton has suffered significant economic hardship since its heyday 
in the last century. What was a manufacturing titan is now a stagnating Rustbelt region by 
most indicators. The city of Dayton and the metropolitan area have been on the decline. 
From 1980 to 2005, the region lost nearly a third of its manufacturing jobs and fell far 
below the U.S. average for job growth, 16 percent compared to 42 percent (Friedhoff, 
Wial, & Wolman, 2010). The trend has continued into the recent recession when Dayton 
saw the loss of General Motors which closed its plant in 2008 and the National Cash 
Register Company, which relocated its headquarters to Atlanta after 125 years in the area. 
It may be no surprise that the metropolitan population shrunk two percent between 1990 
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and 2010. Typically a negative indicator, the contraction in this case may have helped 
keep the unemployment rate at the national average of 11 percent in 2010, up from 6 
percent in 2007 according to Bureau of Labor statistics. Before the financial downturn, 
Dayton ranked extremely low (238 out of 255) according to an index that measured 
change in economic well-being using employment, wages and metropolitan domestic 
product (Furdell & Wolman, 2006). It also consistently ranks toward the bottom of 
regions on various measures of innovation activity, such as patenting, startups and the 
proportion of high-tech workers (Atkinson & Gottlieb, 2001; Clark, Huang, & Walsh, 
2010). Today, census data indicates the region is less educated and poorer than the 
national average (see Table 4-2). In 2010, about a quarter of Dayton’s adult population 
held a bachelor’s degree and 16 percent lived below the poverty line. Comparable 
national figures are one-third and 14 percent, respectively. 
Table 4-2. Demographic Characteristics of the Regions, 2010 
Metropolitan 
Statistical 
Area 
Population 
(per sq. 
mile) 
With 
college 
degree 
In 
poverty 
Foreign 
born 
Job-
less 
Self-
employed 
(inc/un) 
Un-
incorp
only 
Raleigh, NC  1,100,000   
(4,900) 41% 13% 12% 10% 9.0% 4.8% 
 
Dayton, OH 
800,000    
(5,300) 24% 16% 4% 11% 7.5% 5.0% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey, 2010 
In contrast, the Raleigh region has seen dramatic population growth—41 
percent—between 1990 and 2010 and now stands at 1.1 million inhabitants. Raleigh is 
the capital city of North Carolina, a state in the Southeastern section of the country. Three 
major universities in Raleigh and the adjacent Durham-Chapel Hill region comprise the 
Research Triangle, which is most well-known for its innovations in biotechnology. The 
Raleigh region formerly had a strong agricultural industry, especially in tobacco growth 
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and production. And as a capital city, it has always had a strong government sector. Since 
the opening of Research Triangle Park in 1959, the region has built its identity as a tech-
hub, home to a number of health-related and high-tech companies such, as IBM and the 
SAS Institute. It consistently ranks toward the top of indices measuring innovation 
(Atkinson & Gottlieb, 2001; Clark et al., 2010). On the index of economic well-being 
mentioned earlier, Raleigh ranks an impressive 7 of 255 (Furdell & Wolman, 2006). 
Before the recession, Raleigh’s unemployment rate was low for the country, 4 percent in 
2007, but in 2010 the figure was comparable to Dayton and below the national average, 
at 10 percent. Its workforce is highly educated compared to the national average: 41 
percent of adults hold a college degree, many of which are graduate degrees. Both its 
agricultural roots and current high-tech niche have led to a high proportion of immigrants 
living in Raleigh. Approximately 12 percent of the region is foreign-born. Raleigh is a 
classic ascendant region. 
Entrepreneurs in these two regions should have different experiences due to the 
different conditions of deindustrialization. As might be expected, the entrepreneurship 
rate is higher in the ascent than stagnant region. In Raleigh, nine percent of working 
adults claim self-employment as their primary type of work, while the comparable figure 
in Dayton is seven and half percent. On the other hand, the rate of unincorporated 
entrepreneurship—the kind more likely held by traditional entrepreneurs—is nearly 
identical between the regions. The extent of their different response to the acute shock of 
the Great Recession is difficult to determine, but given the longer-term trends, it appears 
that Dayton has done a little better than expected and Raleigh has done a little worse. The 
Brookings Institution is monitoring the economic recovery of the 100 largest 
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metropolitan areas, according to changes in the unemployment rate, employment rate, 
housing prices and economic output (GDP), from the trough (whichever quarter that was 
for the region) to now (the third quarter of 2012 is the most recent data) (Friedhoff, 
Kulkarni, & Berube, 2012). Dayton ranks better than average, 44 of 100, meaning its 
recovery has been better than 56 other regions. Raleigh ranks 25 of 100, which is 
certainly better than Dayton, but perhaps less than would be expected given its 
phenomenal economic success over the past 20 years.  
Analytic tactics. The interview data collected for this analysis is described in full 
in Chapter 3. In short, I used U.S. Census Bureau data to identify working class 
neighborhoods, meaning that they had a below average rate of college graduates for the 
country, but also fell above the high poverty thresholds used to target federal funding to 
depressed areas. The Raleigh and Dayton areas visited were thus much more similar than 
the regional comparison in Table 4-2, with college graduation and poverty rates between 
14 and 17 percent. I interviewed 27 traditional entrepreneurs who I selected by walking 
into local establishments, among other methods. Interviewees represent a variety of ages, 
races, genders, and some are foreign born (see the summary statistics in Appendix 3).The 
interviews were one hour and followed a semi-structured format (see interview protocol 
in Appendix 4). They were transcribed and uploaded to Dedoose.com. I look for 
similarities and differences between the regions in how respondents experience their 
entrepreneurship and how they respond to challenges and changes in their environment. I 
generate analytic findings that can be developed into testable hypotheses in larger settings 
about the relationship between traditional entrepreneurs and regional resilience.  
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The comparative case study approach is common in the resilience and regional 
development literature. Some of the seminal insights into innovation networks were 
gleaned from Saxenian (1994) comparison of technology clusters in Silicon Valley and 
Route 128 in Boston. Since then, researchers have used a mix of methods to better 
understand the growth and development of regions through a comparative lens. For 
example, Wolfe (2010) compares the response of two very large technology cluster cities 
in the Ontario province of Canada to the 2001-2002 and 2008-2009 recessions using 
interview data. In contrast, Welter, Trettin, & Neumann (2008) compare two stagnant 
industrial neighborhoods in the Ruhr area of Germany, the Essen District VI and the 
Gelsenkirchen-Bismarck district. They combine document analysis and in-depth 
interviews with a standardized questionnaire for entrepreneurs to determine why the 
former has fared better in state-sponsored renewal programs. Other studies have looked 
for similarities or difference across very different economic contexts. Klepper (2010) 
applies his in-depth knowledge of the institutional differences between Silicon Valley’s 
semiconductor industry and Detroit’s automotive industry to conduct econometric 
analysis that explains the emergence of these two industrial clusters through regularities 
in firm entry and exit patterns. The findings below add to this growing comparative 
regional studies methodology. 
Findings 
1. There are more similarities than differences in the experience of traditional 
entrepreneurs in ascendant and stagnant regions. 
This research design was premised on the idea that traditional entrepreneurs in 
differing economic contexts would respond and contribute to their environment in 
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distinct ways. What was surprising then, was the extent to which the challenges they 
described were similar. In both regions, entrepreneurs experience slow-burn challenges 
that impact their business. Changes in import availability, online sales, big box stores, 
immigrant labor, customer preferences and radical technologies were all cited as 
challenges in their competitive landscapes. These challenges were not obviously 
mitigated by Raleigh’s phenomenal growth, nor were they more prominent in Dayton’s 
stagnant economy. Indeed, environments of both growth and stagnation provided 
opportunities for entrepreneurs. George said his hardware and power lawn equipment 
business has done well given Raleigh’s rapid expansion into previously agricultural areas, 
but Tray thought the more depressed Dayton economy had provided him a low cost of 
living and easy access to knowledgeable machinists to help grow his gun accessory 
business. Conversely, both environments posed barriers. Jim felt that the astronomical 
internet use and education in Raleigh has meant fewer customers want to establish a 
personal relationship with him to meet their car import accessory needs. Ellie has been in 
the self-employment business as long as Jim (they are both in their 70s) and found that in 
Dayton, the constant outflow of corporate executives due to plant closures means little 
residential house-cleaning exists anymore and there is no new construction house 
cleaning. 
Seasonal droughts, plant closures, and gas price hikes are some of the short term 
challenges described by interviewees. Experiences of acute shocks were also surprisingly 
similar in Dayton and Raleigh, although Dayton entrepreneurs more often cited specific 
corporate closures and a direct impact on their customers as the source of their troubles. 
For example, Phil’s transmission shop saw a drop in repair revenue since a Dayton-based 
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car manufacturer closed and Phil linked it to his long time customers retiring and not 
driving since the closure. Hanna has seen more pricing complaints in her sewing 
business—a fact she considered a challenge—because customers buy more second-hand 
clothing since the recession that costs less than the alteration. In Raleigh, Ed’s car repair 
shop has felt the effects of the recession, but via suppliers. He has dealt with slow and 
more expensive parts delivery, as suppliers reduce their routes and add surcharges due to 
rising gas prices. The housing bust was problematic for entrepreneurs in both regions, but 
they were also equally likely to recognize the short term benefits that the boom had 
brought their business. George’s hardware store in Raleigh first benefited and then 
suffered from the bust: 
George: In this business, we're somewhat recession proof. We don't take big hits because 
we have a lower average dollar sale. And we sell things that people need generally. It's 
more home repair items. Where we took our hit was on the building side. We had a pretty 
good business going with builders. We were selling, you know they're building houses 
with nail guns, they don't hammer nails anymore, they shoot them. So we had carved out 
a pretty good niche that we were stronger than Home Depot and Lowes on is the nail 
business. We got to the point that we could buy container loads, shipping container loads 
of nails and sell to Hispanic framing contractors… 
Jen: But that's the part that took the hit in the recession? 
George: Yeah, we lost 95% of that when the housing stopped. 
Thinking about cluster theory described in Chapter 3, one hypothesis is that 
groups of traditional entrepreneurs establish networks where sharing or learning 
generates positive externalities that help them withstand regional shocks and contribute to 
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the long-term ascendency of Raleigh. This would be revealed in differences in the 
likelihood of group entrepreneur behavior between the regions. The clustering behavior 
assessed in Chapter 3 is broken down by region in Table 4-3. Although Chapter 3 found 
little evidence of neighborhood level differences, this analysis again holds one variable 
constant to better interpret differences in the other variable. Here, I hold the 
neighborhood context steady by comparing the Dayton cluster neighborhoods to the 
Raleigh clusters. It shows that inter-industry, intra-industry linkages and spinoffs are all 
more common in ascendant Raleigh than stagnant Dayton, but the differences are quite 
small. The regions are identical on their inter-industry group linkages (five out of nine), 
which were posited as the most likely contributors to resilience. If we assume cluster 
versus non-cluster neighborhood type has no influence and compare all the cases in 
Dayton to Raleigh, the regional differences become slightly larger for each of the three 
cluster dynamics, which is more supportive of the notion that entrepreneurs relate to 
resilience.  
Table 4-3. Percentage of Entrepreneurs in Each Region that Described an Explore 
or Exploit Response or an Inter-firm Linkage 
Cluster dynamic 
Raleigh 
(n=9) 
Dayton 
(n=9) Example interviews 
    
Inter-industry linkage 5 5 
Knowledgeable equipment shop 
and lawn care entrepreneurs  
Intra-industry linkage 4 2 
Subcontractors joining forces for 
home remodeling 
Spinoff  5 4 
Passing supplier/pricing strategy 
to former employee 
 
Response to challenge 
   
Explore and adapt 6 5 
Operating as a home-based or 
retail shop as needed 
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Exploit and hold course  5 3 Refusing to take credit cards  
 Note: Categories are not mutually exclusive 
 
Beyond grouped entrepreneurs, another potential difference in the regions is the 
individual entrepreneur’s response to a challenge. One could hypothesize that 
entrepreneurs in ascendant regions are used to identifying new opportunities in the midst 
of growth, weighing the costs and gains of exploration and business adaptation. 
Organizational research has shown firms that pursue an explore and diversify strategy 
over an exploit and specialize one tend to go too far (Sorenson, Mcevily, Ren, & Roy, 
2012). Thus it is unclear what the optimal balance of explore and exploit behavior is, but 
the balance is expected to be different in the regions. Again, the difference is slight 
between the regions. Both Raleigh and Dayton entrepreneurs explore more often than 
they exploit. But Dayton entrepreneurs demonstrate a less equally balanced approach 
than Raleigh entrepreneurs (see Table 4-3). If a more equal balance is better for 
resilience, it may support that traditional entrepreneurs bear some relationship to regional 
resilience. Unlike the cluster dynamics, if we assume neighborhood types have no effect 
and compare all Dayton entrepreneurs to Raleigh, the two regions become more similar 
in their balance of exploit and explore behavior.  
One of the most adaptive traditional entrepreneurs I encountered was Jim. Jim 
began his (now 30 year old) business in import cars in his back yard and moved into a 
retail space as it grew. When his investors cheated him, he moved his inventory back to 
the house and sold products from his front room. He returned to house sales again 10 
years later when a series of break-ins at his (second) retail store forced him to close. Even 
within the retail store he adapted. Though he started with import car parts in the 1970s, he 
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moved into sports car art (paintings and drawings) when imports flooding the American 
market. When the art business tanked due to a rise in corporate intellectual property 
claims, Jim simply moved the art out of the fore of the retail store and replaced it with 
bucket seats and larger car part items. The most common example of explore and adapt 
behavior was to alter inventory or services due to changing customer preferences. 
Entrepreneurs in both regions are very likely to respond to requests for new products or 
services and to do so quickly. 
A common example of staying the course and exploiting known strategies is to 
wait out slow periods. Entrepreneurs described a natural ebb and flow to their work so 
they held the course more often than they acted to drum up business during slow periods. 
The down times might bother them or make them nervous, but they viewed it as a bad 
year or season and continued with their normal advertising and pricing. As Derrick put it: 
Derrick: Summer time is always busy, everybody is ready to do stuff. Usually right after 
Christmas you're dead. You're lucky if you can get a basement that will take a little while. 
And you get jobs, you know, smaller ones usually coming in. Yeah, once everybody 
spends all their money at Christmas, it dries up. 
Jen: What do you do? Since you know it's coming, do you save for that? 
Derrick: Yeah kind of. You know, I worry every year but I always have enough work to 
get me through. You know what I mean. Some days, you may only work 4 days a week, or 
you might work two weeks straight and then you got a couple days until the next job 
comes. It's just, that's how it is.  
Other instances of exploiting a known expertise rather than searching for new 
strategies were mentioned as a purposeful stand against (what they might consider) mal-
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adaptation, such as refusing to change the belt requirements of martial arts training to 
increase customers. It can be difficult to identify how an entrepreneur responds to a slow-
burn challenge because it unfolds incrementally over long periods. He or she may have 
mentioned the problem but did not necessarily identify a response. Moreover, self-
transformation, where a major business change was not a response to external stress, is a 
potential source of resiliency to lock-in. There are just a few examples of self-
transformation (not shown). Gwen auctioned off her woodworking inventory to start a 
military memorabilia store simply because she desired a new challenge. Kenneth 
significantly expanded his lawn service territory for the same reason. Rebecca recently 
found a building she plans to buy so that she can combine her tanning and hair salon 
clients under one roof and cut out her commuting time. There is not a marked regional 
difference in rates of self-transformation. 
The behavior of traditional entrepreneurs appears quite similar in ascendant and 
stagnant regions, according to the most basic indicators of types of challenges, responses 
to challenges and types of group linkages. This is surprising because the regions have 
seen such different macro conditions in the past 30 years. On the other hand, similar 
behavior during the acute shock of the recession may be consistent with their similarly 
moderate unemployment outcomes when compared to other regions (Friedhoff et al., 
2012). Interviewee comments suggest that the more important differences in adaptation 
may be between them and their corporate competitors. For instance, Greg in Dayton felt 
his new business in cleaning kitchen equipment was taking off because he could respond 
to restaurant problems faster than his out of state competitors due to his location and 
willingness to take emergency calls. George described his ability to ramp up nail sales 
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quickly and conveniently for the Hispanic framers as was what gave him this edge over 
Lowes and Home Depot. Both Greg and George’s adaptability were vital to the success 
of other traditional entrepreneurs in the area. The next two findings introduce ways that 
traditional entrepreneurs are similar to each other, but potentially unique from other types 
of firms. They report all statistics based on the full sample of 27 interviewees. The 
findings are suggestive of how traditional entrepreneurs contribute to resilience. 
2. Charitable profit-seeking: an organizational routine that offers resilience 
through variety. 
Traditional entrepreneurs offer goods and services that are in high demand during 
tough economic times. Thus their mere presence in Raleigh and Dayton may help 
residents maintain their quality of life during acute shocks. For example, Derrick noted 
that his remodeling business recently had its best year because the mortgage crisis forced 
home owners to make small upgrades rather than buy new. Adam and Ed made similar 
statements about their electronics repair and mechanic services, respectively. People opt 
for repairs over new purchases. However, the type of service appears less important than 
the manner in which it is delivered. Traditional entrepreneurs may contribute to regional 
resilience through an organizational routine that is unique compared to the dominant 
economic paradigm.  
Most entrepreneurs in both regions (20 of 27) saw their business as more than an 
economic entity. They recognized their social value and so are, at once both a profit-
seeking and charitable venture. The most common implication was that they charged less 
than (what they saw as) market rate for their product or service, even giving it away 
under some circumstances. Entrepreneurs who were not looking to “be a millionaire” or 
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to “make a killing” were the norm. Rather than maximizing their profits, stories like the 
one told by Kenneth below, indicate a minimum threshold used to determine appropriate 
price and resource allocation given the service’s social value. Kenneth’s comments about 
his lawn service fees are representative of interviewees’ in both their sentiment and 
specificity: 
Kenneth: Yes, I would say, I wouldn't want to put the word greedy, but you can become 
greedy. I had to just take a step back and gather myself a couple of times and say you 
know, I've made a mistake here and could have done better with this as far as my 
judgment. 
Jen: Do you, can you be more specific? Do you have any examples? 
Kenneth: I would say an example, say like if I go bid on a job that I know is worth $1500 
and I can do it comfortably for $800-$900 and still come out good. And for another 
example, say the person could be a senior citizen or elderly or you know, and I didn't use 
good judgment on that. All the sudden something will start tapping in mentally. I could 
have done better with this. But nine times out of ten, I would turn right back around and 
call or go back and say… look, they hand me the money and I say, well look just give me 
$700. That will be fine.  
Jen: How do you decide that? Like when you were saying you could do the job 
comfortably for $900. Do you mean comfortably as in you'll still be able to pay the bills 
that month? 
Kenneth: Yes. When I say comfortably, I'm looking at 2-3 things. As far as labor time, 
you know like physical labor. Not only that but paying my workers. And then me coming 
out as a pretty good profit. I don't have to make $500-$600 off that. If I come out with 
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$400 that day, as far as like expenses and paying my health, I'm ok. I felt that I have done 
a good gesture in helping someone. And we come across that a lot. 
Fred and his business partner sell eyeglasses. After witnessing what they view as 
an industry-wide practice of ripping people off, they created a 4-part business contract 
promising to have fun, charge reasonable prices, make a decent living for their families 
and grow their friendship. A mutual concern with community value is a major reason for 
the joint business venture. 
Fred: But the other thing that really drives it is that he really cares about people. And 
that is the part I was really struck with. Here's somebody that's really compassionate. 
And we can charge a lot more for our glasses than we do, we can double our prices 
easily. And we don't do it because it's not fair.  
Some instances of social value were conveyed as a long run economic strategy for 
the business, such as a customer appreciation BBQ in the parking lot of Sam’s 
convenience store or Stuart’s efforts to retain students by reducing membership fees at 
the martial arts studio for families who had fallen on hard times. But as the previous 
comments indicate, many others expressed their actions as a business norm to do the 
“right” thing. Previous research has found a similar tendency among entrepreneurs in less 
affluent areas of the U.S. and Europe (Moore, Petty, Palich, & Longnecker, 2010; The 
Aspen Institute, 2004; Williams & Nadin, 2011). They distinguish social 
entrepreneurship, not by a lack of concern with making money, but by an expanded set of 
goals and motives in their business venture. Doing the right thing went beyond fair 
pricing. Some interviewees provided small pockets of short-term funding for their 
employees to attend college. In working class communities with few wealth reserves, 
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such flexible funding can make the difference between completing college or not. 
Participating in charitable organizations was a popular activity. Twenty-two percent of 
the 18 Dayton entrepreneurs and 11 percent of Raleigh’s brought up charity work as 
important to their business and often said it was made possible by their ability to control 
their own schedule. For example, through his membership in the local Rotary Club, 
George spent every Friday for four years overseeing a gym after hours to help turn a 
crack invested neighborhood around. Similarly, Hugh commented on the significant time 
spent feeding the homeless through his American Legion membership. Harris seemed to 
fall into a charitable role based on the location of his Dojo. 
Harris: So I had to change myself to service the community in here. I had to change 
myself. 
Jen: How could you tell that your other style wasn't working? 
Harris: Because I was too intimidating. I taught the class, I didn't really engage into the 
personal level. 'How you been, how's your family?' I was just here to teach martial arts. 
Although the other challenge was I opened up to their own drama. That's the bad part. 
The bad part is there's drama, the good part is it turned out that they have family 
problems, issues, and also children that were having problems. I was able to use that 
stage of openness to be able to help people…With all [my] bad experiences, what has 
helped me is to be stronger inside in this kind of work and also to tell others my story. 
Because we've had divorced kids, I mean excuse me divorced parents, and kids with no 
father around. When I tell them the story, that you're going to be ok that you don't have 
the father. I grew up not knowing my father. So when I tell them that story, they would 
feel a lot better. The mother would come to me and say, I don't know what you did to my 
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two kids, and this is a true story, but their outlook on life is different now. Because they're 
bitter towards their father and I tell them, you're going to be ok, I'm ok.  
Whereas the micro-economic view of rational firms conveyed in the business 
literature is that they maximize profits and produce the most efficient system over the 
long run, traditional entrepreneurs in this study adopted a more community focused 
approach to commerce. When viewed as an informal institution, the blending of social 
and economic activities is suggestive of a successful organizational routine borne in 
working class environments (Boschma & Frenken, 2006). That such a routine is not a 
major factor in regional resilience to slow-burn challenges is evident by the Dayton 
areas’ history and long-term experience as a stagnant region. It may in fact be a 
contributing factor to Dayton’s inability to turn things around. Yet it is equally evident 
that entrepreneurs that operate under a charitable profit-seeking norm relates to the area’s 
resilience. Acute shocks that change the purchasing power in working class 
neighborhoods are more easily absorbed by traditional entrepreneurs because negotiating 
and evaluating a customer’s ability to pay is part of their ongoing routine. It need not be 
learned in the midst of what is already an uncertain and difficult time.  
These data cannot tell us whether charitable profit-seeking is unique to traditional 
entrepreneurs. The fact that over a quarter of the interviewees discussed a difficult road to 
viable self-employment, including periods of homelessness or growing up a foster child, 
suggests that the businesses of traditional entrepreneurs may be more likely than other 
types of firms to adopt a routine that balances individual profit and community. It may 
also be their structure (e.g. single-employer) over personal attitude that fosters a 
charitable profit-seeking routine. In either case, the extent to which it offers variety in the 
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organizational routines of the region’s firms could predict a positive relationship between 
traditional entrepreneurs and regional resilience because resilience calls for variety to 
provide the agents of a system alternatives for adaptation (Axelrod & Cohen, 1999). In 
this instance, traditional entrepreneurs and their charitable profit-seeking provide 
established and vetted alternative services for those outside the neighborhood when a 
downturn prompts widespread lay-offs or belt-tightening. Fred’s optical shop, for 
example, gives the young architect a more inconvenient, but less expensive alternative to 
his stop at the local mall. Adam can tell the accountant hoping to upgrade his computer 
that trading repairs for tax service is perfectly acceptable. Thus traditional entrepreneurs 
are not just useful for the type of service they provide, but for the way in which they 
provide it. 
3. Trial and error learning: a behavior that fosters resilience through more 
adaptation material.  
A major theme in the stories of almost all entrepreneurs interviewed was that their 
knowledge of what works is gained through personal experience rather than the 
classroom or information sharing in formal social networks, two avenues thought to be 
crucial in innovation research. Some ‘trials’ proceed incrementally. For example, Derrick 
in home construction and Ed in automotive services use electronic manuals to look for 
information, but the variety and rate of change in their industries means experimenting is 
often the more efficient, and sometimes the only method for problem solving. Major 
changes occur in home construction every decade so a successful remodeler must be 
comfortable with constant trial and error learning to retrofit material. It may be common 
knowledge that older houses used plaster, but Derrick laughed as he explained that there 
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was no one to ask how to remodel a bathroom built in 1912 to current drywall standards 
and blend the renovation to be structurally sound and visually pleasing.  
When he started, Greg offered his kitchen cleaning services for free so that he 
could learn-by-doing and build a customer referral base at the same time. Many 
interviewees recognized the importance of creating or seizing opportunity to start or 
evolve their business. Gwen has changed her retail business three times over almost 20 
years and each time she started small and built her inventory and knowledge of the 
subject as she went. Even when done incrementally, setting your own course and 
learning-by-doing carries more risk than imitation. Tray is pursuing a number of small 
ventures with friends, from gaming software for electronic devices to a mat for 
disassembling and cleaning a popular gun used in the U.S. He had this to say about his 
entrepreneur experience: 
Tray: I would say that in any of the three businesses the biggest challenge to overcome, 
and it's probably for entrepreneurship in general, is having that idea and not being 
afraid to try it. Believing that you can do something. Believing and understanding that it's 
ok if you try something and fail. As long as you don't put your entire life savings in it or 
something like that. That's really been the only challenge. 
And several entrepreneurs I interviewed have ‘failed’ in some sense. Both Julie’s 
hair salon and Nick’s beer shop stocked up with gift shop inventory to balance their 
offerings and both quickly determined they needed to minimize or eliminate the side 
business. Interestingly, it was the salon not the gift shop that a local business training 
program advised against. Sam has branched out into three convenience stores, but after 
three months of changing tires and oil at a mechanic garage he bought, he had to admit, 
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“look, this is not my kind of thing” and he returned to his store and rented the garage to a 
more suitable entrepreneur. They initially made a bad choice between exploiting and 
exploring, but recognized it in time to reverse course. 
Other, far less incremental trials, ended positively. It is also not uncommon for 
entrepreneurs to try something risky at a seemingly bad time. George inherited a small 
hardware store from his dad. When Home Depot moved into the neighborhood, his 
business dropped. In response, he built a new, larger facility with the hope of growing his 
power equipment niche. Harris used the economic downturn to expand his Dojo and 
attached customers he lost when the GM plant closed. Each of these stories ended 
positively, with a stronger business for the individual and greater investment in the local 
area. George and Harris both felt that their choices were to die as a business, or to 
become more of a ‘player’ in the industry, more competitive. 
The system level benefit of trial and error learning is that some trials produce the 
big pay-off, an innovation in service delivery or product. This view would describe trial 
and error behavior as learning in the Doing, Using and Interacting mode rather than 
learning codified scientific and technical knowledge (Jensen et al., 2007). Tim is 
counting on this method. He refused to adopt the methods taught to him in barber school, 
such as aiming for efficiency over quality time, and he believes it has been key to 
building his customer base. Adam had never seen it done, but his computer repair 
business has only survived by bartering services. Greg is waiting to see whether his 
experiment pays off in the long run. When he started his kitchen equipment cleaning 
business, he was shocked to find the degreasing chemicals were dumped down the city 
drains. He worked with the city chemists to develop the first citric-based solvent, which 
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the city estimates would save them $200,000 a year and reduce residential flooding if 
used industry-wide in Dayton. An amazing innovation, but it took someone who was 
willing to fail, as Greg tells it:  
Greg: But I talked to [a friend that worked in the industry] before because I spent almost 
all my money setting up the company to be identical to my competitors. And what I found 
out after the first job we did, was that I was going to have to invest in this new chemical. 
Not only that, I needed a bigger trailer because my stuff wasn't set up enough to haul that 
kind of weight. And I needed to haul multiple 55 gallon drums. That's another $5000 
worth of equipment that I didn't have the money for. .. I went again and just spent every 
penny I had left and got all that stuff we needed. Took a chance on it. It's been much 
more successful going with this. They suggested that I didn't, that I just did it like 
everybody else. And it just wasn't, I think when companies get bigger they don't take 
chances as much.  
Whether it is local problem solving in one’s day to day job or more radical trials 
in starting a business venture, the tendency of traditional entrepreneurs to reject 
institutional knowledge may help avoid lock-in and path dependent decline. Cognitive 
lock-in stems from too close a connection among a region’s main actors (e.g. policy-
makers, chambers of commerce, higher education institutes or within an industry cluster) 
and too little connection to knowledge outside of that network (Hassink, 2005; Martin & 
Sunley, 2007). Traditional entrepreneurs are likely to search for unconventional solutions 
through their own trial and error in business. Indeed, entrepreneurs in Raleigh and 
Dayton referred to a special commitment, something different about being an 
entrepreneur than being self-employed. Eli described entrepreneurship as “a different 
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kind of drive.” They talked about there being a moment when one has to decide whether 
they planned to be a real entrepreneur. In Kenneth’s crowd, they say you have 
“established yourself” when that moment comes and you commit to “going out and 
getting it” each and every day. Perhaps it is counter-intuitive that being established means 
commitment to an ongoing search effort. But it is the search behavior associated with 
entrepreneur personality traits that make traditional entrepreneurs an interesting potential 
component of regional resilience.  
Again, these data cannot speak to whether this search behavior is unique to 
traditional versus high skill entrepreneurs. But the variety they can potentially add by 
accessing knowledge from informal sources is a departure from the literature on high 
skill entrepreneurship. Although business networks were reported as an important 
information source by 44 percent of interviewees, a number of other sources were also 
very common (see Table 4-4). Moreover, sixteen of the 27 interviewees had negative 
things to say about formal business organizations, even when they took part in them. 
Table 4-4 Percentage of Interviewees that Discussed the Network 
Network  type 
Percent  
(n=27) Example 
Other networks 63% 
Acquired money from old friend/family; 
learned of available real estate from State 
Licensing Board representative  
Customer or supplier 56% 
Learned of a new, top-selling product for the 
local market from a customer 
Succession 48% Had a parent/close relative entrepreneur 
Business organization 44% 
Got a new business idea from another 
member- Chamber of Commerce, 
Transmission Association 
Industry competitor 33% 
Got new customer through a competitor 
referral  
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Former colleague 26% Met a business partner in trade school 
Service organization 19% 
Accessed new markets through the group- 
Knights of Columbus, Veterans Club, church 
Anti-formal networks 59% 
Disliked the growth focus of the Chamber of 
Commerce 
 
A handful of interviewees were fully anti-institution in their views. Fred felt the chamber 
of commerce was a waste of money and his required continuing optical education classes 
taught how to cheat customers. Similarly, Sam believed business groups focused too 
much on economic growth when he was looking to make his mark in the community. 
That is not to say that the sources of knowledge for traditional entrepreneurs are not 
limited in their own right. But from a regional perspective, having a business contingent 
that is committed to going their own way helps maintain needed knowledge diversity. 
Still, this contingent is present in regional environments of ascent and stagnation. Thus, 
the question for resilience at the regional level is the extent to which traditional 
entrepreneurs are connected to actors outside their working class neighborhood.  
4. Turnkey spinoffs and second hand startups in stagnant regions warrant 
further investigation. 
Although it was surprising how often the same themes arose in conversations with 
Dayton and Raleigh entrepreneurs, two variations on how businesses are started are 
noteworthy. Both phenomena are unique to Dayton (see Table 4-5). Spinoff firms are a 
well-studied method of cluster growth in regional development (Boschma & Frenken, 
2011; Klepper, 2010). Traditional entrepreneurs had many examples of passing on or 
receiving vital resources or information from a parent firm. For example, Harris felt he 
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passed on a necessary survival strategy to a martial arts student/instructor, which was to 
balance adult classes with offerings for children. That person’s refusal to follow the 
strategy led to the Dojo’s quick demise, according to Harris. But strategies and routines 
are not the only mechanism for spinoff creation in Dayton. Harris called it a "turnkey 
operation" when students paid him to physically establish their Dojo and clientele, an 
activity he has done several times. Fred is a successful eyeglass store owner who has 
been asked to start similar stores on a number of occasions. He negotiates the lease and 
gets the new entrepreneur a good deal. He also sets up the interior. He created a turnkey 
operation for free for his apprentice, but he typically charges significant money for this 
service (up to $33,000) to those he meets in the optical trade organization.  
Rather than passing along a substantive piece of knowledge, as was the case in 
spinoffs in Silicon Valley and Akron's automotive industry, successful parent companies 
in Dayton are passing on more general entrepreneur skills and information. Turnkey 
spinoffs may be a useful means to develop entrepreneurs in a stagnant environment, but 
they may also serve to reduce the variety within the system by limit the search behavior. 
Traditional entrepreneurs that copying past routines through turnkey spinoffs may result 
in less resilient regions, a conclusion supported by the chronic slow-burn challenges in 
Dayton that are not evident in Raleigh.  
Table 4-5. Percentage of Entrepreneurs in Each Region that Described a New Firm 
Behavior  
Interview code 
Raleigh 
(n=9) 
Dayton 
(n=18) 
Turnkey spinoffs 0% 22% 
Second hand startups 0% 39% 
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A second variation on a known concept is the use of second hand goods and 
discount items to “startup” a new venture. Over a third of the entrepreneurs interviewed 
in Dayton mentioned their use of thrift stores and pawn shops to buy needed equipment, 
such as tools and shelving. Adam even sought second hand goods from customers and 
other local owners to keep his business afloat.  
Adam: But I've kind of got the gift of gab. And I like to barter a lot too. And bartering has 
gotten me a lot of stuff that I've needed. 
Jen: Like what? 
Adam: Just going to these local business. Like, you get to know somebody and they need 
some help. For instance, the car place across the street, we do some electronics work for 
them. Their computers break down, we give them a good deal and if we have a car issue, 
then we can trade out that way. They hook us up, like no labor charges, just the parts. So 
I go around a lot, especially if I know someone is in need. And they go 'oh I don't know if 
I have the money to do that' and I go, well what do you have to trade? Do you have old 
computers sitting at your house? Because we'll recycle those and get money for them. So 
it's a lot of bartering too to get me to where I've been because I haven't had the money in 
my pocket to really spend out for anything. 
Although Raleigh entrepreneurs also started their business with low overhead, 
such as buying tools on payment plans or using friends to help set up their store, no 
Raleigh entrepreneurs discussed a strategy of buying second hand goods. These 
secondary markets, as they appear to be, could increase regional adaptation by lowering 
the financial risk of firm creation. Angel investors and other flexible capital programs are 
promoted to advance innovation. But it should be no surprise that traditional 
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entrepreneurs also lack small and flexible programs to access financial capital (Servon et 
al., 2010). Servon et al. (2010) also found that many entrepreneurs were unlikely to apply 
to the microloan programs that do exist, which resonates with the anti-institution 
sentiment I found among my interviewees. Positive intervention in a second hand goods 
market offers an alternative way to promote successful business development within the 
milieu of traditional entrepreneurs in stagnant regions. It also supports a more charitable 
firm routine, as discussed early and demonstrated again in Adam’s comment. These data 
do not allow for closer analysis, but regional variation in the character of spinoff and 
startup businesses warrants further investigation. 
Conclusion 
This analysis used interview data to explore potential relationships between 
traditional entrepreneurs and regional resilience. A systems framework suggests that a 
region’s capacity for resilience to external challenges can be found in the amount of 
variety available in the system, an optimal amount of connectivity between types of 
variety, and the balance of exploring and exploiting behavior in the system agents. Given 
the economic climates of Raleigh and Dayton, it seems the behavior of traditional 
entrepreneurs should be different in these contexts. Where Raleigh entrepreneurs work 
within, and potentially help generate a forward-moving economy, Dayton entrepreneurs 
must work within, or are potentially contributing to, a macro environment of stagnation.  
Based on findings in Chapter 3, I was first interested in whether there were 
regional differences in how the entrepreneurs’ worked as a group. I found that 
collaborative relationships help entrepreneurs alter their services when times got tough 
and keep them afloat when their own advertising efforts were not producing. If industry 
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linkages that demonstrate positive externalities are more likely in the ascendant region, it 
would argue for a positive relationship between sub-regional clusters and regional 
resilience. It would also suggest that cluster theory could be usefully extended from 
economic growth outcomes to resilience, when the theory is applied to traditional 
entrepreneurs. 
It was surprising then, that the results of this analysis show many more 
similarities than differences in Raleigh and Dayton entrepreneurs. The challenges they 
described, their balance of exploiting and exploring and instances of cluster behavior 
(generating spinoffs) were not markedly different. As the literature review makes clear, 
resilience is a complicated concept and it lacks the standard metrics used in economic 
growth analyses. For example, are entrepreneurs important for recovering from slow-burn 
or acute shock challenges, and are they important for recovery or for avoiding them in the 
first place? The networks described by entrepreneurs in this study are more likely 
important for faster recovery from downturns than for preventing them. They most 
clearly argue against a role for traditional entrepreneurs in avoiding or recovering from 
slow-burn challenges. But even this conclusion is premature. It could be that traditional 
entrepreneurs are key to combating lock-in, and they are better connected to other parts 
of the economic system in Raleigh than in Dayton and that explains their ascendant and 
stagnated conditions, respectively. Alternatively, traditional entrepreneurs may have no 
impact in ascendant regions, but are a major contributor to why stagnant regions do not 
fully descend into chaos. The answer is difficult to determine, even without the limitation 
of a small sample and short time frame. These data do not yet offer an extension of 
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cluster theory to regional resilience, but their potential relationship to acute shock 
resilience is promising. 
Importantly, the analysis found that traditional entrepreneurs, at the individual 
level, demonstrate resilience characteristics commensurate with complex adaptive 
systems theory. Thus, the findings inform resilience theory on its own, outside of cluster 
theory. I found that entrepreneurs in both regions offer a potential source of variety in the 
balance of economic and social logic they use to pursue their business (i.e. charitable 
profit-seeking). They also demonstrate search behavior that may be particularly effective 
at generating variety because it is often established through trial and error. These 
behaviors describe how traditional entrepreneurs may help regions continually adapt and 
transform, through short and long term challenges. Their effect is most evident at the sub-
regional level because their social networks appear limited to similar working class 
neighborhoods, but depending on their connection to other parts of the region, their 
resilience contribution could be region-wide.   
 Although this analysis is intended to be exploratory, a limitation of the study and 
threat to these conclusions is that I cannot determine if these behaviors and attributes are 
unique to traditional entrepreneurs, versus corporate competitors or high skill 
entrepreneurs for example. There are some factors supporting their uniqueness. 
Entrepreneurs that work in high tech industries do not often provide a direct service to a 
customer. Thus they do not have the opportunity to enact community focused business 
goals by how the business is operated. Corporate service providers may interact directly 
with customers, but they are limited by company policy on some matters. Another word 
of caution is that ‘unsuccessful’ firms are excluded from the analysis. Entrepreneurs I 
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interviewed have been in business since 1996 on average. The rate of non-adaptive 
behavior could be found in higher failure rates in one region over the other.  
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                                                  CHAPTER 
5 –IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The wealth of research on industry clusters and innovation networks is in stark 
contrast to the considerable gap in our knowledge of traditional entrepreneurship. This 
dissertation has offered some of the first evidence of spatially clustered networks in the 
home remodeling, lawn care services, hair dressing, and other traditional businesses. It 
rounds out the large literature that documents regional clustering among entrepreneur 
start-ups and export-oriented firms (e.g. Acs & Armington, 2006; Glaeser, Kerr, et al., 
2010; Powell et al., 1996). It also makes fuller the urban affairs and sociological studies 
on disadvantaged entrepreneurs by highlighting the positive aspects of their collaborative 
work conditions (e.g. Fairlie, 2005; Valdez, 2011; Sassen, 2001). Together, these 
contributions point to the commonalities among entrepreneurs, outside of and regardless 
of their educational attainment. Perhaps most important for policy, the study identifies a 
role for traditional entrepreneurs—clustered or not—in regional resilience. Until now, 
this literature too has failed to incorporate entrepreneurs outside of the university context 
(e.g. Saxenian, 1994; Simmie & Martin, 2010).  
Innovation scholars have not only conceptualized entrepreneurial activity in a way 
that ignores a sizable portion of the entrepreneur population, but qualitative case studies 
have been confined to very large cities on the East and West coasts, which are largely 
anomalies in the American landscape. This research and its findings are a unique 
contribution to the conversation on innovation because the neighborhoods under study 
are unlike the large and densely populated New York City neighborhoods studied by 
scholars like Jane Jacobs and Saskia Sassen, or the Boston region studied by Walter 
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Powell and AnnaLee Saxenian, or even the Silicon Valley area, with its density and 
proximity to San Francisco. Raleigh, North Carolina and Dayton, Ohio better represent 
typical American regions and neighborhoods because they are mid-sized, have average 
population densities and have no major public train transport. This means they rely 
significantly on cars to travel between different parts of the metropolitan area, which has 
implications for the frequency and diversity of network building. In turn, different 
network structures have implications for the types of cluster policies enacted in different 
regions. 
In this final chapter, I summarize the findings from all parts of the dissertation 
and offer their implications for both research and practice. The parts include the 
quantitative and qualitative answer to the question of whether traditional entrepreneurs 
cluster (concentrate) in particular working class neighborhoods and whether firm 
relationships, linkages and spillovers (agglomeration) explain clustering. It also includes 
the implications regarding how traditional entrepreneurs contribute to the resilience of 
regions or neighborhoods. I conclude with some brief reflections on the future of 
traditional entrepreneurship in a knowledge-based economy. 
Future Research and Policy Implications of Traditional Entrepreneur Clusters 
The first part of this dissertation was focused on the locational Gini coefficient 
calculated for 12 representative regions in the United States and found that self-employed 
workers do cluster in neighborhoods more than other types of workers, but it is a very 
minor degree of clustering. Further analysis indicated that the regional Gini coefficients 
were somewhat unreliable. This may be attributable to data reliability issues that the 2010 
Decennial Census can help confirm or dispute, but my sense is that self-employment 
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clustering in working class neighborhoods is indeed minor and variation in neighborhood 
self-employment (outside of densely populated and walker-friendly regions) is 
attributable to other factors, such as unusually high numbers of government workers in 
neighborhoods near a military base. This is further supported by the fact that the 
important networks and industry linkages that the entrepreneurs themselves described 
were not confined to the neighborhood of their residence or business. 
The interviews, however, indicated that the geographic component of 
entrepreneurs’ social networks did matter. The competitors, customers, service 
organization members and other local business owners in their networks were not from 
across the metro area, but were most often located in other working class neighborhoods, 
rather than in well-off suburbs or areas of extreme poverty. The results suggest widening 
the geographic scope of traditional entrepreneur cluster analysis to something larger than 
a neighborhood or census tract, but smaller than a metropolitan region. Entrepreneurs in 
traditional service industries are likely to have incomes that restrict their housing options 
to particular neighborhoods, so in some sense it is no surprise that their social networks 
have spatial limitations. But within those areas, we may still find regions whose business 
owners have closer cognitive, social and institutional proximity that lead to more learning 
and sharing, and more supportive environments for entrepreneurship. The clustering 
process would be similar to that found in Silicon Valley and any other regional clusters: 
there is not necessarily a natural (sub)regional advantage or disadvantage to traditional 
entrepreneurship. However, historical circumstances can start a trend in self-employment 
that, after building in a self-reinforcing cycle over the years, eventually results in a 
bifurcation into clustered and non-clustered entrepreneur regions.  
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This research uncovered previously unknown linkages and spillovers among 
traditional entrepreneurs that mirror the positive externalities at the heart of regional 
clusters. One person’s investment in a storefront or in a reputation of quality and fairness, 
can be shared at a lower cost with the group. Now that the basic tenant of those 
relationships has been identified, much work needs to be done to understand their 
character in greater depth. An important next step is to go further in identifying the type 
of proximity that links these workers as an interdependent group, and the extent to which 
the linkages map to spatial configurations of the city. It was suggested in Chapter 4 that 
the entrepreneurs in working class areas may share certain norms of charitable behavior 
within their business, which could be attributed to cognitive proximity (i.e. world views). 
But future research needs to determine if that is a criterion by which the entrepreneurs 
build their collaborative networks. Geographic distance would have a minimal influence 
on traditional entrepreneur networks then, but charitable profit-seeking could be a 
prerequisite to gaining the information or resources that allow them to be more successful 
as a group. Importantly, such a situation would directly link entrepreneur clusters with 
sub-regional or even regional resilience. 
Lastly, and along these same lines, if geographic proximity is not the primary 
facilitator of clusters, the self-reinforcing effects of intra- and inter-industry referral 
processes should be more closely assessed. Understanding the number, source and 
strength of these types of ties could offer evidence for how nascent clusters gain their 
momentum, and why some clusters can withstand external forces, such as a box store 
locating near them, and some fail. In fact, the ‘life-cycle’ of clusters is an entire research 
thread (Menzel & Fornahl, 2009) that could be applied to the traditional entrepreneur 
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population. This research may help tease apart when in their firm growth that local 
service providers benefit the most from the collaborative relationships of a cluster, and 
when in the cluster growth, the region benefits the most.  
The policy implications of this research relate to neighborhood or sub-regional 
cluster initiatives. It seems unlikely that the same policy strategies used for high skill 
clusters would be effective with traditional entrepreneurs. One lesson that should be 
taken from regional cluster programs is that new clusters cannot be created from scratch 
to mirror other regions’ models of success. Doing so amounts to putting governments in 
the position of ‘picking industry winners,’ which is a highly centralized mode of 
economic decision-making (Cortright, 2006). Since the evidence and resilience impact of 
neighborhood clusters is not overwhelming, this is an even bigger risk for traditional 
entrepreneurship. 
Mimicking strategies used in other contexts can also have unexpected results 
when the underlying motivations of the target populations are different, such as the 
profit-maximization assumption. A key lesson (which supports other neighborhood-level 
studies of entrepreneurs) is that ‘good’ or ‘successful’ entrepreneurship should not be 
measured by profits because the measure misses the ‘good’ outcomes entirely. 
Traditional entrepreneurs may be purposefully diverting potential profits for social goals 
and in so doing, intercepting the downward spiral of economic recession, natural disasters 
and other economic shocks, before their momentum is too great.  
As would be expected from a profit maximization standpoint, a handful of 
entrepreneurs brought up tax and regulation at some point in our conversation, including 
concerns about health care reform legislation. Slightly more entrepreneurs mentioned 
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concerns with local policy, such as cumbersome rules on workers compensation and 
economic revitalization programs gone bad. Still, other interviewees thought tax and 
regulation were currently more beneficial to their business than not. For instance, John 
mentioned that he already offered health care to his full-time and part-time employees, 
but it is expensive and he was glad they would get federal assistance to pay for it. Fred 
believed that health care reform would allow his optical shop to better compete with 
corporations for qualified employees. He does not currently offer health care and felt the 
universal plan would make it less of a disincentive to work for a small business.  
One option is to derive no cluster policies from this analysis and to continue to 
research the appropriate geographic scope of clustering and measure its impacts before 
acting. On the other hand, one of the most basic but important policy implications from 
this research is that traditional entrepreneurs, like high skill start-ups and larger export 
firms, may benefit from group-focused programs, not just the tax and regulation 
reductions most often discussed in public policy. Traditional entrepreneurs’ small firm 
size and local service focus does not preclude them from demonstrating some of the same 
group phenomena of interest and concern to policymakers. If we are to heed Gottlieb's 
(1997) call discussed in Chapter 2, research must go beyond measuring and describing 
current states, to suggesting what is possible for improving or sustaining neighborhoods.  
If subregional networks of entrepreneurs could have positive benefits for neighborhoods 
and individuals, even it is not already occurring, the policy question should be how best 
to facilitate those networks.  
On that note, the other option Cortright advocates besides letting clusters grow 
without intervention is that cluster strategies should build on the unique strengths and 
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history of the area. For the traditional entrepreneur population in the areas studied, it 
seems that the formal industry and business organizations created for regional clusters are 
not the best fit. However, it is important that interviewees in this study perceived 
connections to customers and other informal networks as contributors to their success 
because policy that facilitates these connections will likely come most naturally to the 
target population. Helping traditional entrepreneurs connect to their customers or to other 
business owners within service organizations, for example, would be more appropriate 
because these types of networks more naturally align with the objectives of traditional 
business owners. This could mean simply advertising these service organizations to 
business owners. Indeed, policy strategies should avoid working through formal business 
organizations due to the negative impression many traditional entrepreneurs have of 
them.  
Unlike business development in areas already suffering from high poverty and 
physical decay, supporting entrepreneur networks could help combat the external forces 
that ultimately lead to business closures and neighborhood decline. These forces are often 
referred to as a vicious cycle because the causes of decline are so varied, interdependent, 
and cumulative, and they are especially resistant to policy interventions. Bottom-up 
policy interventions can be most effective in these situations because they maximize local 
information about the nuances of social groups. Policy strategies that effect work 
conditions rather than target specific places for redevelopment or create incentives 
toward specific ends allow entrepreneurs (who interviews showed clearly have an 
attachment to place when they have a physical location) to adapt their business in ways 
that make sense for their current system of operation.  
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Technology is a great way to affect work conditions without prescribing one-size-
fits-all solutions. I found that traditional entrepreneurs were accustomed to using some 
form of technology, whether it was social media to advertise or software to search car 
part databases. About half of the interviewees discussed the importance (or love) of 
learning in their business. Mobile devices are especially useful because the entrepreneurs 
I spoke with were almost never behind a desk during their work day. Using a cell phone 
as a credit card processor, for example, has been adopted by taxi drivers, farmer’s market 
sellers, and other local businesses without a physical building. This emerging practice 
might be a useful approach to share considering some interviewees discussed the 
difficulty of hunting down payments from customers. Electronic forums are another 
technology that may facilitate networks. For instance, they could allow home-remodelers 
to easily and quickly find complementary services for large or unique projects could 
connect workers from different parts of the region. Websites like TaskRabbit.com allow 
the same connections for finding people to do small errands (e.g. grocery shopping), 
while ELance.com and other technical sites allow connections for obtaining professional 
services. A cell phone application that performed the same function for accessing 
suppliers, co-workers or information in traditional trades would not be a substitute for the 
current method of building and trialing inter-personal referrals or old acquaintances, but 
it could supplement that method when a traditional entrepreneur is in a pinch or needs a 
unique or differently skilled co-worker. 
Future Research and Policy Implications for Regional Resilience 
Research on building regional resilience is still new and it has only recently 
become a big enough policy concern to divert attention away from regional growth 
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efforts. Prior to the Great Recession, some people found significant gains in the rapid 
growth of the economy, but few of those individuals, and few of the American’s who saw 
no profits from the boom, weathered the downturn easily. That is why it so important to 
explore new and varied ways to increase regional resilience. The downward cycle has 
only recently abated, but with a jobless recovery in which firms saw increased revenue 
but have failed to hire more workers. In this study, I explored how a significant portion of 
the workforce—traditional entrepreneurs—adapts to challenges and changes to see what 
could be learned about resilience from their responses.  
The initial cluster analysis revealed that traditional entrepreneur networks are 
more likely to increase the longevity of a business than to grow a cluster through more 
employment or profits. This is interesting because withstanding forces that would hasten 
closure is one part of resilience. I found that clustering activity (e.g. spinoffs, intra-firm 
linkages) was largely the same in the ascendant region of Raleigh and the stagnant 
economic environment of Dayton, which could indicate that groups of traditional 
entrepreneurs do not play a role in preventing long periods of decline caused by 
challenges like the exodus of manufacturing firms seen in Dayton (and other Rustbelt 
regions) over the past thirty years. In future research, it will be important to 
systematically separate different challenges in the study design. Regional shocks, like a 
plant closure, were also part of the resilience analysis because the entrepreneurs in both 
environments have been affected by the country’s recent recession. It was difficult to 
disentangle the effects of an acute shock from the long-term trend of deindustrialization, 
but the current data offer hypotheses (discussed next) for more systematic testing.  
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Previous research found that lower skilled workers do not prevent a downturn, but 
their presence can soften it or make recovery faster (Acs & Armington, 2006; St. Clair et 
al., 2011). This research offers first-hand accounts of how entrepreneurs in traditional 
trades may contribute to faster recoveries and softer falls. Charitable profit-seeking was a 
firm routine uncovered in both Raleigh and Dayton. It runs counter to the profit-
maximizing entrepreneur that many economic policies rely on inherently. Trial and error 
learning was also a consistent finding among entrepreneurs in both regions. Their distaste 
for school and industry-based information and their consistent exploration of new ways to 
promote firm success is also a rejection of supposed business norms and best practices. 
Both of these behaviors relate to resilience because they offer, and even increase, variety 
in the economic system. Variety provides alternatives when dominate firm strategies fail 
in the face of external challenges, while increasing the amount of variety offers more 
adaptation material for firms to overcome those challenges.  
Specifically, there are two potential hypotheses that take into account the type of 
challenge described in resilience frameworks. First, it may be the case that charitable 
profit-seeking is especially necessary for resilience to acute shocks because traditional 
entrepreneurs have the experience to quickly judge which customers they can and should 
be more flexible with in terms of amount, timing and form of payment. This—the local 
knowledge of personal relationships—would provide a nuanced understanding of how 
limited local resources should be allocated. A second hypothesis is that the search 
behavior of trial and error learning is especially pertinent for avoiding long-term decline 
because it instills constant monitoring of local conditions and a high risk tolerance. 
Future research should identify the ways in which these behaviors are unique from other 
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types of firm and industry structures. For example, to what extent do export-oriented 
entrepreneurs rely on trial and error learning, to what extent do corporate service 
providers in traditional industries exhibit these behaviors, and are the behaviors related 
both to the small size and to the industries of traditional entrepreneurs? If they prove to 
be unique, traditional entrepreneurs may hold an unexpected answer to what helps build 
regional resilience capacity.  
In the meantime, policymakers may find ways to facilitate these behaviors. Trial 
and error experience was described as a vital learning tool by many traditional 
entrepreneurs. Reducing the costs of failure when exploring for new business strategies 
will maximize the ability of experience learning to produce innovations or to avoid 
regional (or at least neighborhood) decline in the face of external changes. A somewhat 
radical policy option is to facilitate the bartering networks seen in Dayton. This approach 
has been underway in some Greek towns hard hit by unemployment, where 
municipalities have created an alternative currency and website for trading services 
(Poggioli, 2011). The Greek system is a good example because it also addresses the 
natural problems of tax evasion in bartering networks. These types of informal exchanges 
can lessen the financial setback of a failed venture. Policies that allow business failure 
must of course be monitored so that public money is not wasted on bad ideas. But the 
policy insight is that some amount of ‘waste’ may be an efficient allocation of resources 
when viewing them in the context of the larger portfolio of investment. Similar to how a 
venture capital firm knows that only a portion of its investments will see a positive return, 
considering a region’s overall development portfolio risk will increase tolerance for 
failure of one policy and thus increase risk-taking, and potentially long-run rewards. 
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This indicates a different overall policy approach to economic development. 
Rather than maximizing growth, a better goal may be to manage the variability in 
neighborhood development life-cycles. It may appear counterintuitive and inconsistent 
with current policy design, but while alluring and certainly important during some 
periods of development, fast growth makes regions more susceptible to abrupt or severe 
downturns that can be much more devastating for the individual worker to bounce back 
from. Fast growth may also disrupt vital social networks that prevent neighborhood 
decline because a heavy stream of people relocating to the area affects housing prices and 
land values. Traditional entrepreneurship is one way to prevent over-investment in 
growth capacity (e.g. large export firms). These results have broader implications than 
just entrepreneurs and neighborhood development. Understanding the actions of different 
players in the system can provide insight into managing variability in other systems. For 
example, determining a set of common parent responses to falling student test scores may 
help map the decline of a school to know when a redoubling of efforts will have better 
than expected gains. Or trial and error learning could be used to induce change in small 
business when current conditions are problematic, but the path out is unclear.  From a 
policy perspective, it will be important to identify indicators that alert policymakers when 
a region is moving from a stable and resilient condition to a trajectory in which forward 
momentum makes a course change more difficult. 
These implications of managing economic variability become much more 
palatable to growth advocates if the benefits of the entrepreneur behaviors identified here 
extend beyond their own networks and beyond certain groups of neighborhoods, to the 
region as a whole. Ultimately, to assess the impact of traditional entrepreneurs on 
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regions, a much better understanding of the connections between component parts of the 
region is needed. The innovation literature (Martin & Sunley, 2007), the community 
development literature (Woolcock, 1998) and the social capital literature (Granovetter, 
1983) all point to the importance of balancing inward and outward focused connections 
to thrive economically. The following excerpt from an entrepreneur in Dayton, Ohio 
describes why. Tim moved his home-based barber service to a nearby shop in 2011 when 
he finished barber school. He wanted to do things differently than his predecessors. To 
ensure broader appeal he strategically reaches for clients outside his immediate 
neighborhood and social group.  
Jen: Well you also have the space of the other two [chairs]. Do you think you'll hire 
somebody? 
Tim: We’ll see. To hire other barbers, they have to bring something to the table. It's not 
just putting a guy in there to rent and make some money. I need somebody that brings a 
different, they have to be an individual. I don't like people that do what everybody else 
does. I like different individuals. You know what I'm saying?  
Jen: Did that work with the Turkish guy you had [working here previously]? 
Tim: For sure. It helped the vibe because with us, with our clientele, he had all his guys 
and I had my guys. And then eventually we kind of interact and the customers kind of 
switch. Rarely. For the most part they're loyal to whoever they go to. It worked good.  
Thus regional cluster research and policy that addresses traditional 
entrepreneurship would benefit from a sub-regional focus and a bridging component. Tim 
is a good indicator that these communities may be receptive to such a strategy. Bridging 
is important for the entrepreneur, but also to ensure that traditional entrepreneurship is an 
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asset in regional resilience. Although there have long been social and physical obstacles 
to connecting different neighborhoods and people in a region, perhaps regional resilience 
is the policy goal that will help unite different constituencies under the effort. 
Conclusion 
If policymakers are serious about reducing unemployment and maintaining the 
American legacy of entrepreneurship, they should not ignore small, traditional 
entrepreneurs providing local services that communities depend on. This may run counter 
to mounting arguments that the value created by U.S. businesses is in knowledge 
production, rather than goods and services. Networks innovating at the frontier are indeed 
assets to a region. And ensuring that our entire labor force meets basic educational 
competencies will be necessary to compete in the global economy. However, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the scores of direct services currently needed on a daily 
basis are going to become automated or outsourced. In fact, it should be a priority to 
ensure that they are not because front line service providers are in a pivotal role to 
respond to variability caused by individual and more global challenges. When economic 
times are tough, regions benefit from a service sector that can respond with charitable 
profit-seeking. When a problem arises that has never been seen before, regions benefit 
from people who are well-versed at going-it-alone and taking risks. 
The more that individuals are empowered to act in ways that result in real change, 
the more wisdom that can accumulate in regions, which are sorely in need of it. This is 
essentially the goal of bottom-up development policies. Policymakers and analysts have 
spent many decades trying to solve problems that are either solved until an external 
condition changes, or never truly solved or even mitigated. It may be worrisome to both 
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parties to invest in capacities and conditions and reduce investments in aggregate 
analyses, but it seems that it could be the next great experiment. And job creation is the 
perfect place to start.  
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Term Definition 
Chapter with 
more information 
Traditional 
entrepreneur (TE) 
A self-employed person with a high 
school degree but no college degree, 
typically running a very business in 
the consumer or business services 
industry Chapter 2 and 3 
TE cluster 
A high concentration of traditional 
entrepreneurs living in the same 
neighborhood Chapter 2 and 3 
Innovation 
New products, new processes and 
new forms of organization that 
generate commercial (profit or 
nonprofit) value Chapter 2 
Regional resilience 
The capacity of a city or metropolitan 
area to respond to social, 
demographic and economic change  Chapter 4 
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Name 
(alias) Industry 
Start 
Year 
Full time 
employee 
Home
based Age 
College 
grad-
uate 
Race/ 
ethnicity 
Raleigh cluster 
      
Jim 
Automotive parts 
and art 1973 No Yes 69 No 
 
George 
Hardware and 
lawn store 1980 Yes No 58 No 
 Stuart Martial arts studio 1982 No No 40s No Black 
Eli Barber shop 1996 No No 40s No Black 
Kenneth Lawn service 1996 No Yes 40s Yes Black 
Matt 
Online advertising 
and computer 
assistance 2001 No Yes 43 No Black 
Sam Convenience store 2007 Yes No 34 No Non-US 
Julie Salon 2009 Yes No 40s No 
 Ed Mechanic shop 2011 No No 50s No 
 Dayton cluster 
      John Restaurant owner 1967 Yes No 60s Yes 
 Harris Martial arts studio 1980 No No 57 No Non-US 
Phil 
Transmission 
service 1989 Yes No 50s No 
 Ellie Cleaning service 1992 No Yes 70 No 
 
Gwen 
Military 
memorabilia store 1994 Yes No 63 Yes 
 Fred Eyeglass store 2002 Yes No 61 Yes 
 Derrick Home remodeling 2004 No Yes 40s No 
 
Adam 
Computer and 
electronics repair 2011 No No 39 No 
 
Tray 
Gun accessories 
and iPad board 
games 2011 No Yes 26 No 
 Dayton non-cluster 
      
William 
Wedding 
photography  1978 Yes No 60 Yes 
 
Nick 
Beer store and 
sandwich shop 1984 Yes No 59 No 
 Rebecca Salon and tanning 1986 No No 40s No 
 
Hanna 
Sewing 
alternations 1995 No No 40s No Non-US 
Hugh 
Janitorial and 
lawn service 2001 No Yes 50s No Black 
Vincent Mechanic shop 2006 No No 50s No Non-US 
Simon Home remodeling 2010 No Yes 37 No 
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Tim Barber shop 2011 No No 32 No Black 
Greg 
Restaurant 
equipment 
cleaning 2012 No Yes 30s No   
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Entrepreneur 
 Age (average) 47 
Female 19% 
Foreign-born 15% 
Non-white 37% 
College degree 19% 
Firm 
 Business start (average) 1996 
Has full-time employee(s) 30% 
Home-based business 33% 
Industry 
 Lawn/cleaning service (commercial and residential) 15% 
Salon/Barber 15% 
Auto service 11% 
Food or alcohol sales 11% 
Martial arts 7% 
Remodeling 7% 
Other 33% 
  Interview length (average) 61 min. 
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1.      Can you tell me a little bit about your [former] business (e.g. number of hours, split 
time with wage work, employees, office)? 
a.       Do [did] you enjoy it? 
 2.      How did you get started working for yourself (e.g. employment situation, financing)? 
a.       When, did you live here, did you move here? 
b.      Do you know other self-employed people (relatives, people around here), did 
that matter? 
 3.      How has your business changed over the years (e.g. hours, locations, employees)? 
a.       What about with the recession? Other challenges? 
b.      Were there any unique opportunities because of that challenging time (e.g. 
creativity, new clients, suppliers, employees)? 
 4.      What groups or program have you been a part for your business (e.g. SCORE, 
industry group)? 
a.       Where are they, how did you learn of them, what was experience with them? 
b.      What about formal training, classes, education? 
 5.      How do [did] you get new business (e.g. who do you talk to, advertising)? 
a.       Are clients from this neighborhood? 
b.      Do you use the local businesses around here? 
c.       What about competitors in the neighborhood? 
 6.      Have you helped your friends or neighborhoods who have their own business (e.g. 
advice, encouragement, info, networks, cash, trades)? 
a.       Have there been people that have been important to your business? 
b.      What do you look for in people that you go to for help or to work with (e.g. old 
friends, military, family, church members)? 
 7.     Are there things that would be different about your business if you lived in a different 
neighborhood in this city? 
a.       Would have started it in the first place? Would you be more or less success? 
b.      *Would you have stopped? 
c.       Is this a good neighborhood to live in if you’re self employed? 
 8.      Are there things that would be different about the neighborhood if your business 
wasn’t here? 
a.       That is, do you participate in government or hire people from around here? 
b.      What about before/after the recession? 
 9.     I’m also looking to talk to people in this neighborhood who used to be self-employed 
or are part-time self-employed. If there’s someone you would recommend, would you ask 
if it is ok that you send me their contact information? They can call me directly at the 
number on this invitation. 
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